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Abstract 
 The aims of the current thesis were three fold. The first aim was primarily 
methodological and attempted to determine the stimulus presentation that would 
produce the strongest IRAP effect. Experiment 1 set out to address this simple 
experimeental question. The key manipulation involved the presence or absence of 
the randomisation of the sample stimuli and/or the respponse options within the 
IRAP. The results indicated that the ramdomisation of the sample stimuli (with or 
without the randomisation of the response options) generated the strongest D-IRAP 
scores. Randomising the response options alone without randomising the samples also 
produced a significant IRAP effect, although this was smaller. The D-IRAP score that 
resulted from the static presentation of both samples and response options was almost 
negligible.  
The second aim of the thesis was to determine the utility of the IRAP as a 
measure of implicit attitudes to race and this was the core focus of Experiments 2 to 6. 
In the IRAP in Experiment 2, participants were simply required to relate the phrases 
WHITE PERSON and BLACK PERSON  to a range of simple positive and negative 
terms that could be readily categorised as safe and dangerous. We predicted that our 
Irish participants would show a pro- White and anti- Black bias. The D-IRAP trial-type 
scores were in part consistent with experimental predictions and showed a pro- White 
bias where White was safe, but not an anti-Black bias. In fact, participants 
significantly confirmed that Black was safe. This coincided with the explicit 
measures, on which participants indicated the absence of racial bias against Black 
people. 
In line with existing IAT evidence, to determine whether racial pictures would 
generate stronger IRAP effects than words, and to examine the potential role of 
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attentional weapon bias, the IRAP in Experiment 3 presented pictures of Black and 
White men holding guns. For correct responding, however, the presence of the guns 
was incidental and the discriminations among the pictures were based on race alone. 
We predicted that Irish participants would show a pro- White and anti- Black bias that 
was perhaps enhanced by the presence of the guns. Participants significantly 
confirmed that White was safe and Black was dangerous, although they also 
significantly confirmed that Black as safe. Hence, this was our first evidence of an 
anti- Black bias, but other effects were not entirely as expected. Again on the majority 
of explicit measures, participants indicated the absence of racial bias.  
In order to determine whether the anti-Black bias in the previous study did 
reflect the influence of the guns, Experiment 4 presented pictures of Black and White 
men holding mundane objects. We predicted that Irish participants would show a pro- 
White and anti- Black bias, even though both were holding mundane objects. 
Participants significantly confirmed that both White and Black were safe, but had 
mixed views of either as dangerous. Hence, the anti- Black bias from the previous 
study was now lost, suggesting that the weapons had facilitated the effect. Again, on 
the majority of the explicit measures, participants indicated the absence of racial bias. 
In line with previous IAT studies of race and to examine further the outcomes 
from the previous studies, Experiment 5 presented pictures of Black and White men 
holding both guns and mundane objects. We predicted that Irish participants would 
show a pro- White and anti- Black bias that may be differentially influenced by the 
items presented in the pictures. The four trial-types examined in the previous studies 
were sub-divided into eight to permit comparisons of the relative influence of the 
different items held in the pictures. Overall, seven of the eight trial-types were non- 
significant and participants only significantly confirmed that White men with 
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mundane objects were safe. In fact, close inspection of the non-significant effects 
indicated unexpected evidence of pro- Black bias. Again these agreed with the 
explicit measures, on which participants indicated the absence of racial bias. 
In Experiment 6, participants were presented with the same IRAP as the 
previous study, but were required to discriminate the objects in the pictures as the 
basis for correct responding and ignore race. That is, on consistent trials guns were 
always dangerous and mundane objects were always safe and correct responding on 
inconsistent trials was reverse (guns always safe and mundane objects dangerous). 
We predicted that Irish participants would categorise guns as dangerous and mundane 
objects as safe, but expected that these effects might be influenced by race. In this 
study, six of the eight were non-significant. Participants only significantly confirmed 
that Black with a gun was not safe and White with a gun was dangerous, but there 
was no evidence of clear influence of either items or race in the remaining effects. 
Again, the explicit measures indicated the absence of racial bias. 
The third aim of the current thesis was to examine the utility of the IRAP as a 
measure of clinically relevant implicit cognitions. Previous preliminary research had 
indicated strong IRAP effects that showed a positive bias towards the self in 
participants with a high explicit self-esteem. In Experiment 7, participants were 
required to indicate their agreement or disagreement with a range of statements that 
reflected high self-esteem (i.e. were positive about the self) or reflected low self-
esteem (i.e. were negative about the self). Because the study was aslo concerned with 
whether on not the IRAP would correlate with an explicit measure of self, the positive 
and negative statements presented in the IRAP were taken directly from the Roseberg 
Self-Esteem Scale (RSES) and particiants also completed this as an explicit measure. 
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We predicted that participants high on explicit self-esteem would relate the self with 
the positive self-statements and not relate the self with negative self-statements. 
The findings indicated that participants significantly confirmed that they 
agreed with the positive (high self-esteem) statements and significantly disconfirmed 
that they disagreed with them. They also disconfirmed that they agreed with the 
negaative statements, although this effect was non-significant. Although these 
findings were largely as expected from participants who all scored as high in self-
esteem on the explicit RSES, there was no significant correlation between the two 
measures. 
In Experiment 8, we used the IRAP to  explore implicit attitudes towards 
acceptance and avoidance. For this purpose, we selected undergraduate students who 
showed an xplicit propensity towards high acceptance/ low avoidance on the 
Acceptaance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ-2). In order to enhance the potential 
overlap  between the two types of measure, as we had done in Experiment 7, we took 
opposing satements directly from the AAQ and inserted them into the IRAP as target 
stimuli. The results indicated that participants significantly confirmed that they agreed 
with the acceptance statements, but all other effects were non-significant. Closer 
inspection of the trial-types, however, were as expected and showed that particpants 
disconfirmed that they agreed with the avoidance statements and confirmed that they 
disagreed with them. In spite of these outcomes, the IRAP data did not correlate 
significantly with the AAQ. 
The current reaearch program offered preliminary investigations of the utility 
of the IRAP as a measure of impicit attitudes to a range of psychological phenomena, 
including race, self-esteem and acceptance. Although the IRAP effects in many cases 
were not as significant and predicted, particularly in the context of race, there 
 x 
wasgood evidence thata further investigation would be promising. The findings here 
make a useful contribution to the small existing IRAP research base by highlighting 
key issues that influence IRAP outcomes in a range of areas. 
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Chapter 1 
General Introduction 
 
Relational Frame Theory (RFT) is a modern behavioural approach to human 
language and cognition. The basic account is built on the pivotal assumption that the 
behavioural units of language and higher-cognitive functioning are best defined in 
terms of derived stimulus relations (Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001). For 
RFT, derived relational responding is primarily arbitrary in nature and is governed by 
contextual cues via an appropriate history of multiple-exemplar training (see Barnes, 
1996; Barnes, & Holmes 1991; Barnes, & Roche, 1996; Hayes, & Hayes, 1989). The 
distinction between arbitrary responding and the types of non-arbitrary responding 
commonly observed in non-humans is an important distinction for RFT. For example, 
animals can be trained to select the larger, smaller, or dimmer stimulus from a range 
of choices (see Reese, 1968), but this behaviour is almost certainly governed by the 
formal properties of the stimuli involved (e.g. size). The complex functioning of 
specific contextual cues permits language-able humans to develop repertoires of 
relational responding that are arbitrary, and as such can control relations among 
stimuli that share no formal overlap whatsoever. For example, in many monetary 
systems smaller coins are often worth more than larger coins. For RFT, this relational 
responding is referred to as arbitrary applicable because it is governed by contextual 
cues established by social convention, rather than being governed by the physical or 
formal properties of the stimuli.  
According to RFT, contextual cues facilitate various patterns of relational 
responding that are collectively referred to as relational frames. All relational frames 
possess the same three properties of mutual entailment, combinatorial entailment and 
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the transfer or transformation of stimulus functions, but each is identified according to 
the core type of stimulus relations involved. Specifically, RFT describes frames of co-
ordination, opposition, distinction, hierarchy and perspective-taking, (Dymond, & 
Barnes, 1994).  
The term mutual entailment encompasses Sidman’s (1971) symmetrical 
responding, but also refers to responding that is not strictly symmetrical. For example, 
in a frame of co-ordination, if A is the same as B, then B is the same as A; that is, the 
relation is symmetrical. In a comparative frame, however, if A is better than B, then B 
is worse than A. The relations, therefore, are not symmetrical but they are mutually 
entailed.  
Similarly, the term combinatorial entailment encompasses Sidman’s 
transitivity, but also refers to relations beyond the scope of those commonly thought 
of as transitive. For example, transitive responding in the context of a frame of co-
ordination would entail that if A is the same as B, and B is the same as C, then A is 
the same as C. However, in the case of a frame of opposition, if A is the opposite of 
B, and B is the opposite of C, then the relation between A and C is one of sameness, 
not opposite. Therefore, the relations are not strictly transitive, but they are 
combinatorially entailed. That is, the relations between A and B and between B and C 
combine to entail the relations between A and C and between C and A. According to 
RFT, therefore, both transitivity and equivalence responding are instances of 
combinatorial entailment in which the trained relations are the same as the derived 
relations (Hayes et al, 2001). An alternative term that captures the property of 
reflexivity does not appear to be necessary for RFT. In any case, some researchers 
have questioned the utility of reflexivity as a defining property of derived relational 
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responding because such responding may be based upon either derived stimulus 
relations or formal similarity (Barnes, 1994).  
The third defining feature of RFT is a transfer or transformation of functions. 
When stimuli are involved in a relational frame, any psychological function attached 
to one of the stimuli may transfer through the frame to any, or all, of the other stimuli 
involved. If the relevant frame is one of co-ordination, for example, then a similar 
function will attach to each stimulus in the frame because the relations among them 
are all co-ordinated (e.g. Barnes, & Keenan, 1993). For example, if a child learns to 
stop talking when a teacher says “quiet” and this word participates in a relational 
frame of co-ordination with the Irish word "ciunas," then the child may stop talking 
when the teacher says "ciunas." For RFT, this effect is due to the function of the word 
“quiet” transferring to the word "ciunas" through the derived relation between the 
English and Irish words. If, however, the relational frame is not one of co-ordination 
the functions will be transformed in accordance with the relations involved. For 
example, if two stimuli participate in a frame of comparison, such that A is “more 
than” B, and B is established as discriminative for a low-response rate, A may acquire 
a discriminative function for a high response rate based of its “more than” relation 
with A.  
According to RFT, any stimuli may participate in a given instance of 
arbitrarily applicable relational responding, given the appropriate contextual cues. 
Hence, stimulus equivalence and other derived relational responses are viewed as a 
form of generalised operant behaviour. There is now a growing body of data that 
provides empirical support for the assumption that responding in accordance with the 
arbitrarily applicable relations of ‘different’, ‘opposite’, ‘perspective’ ‘comparison’ 
are forms of generalised operant responding (see Dymond, & Barnes, 1995). 
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Empirical Evidence for Relational Responding  
As well as generic support for the generalised operant nature of derived 
relational responding, numerous studies have also supported RFT’s identification of 
the various types of relational frames. Specifically, there is empirical evidence for co-
ordination relations (Barnes, Browne, Smeets, & Roche, 1995); comparison relations 
(Vitale, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & Campbell, 2008); opposition relations 
(Dymond, & Barnes, 1996); deictic frames of perspective (McHugh, Barnes-Holmes, 
O’Hora, & Barnes-Holmes, 2004); and even for relational responding between 
relational frames (Stewart, Barnes-Holmes, Roche, & Smeets, 2001).  
A variety of methodologies have been employed to examine derived relational 
responding. These include problem-solving procedures on a continuum for the very 
simple for use with young children to the very complex involving numerous 
overlapping relational networks. Other procedures employed in RFT research to date 
include: Match-to-Sample (MTS); respondent-type training procedures; and relational 
evaluative procedures (REPs). 
Problem Solving Procedures may be table-top or automated and are 
commonly employed with young participants (Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, 
Smeets, Strand and Friman, 2004). These researchers developed a problem-solving 
procedure as a means of testing and training co-ordination relations in a sample of 
young children. The methodology involved presenting each child with identically-
sized paper coins and describing how the coins compared to one another in terms of 
their value. The child was then asked to pick the coin that would ‘buy as many sweets 
as possible’. These interventions were successfully used to establish increasingly 
complex patterns of co-ordination responding in all participants, including 
generalisation to novel stimuli and novel experimenters. 
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Matching-to-sample (MTS) procedures have been the most commonly 
employed methodology in the study of stimulus relations. This generally involves 
training participants in a series of related conditional discriminations using arbitrary 
stimuli, such as nonsense syllables. For example, in the presence of the sample 
stimulus A1, participants must choose comparison B1 over the alternative comparison 
B2. In contrast, they must choose B2 (not B1) when the sample A2 is present. Hence 
the relations A1-B1 and A2-B2 are established. Subsequently, participants are then 
trained to select C1 in the presence of B1 (now a comparison rather than a sample) 
and C2 in the presence of B2. Hence, the additional relations B1-C1 and B2-C2 have 
also been established. Following the conditional discrimination training, participants 
are tested to determine if the expected untrained relations among the A and C stimuli 
have emerged as a result of training the baseline relations. For example, if presented 
with C1 participants should choose A1 and vice versa, and when presented with C2 
participants should choose A2 and vice versa. In this way, the MTS training 
established the co-ordination relations (also called stimulus equivalence classes) 
involving the A and C stimuli. Of course, MTS procedures have been effective in 
establishing many more complex patterns of relational responding than those in the 
current example (e.g. Stewart, Barnes-Holmes, Roche, & Smeets, 2001). 
The dominance of the MTS procedure as a methodology for studying stimulus 
relations has caused concern among some researches. Typically in behaviour analysis, 
core concepts are transituational and are thus not tied to specific experimental 
procedures (Barnes-Holmes, Dymond, Roche, & Grey, 1999). Consider for example, 
reinforcement, discrimination, primary stimulus generalisation and respondent 
conditioning. Each of these has been observed and manipulated in a variety of basic 
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and applied contexts. In contrast, equivalence relations in particular have been almost 
entirely tied to the MTS procedure for both experimental and applied purposes.  
It has been within this drive to develop new procedures for examining the 
multiple stimulus relations that RFT researchers, in particular, have made 
considerable efforts. Put simply, if the concept of derived relational responding is a 
valuable one, then it should be possible to study it in a variety of methodological 
contexts.  
The Respondent Training Procedure was first reported by Smeets, Leader and 
Barnes (1997). The methodology comprises two parts -- respondent-type training and 
an equivalence test (Leader, Barnes-Holmes, & Smeets, 2000; Leader, & Barnes-
Holmes, 2001). During respondent-type training, participants are exposed to up to six 
stimulus pairs presented with 0.5s inter-stimulus intervals and 3s. inter-pair intervals 
between each pair, that is 0.5s between pair members (e.g. AB) and 3s between pairs 
(e.g. between AB and BC). In the subsequent equivalence test, participants are 
presented with a three-choice MTS procedure that assesses the derived symmetry and 
equivalence relations based on the training. What is novel about respondent training, 
relative to MTS, is that it does not provide explicit, differential reinforcement for 
selecting any of the stimuli (as is the case with the standard conditional discrimination 
training). The methodology was, in fact, the first to demonstrate reliable equivalence 
responding without an experimental history of explicit differential reinforcement for 
MTS responding or an experimental history of successful equivalence testing.  
The Precursor to the Relational Evaluation Procedure (pREP) is based on the 
Go/No Go Procedure (e.g. D’Amato, & Colombo, 1985). Other similar preparations 
include go left/go right, yes/no, or same/different (D’Amato, & Worsham, 1974; 
Edwards, Jagielo, Zentall, & Hogan, 1982) procedures. The pREP was developed as a 
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methodology that is independent of the MTS paradigm in the training stage, but does 
rely on MTS in the testing phase. The pREP involves the presentation of two stimuli 
on each trial -- one conditional stimulus (CS) and one discriminative stimulus (Sd). 
On trials that combine a CS with a positive Sd, responding (for example, pressing the 
space bar) is reinforced, but not on trials that combine a CS with a negative Sd (in this 
case it is appropriate not to make any response and to wait for the next trial). That is, 
reinforcement is provided for responding to target relations (e.g. A1->B1 and A2-
>B2), but not for non-target relations (e.g. A1->B2 and A2->B1). Cullinan, Barnes 
and Smeets (1998) reported that although the pREP was as effective as MTS in 
producing symmetry, it was relatively ineffective in producing equivalence 
responding, where participants had not been previously exposed to a history of MTS 
training and testing (see also Cullinan, Barnes-Holmes, & Smeets, 2000). 
The Relational Evaluation Procedure (REP) was an extension of the pREP 
work and an attempt to rectify some of the weak equivalence performances that had 
been observed. Specifically, pREP researchers recognised the need to identify 
possible sources of contextual control that could be incorporated into the procedure 
(Cullinan, Barnes-Holmes, & Smeets, 2001). This involved replacing the “press” and 
“no press” responses on the space-bar with contextual cues for relations of “same” 
and “different”. In order for these functions to be established, participants were first 
trained, across a number of exemplars, to choose one arbitrary stimulus in the 
presence of identical stimuli (thereby establishing a “same” function for the arbitrary 
stimulus) and a second arbitrary stimulus in the presence of physically different 
stimuli (thereby establishing a “different” function for the second arbitrary stimulus).  
Once the “same” and “different” functions had been established for the two 
arbitrary stimuli, two response keys were assigned to these stimuli for subsequent 
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training and testing using the same procedure as the pREP. That is, participants 
pressed the “same” function key on CS-positive/Sd trials and pressed the “different” 
function key on CS-negative/Sd trials. Cullinan et al. (2001) reported found that the 
use of the contextual cues facilitated both symmetry and equivalence responding 
across participants. 
 
Relational Frames versus Stimulus Classes 
 An alternative traditional behavioural view has long proposed that stimulus 
relations and relational networks can be more readily accounted for by the established 
concept of stimulus classes (Donahoe, & Palmer, 1994). The core difference between 
this and RFT is that the former views stimulus classes as the central and most 
complex unit of derived relational responding, whereas multiple stimulus relations lie 
at the heart of RFT. This controversy has arisen, in part, from the fact that class 
formation can be understood as both a product and a process (Hayes et al., 2001). 
That is, the process of deriving equivalence relations always gives rise to the products 
-- reflexivity, symmetry and transitivity. Furthermore, stimulus generalisation is 
considered the basic behavioural process that permits the formation of stimulus 
classes. The classes of stimuli that emerge via the process of stimulus generalisation 
are thus defined as part of the product of that process (Hayes et al., 2001). However, 
when class formation is also taken to be a process, it is difficult to provide an 
explanation for its occurrence (Hayes, & Barnes, 1997).  
Perhaps the strongest argument against the use of the concept of stimulus 
classes in this context lies in the empirical evidence, especially from RFT research. 
For example, numerous studies have demonstrated contextually controlled, arbitrary 
responding in accordance with multiple stimulus relations such as same, different, 
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opposite and comparison. Indeed, extraordinarily complex patterns of responding can 
result from the simplest form of training. Consider the research by Steele and Hayes 
(1991) as a case in point. It is difficult to see how the concept of stimulus class can 
account for the complex and interconnected array of derived stimulus relations that 
emerged from the very basic establishment of “same” and “opposite” relations (see 
also Wulfert, & Hayes, 1988). 
 
Relational Frames versus Associations 
Another behavioural approach to stimulus relations hails from the more 
traditional concept of the association. Although much work here (mainly with non-
humans) pre-dates RFT and even stimulus equivalence, the concept of the association 
has in a sense been re-invented by social psychologists to account for matching 
performances that bear a strong resemblance to work on derived relations. The 
dominant methodology in this area is the Implicit Association Test (IAT) which has 
been repeatedly used to demonstrate strong and predictable patterns of stimulus 
matching across a whole array of psychological phenomena. These include: race 
(Dunham, Baron, & Banaji, 2006), ethnicity (Rudman, & Ashmore, 2007), self-
esteem (Yamaguchi, Greenwald, Banaji, Murakami, Chen et al., 2007) and even 
eating habits (Grover, Keel, & Mitchell, 2003).  
 From this perspective, the concept of the association appears to describe the 
process by which implicit cognitions (also referred to as implicit attitudes) emerge 
(Greenwald, 1990). These are defined as “introspectively unidentified or inaccurately 
identified traces of past experience that mediate favourable or unfavourable feeling, 
thought, or action toward social objects” (Greenwald, & Banaji, 1995, p.8). Like the 
concept of stimulus relations, individuals are often not aware that the relevant 
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associations have been formed, or that they can manifest as judgements or overt 
actions. As a result, implicit cognitions do not require conscious effort and appear to 
be initiated by stimulus cues in the environment (Shiffrin, & Dumais, 1981). Indeed, 
implicit attitudes are believed to be inescapable (Neely, 1977). In contrast, explicit 
attitudes are intentional and require the active attention of the listener. They are more 
flexible than automatic processes and this makes them particularly useful for 
decision-making, problem-solving and the initiation of new behaviour (Devine, 
1989). 
Social psychologists have devoted considerable effort towards the 
development of robust methodologies for the study of implicit attitudes. Those 
available to date include: the Go/No-Go Association Task (GNAT: Nosek, & Banaji, 
2001); the Extrinsic Effective Simon Task (EAST: de Houwer, 2003); word fragment 
completion tasks (Gilbert, & Hixon 1991); name-letter preference tasks (Koole, 
Dijksterhuis, & van Knippenberg, 2001); and the original spatial Simon task (Simon, 
1990). However, by far the most well established is the Implicit Association Task 
(IAT: Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). 
 
The Implicit Association Test (IAT) 
The IAT has been successfully employed to measure implicit attitudes toward 
a broad range of phenomena, including cognitions that are particularly susceptible to 
concealment or manipulation on explicit measures. This array includes: race 
(Greenwald, Oakes, & Hoffman, 2003); gender (Greenwald, & Farnham, 2000) 
dysfunctional beliefs (de Jong, Pasman, Kindt, & van den Hout, 2001), eating 
disorders (Grover, Keel, & Mitchell, 2003); and anxiety (Egloff, & Schmukle, 2002).  
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The IAT is based on the assumption that it should be easier to map two 
concepts onto a single response when those concepts are associated in memory than 
when they are unrelated (Farnham, Greenwald, & Banaji, 1999). It is a latency-based 
measure that compares the speed of the congruent versus incongruent associations. 
Specifically, it predicts that participants will require less time to categorise an 
attribute and concept strongly associated in memory than an attribute and concept 
weakly associated in memory. According to Greenwald et al. (1998), the IAT 
measures the strength of associations between concepts and then infers the nature or 
directionality of the associations on this basis. The procedure is considered to be an 
implicit measure because participants are required to respond in less time than is 
needed to make a conscious response. 
Consider a typical IAT trial from Greenwald et al. (1998). The target concept 
discriminations were flowers (e.g. ROSE and TULIP) versus insects (e.g. BEE and 
WASP) that were combined with pleasant (HAPPY, PEACE) and unpleasant 
attributes (ROTTEN, UGLY). On a trial (referred to as consistent), participants were 
presented with INSECT and UNPLEASANT on the top left of the screen with 
FLOWERS and PLEASANT on the top right. In the centre the target word may have 
been FLEA. In this case, it was relatively easy for participants to emit a left-hand key 
press to indicate that FLEA was associated with the INSECT-UNPLEASANT 
combination, rather than FLOWERS-PLEASANT. On another trial however (referred 
to as inconsistent), the concept-attribute pairings may have been alternated such that 
INSECT was now combined with PLEASANT and FLOWERS with UNPLEASANT. 
In this alternative case, it was likely more difficult for participants to associate FLEA 
with either INSECT-UNPLEASANT or FLOWERS-PLEASANT. The simple logic is 
that the FLOWERS-PLEASANT/INSECT-UNPLEASANT associations are already 
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better established than FLOWERS-UNPLEASANT/INSECT-PLEASANT. The 
predicted superiority of responding on consistent trials over inconsistent trials is 
known as the IAT effect. 
Greenwald and colleagues have published a range of studies showing that the 
IAT appears to reveal implicit attitudes that participants typically deny on explicit 
measures. For example, participants who claimed not to hold racist attitudes on 
explicit measures more readily categorised names typical of White persons with 
positive words and names typical of Black persons with negative words, than vice 
versa on the IAT (see Greenwald, Banaji, Rudman, Farnham, Nosek et al., 2002, for a 
review). The basic IAT effect has been replicated many times, and it has become an 
increasingly popular method for assessing implicit attitudes, particularly to socially 
sensitive phenomena (e.g. de Houwer, 2002). 
There is little to doubt about the robustness of IAT effects or the utility of the 
procedure in a broad array of phenomena. But it remains the case, at a conceptual 
level, that the methodology relies on the basic idea that associations are central to 
higher cognitive functioning. But, his is problematic for RFT researchers and others. 
Consider the following paragraph by de Houwer (2002, pp. 117-118): 
Greenwald et al. (1998) designed the IAT to assess the strength of 
associations between concepts in memory. One can argue that beliefs 
involve more than just associations between concepts. First, beliefs reflect 
qualified associations. For instance, the belief “I am a bad person” implies a 
special type of association between the concept “self” and the concept 
“bad”, namely a directional association which specifies that “bad” is a 
property or characteristic of “self”. IAT effects do not reflect the nature of 
directionality of an association between concepts, they can reflect only 
strength of association. Second, many beliefs involve several associations 
and several concepts. For instance, conditional beliefs such as “if I do not 
perform well on a task, then I am an inferior person” involve rather complex 
structures of qualified associations between several concepts. The IAT 
cannot be used to directly capture such complex conditional beliefs (also see 
de Jong et al., 2001, p.111). In sum, the IAT does not provide a measure of 
beliefs, nor was it designed to do so. It can only provide an index of 
associations that are assumed to be involved in certain beliefs and thus 
indirect evidence for the presence of certain beliefs  
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Put simply, the IAT cannot readily assess the nature or directionality of associations. 
 In one sense, this limitation is not of central concern if one considers that 
human cognition is a largely associative set of processes (see Greenwald, Nosek, 
Banaji, & Klauer, in press for a relevant discussion). But, if this is not the case then 
one begins to wonder what it is that the IAT is measuring. Researchers in RFT have 
recently developed an alternative measure of implicit cognitions, which, not 
surprisingly, has stimulus relations at its core and which appears to go some way 
towards addressing de Houwer’s concerns. 
 
The Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP) 
The IRAP is an automated latency-based measure that also juxtaposes 
consistent and inconsistent responding. But there are a number of key procedural 
differences with the IAT. First, all IRAP trials are identical in format, so the 
complexity of the target relations is not increased across blocks. That is, one of two 
attributes is always presented as a sample stimulus and one member from two sets of 
target concepts is always the target stimulus. Hence, consistent and inconsistent trials 
do not differ in format. Second, in order to capture the directionality or specificity of 
the target relations, the response options are directly paired with specific relational 
terms (e.g. SIMILAR and OPPOSITE).  
Consider a trial from the research by Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Power, 
Hayden, Milne et al. (2006). On each trial, either PLEASANT or UNPLEASANT 
appeared as a sample stimulus at the top of the screen. The target stimulus in the 
middle of the screen comprised of a word from one of two concept categories that 
could be readily evaluated as positive (e.g. LOVE and HOLIDAY) or negative 
(CANCER and JAIL). The relational response options in the case were SIMILAR and 
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OPPOSITE. In short, participants were required to indicate that the relationship 
between PLEASANT and LOVE is one of co-ordination (by choosing SIMILAR) or 
opposition (by choosing OPPOSITE). In line with the IAT, the IRAP predicts that 
already-established relations will result in shorter response times than novel relations. 
For example, participants should take longer to relate UNPLEASANT-LOVE-
SIMILAR than PLEASANT-LOVE-SIMILAR. IRAP effects have already been 
successfully established across an array of psychological phenomena, including 
attitudes to homosexuality (Cullen, & Barnes-Holmes, 2008), meat-eating (Barnes-
Holmes, Murtagh, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, in press), self-esteem in children 
(Scanlon, 2008) and even attitudes to sexual offending (Dawson, Barnes-Holmes, 
Gresswell, Hart, & Gore, 2009). 
One of the first published IRAP studies compared the explicit and implicit 
attitudes of professionals with varying degrees of experience working with 
individuals with Autistic Spectrum Disorder (ASD -- Barnes-Holmes et al., 2006). 
Specifically, one group of participants had between six months and six years 
experience; another group had less than six months experience; and the remainder had 
never worked professionally with this population. The IRAP employed the phrases 
AUTISTIC SPECTRUM DISORDER and NORMALLY DEVELOPING as sample 
stimuli, with positively or negatively evaluated target stimuli (e.g. CALM or 
DIFFICULT). During consistent blocks, participants were required to relate, for 
example: NORMALLY DEVELOPING-CALM-SIMILAR; NORMALLY 
DEVELOPING-DIFFICULT-OPPOSITE; AUTISTIC SPECTRUM DISORDER-
CALM-OPPOSITE; and AUTISTIC SPECTRUM DISORDER-DIFFICULT-
SIMILAR, thus assessing bias towards normally-developing children and against 
children with ASD. On inconsistent blocks, the expected patterns were reversed. In 
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order to compare outcomes on implicit and explicit measures, participants also 
completed the Challenging Behaviours Attribution Scale (CHABA: Hastings, 1997) 
and the Attitudes to Autism Scale (AAS).  
The results from the study showed IRAP effects biased in favour of normally-
developing and against ASD for all three groups. Although the group with the most 
professional experience showed the strongest effects, there was no statistically 
significant main effect for group. In contrast however, the two groups with experience 
showed significantly more positive attitudes to ASD than the group with no 
experience on the explicit measures. In short, the professionals appeared to understate 
their bias against this population on the explicit measure, but all was revealed on the 
IRAP. 
In another study of implicit attitudes to nationality, the same researchers 
presented Irish students with a likeability hierarchy among Scottish, American and 
African groups. The researchers predicted that Irish participants would respond in 
accordance with Irish as most likeable, Scottish as next most likeable (probably 
because they were most similar), followed by American (less similar) and then 
African (least similar). In other words, participants were required to choose between 
Irish over Scottish, Scottish over American and American over African as more or 
less likeable. In this case, the response options were TRUE and FALSE. Participants 
were also presented with a series of explicit measures of their attitudes to these 
nationalities. 
 Consistent with experimental predictions, participants showed implicit bias in 
terms of Irish as more likeable than Scottish, Scottish more likeable than American 
and American more likeable than African. In contrast however, attitudes on the 
explicit measure were either mixed or opposite (e.g. Irish and Scottish were preferred 
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equally and Africans were preferred over Americans). Once again, therefore, there 
was clear divergence between the implicit and explicit measures that showed more 
politically correct responding on the explicit measure relative to the IRAP. 
 
The Current Thesis 
 The aims of the current thesis were three-fold. The first was primarily 
methodological and attempted to determine the stimulus presentation that would 
produce the strongest IRAP effect. Experiment 1 set out to address this simple 
experimental question. The key manipulation  involved the presence or absence of the 
randomisation of the sample stimuli (with or without the randomisation of the 
response options) generated the strongest D-IRAP scores. Randomising the response 
options alone without randomising the samples also produced a significant IRAP 
effect, although this was smaller. The D-IRAP score that resulted from the static 
presentation of both samples and response options was almost negligible. 
 The second aim was to determine the utility of the IRAP as a measure of 
implicit attitudes to race and this was the core focus of Experiments 2 to 6. In the 
IRAP in Experiment 2, participants were simply required to relate the phrases WHITE 
PERSON and BLACK PERSON to a range of simple positive and negative terms that 
could be readily categorised as safe and dangerous. We predicted that out Irish 
participants would show a pro- White and anti- Black bias. The D-IRAP trial-type 
scores were in part consistent with experimental predictions and showed a pro- White 
bias where  White  was safe, but not an anti-Black bias. In fact, participants 
significantly confirmed that Black was safe. This coincided with the explicit measures 
on which participants indicated the absence of racial bias against Black people. 
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In line with existing IAT evidence, to determine whether racial pictures would 
generate stronger IRAP effects than words, and to examine the potential role of 
attentional weapon bias, the IRAP in Experiment 3 presented pictures of Black and 
White men holding guns. For correct responding, however, the presence of the guns 
was incidental and the discriminations among the pictures were based on race alone. 
We predicted that Irish participants would show a pro- White and anti- Black bias that 
was perhaps enhanced by the presence of the guns. Participants significantly 
confirmed that White was safe and Black was dangerous, although they also 
significantly confirmed that Black as safe. Hence, this was our first evidence of an 
anti- Black bias, but other effects were not entirely as expected. Again on the majority 
of explicit measures, participants indicated the absence of racial bias.  
In order to determine whether the anti-Black bias in the previous study did 
reflect the influence of the guns, Experiment 4 presented pictures of Black and White 
men holding mundane objects. We predicted that Irish participants would show a pro- 
White and anti- Black bias, even though both were holding mundane objects. 
Participants significantly confirmed that both White and Black were safe, but had 
mixed views of either as dangerous. Hence, the anti- Black bias from the previous 
study was now lost, suggesting that the weapons had facilitated the effect. Again, on 
the majority of the explicit measures, participants indicated the absence of racial bias. 
In line with previous IAT studies of race and to examine further the outcomes 
from the previous studies, Experiment 5 presented pictures of Black and White men 
holding both guns and mundane objects. We predicted that Irish participants would 
show a pro- White and anti- Black bias that may be differentially influenced by the 
items presented in the pictures. The four trial-types examined in the previous studies 
were sub-divided into eight to permit comparisons of the relative influence of the 
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different items held in the pictures. Overall, seven of the eight trial-types were non- 
significant and participants only significantly confirmed that White men with 
mundane objects were safe. In fact, close inspection of the non-significant effects 
indicated unexpected evidence of pro- Black bias. Again these agreed with the 
explicit measures, on which participants indicated the absence of racial bias. 
In Experiment 6, participants were presented with the same IRAP as the 
previous study, but were required to discriminate the objects in the pictures as the 
basis for correct responding and ignore race. That is, on consistent trials guns were 
always dangerous and mundane objects were always safe and correct responding on 
inconsistent trials was reverse (guns always safe and mundane objects dangerous). 
We predicted that Irish participants would categorise guns as dangerous and mundane 
objects as safe, but expected that these effects might be influenced by race. In this 
study, six of the eight were non-significant. Participants only significantly confirmed 
that Black with a gun was not safe and White with a gun was dangerous, but there 
was no evidence of clear influence of either items or race in the remaining effects. 
Again, the explicit measures indicated the absence of racial bias. 
The third aim of the current thesis was to examine the utility of the IRAP as a 
measure of clinically relevant implicit cognitions. Previous preliminary research had 
indicated strong IRAP effects that showed a positive bias towards the self in 
participants with a high explicit self-esteem. In Experiment 7, participants were 
required to indicate their agreement or disagreement with a range of statements that 
reflected high self-esteem (i.e. were positive about the self) or reflected low self-
esteem (i.e. were negative about the self). Because the study was aslo concerned with 
whether on not the IRAP would correlate with an explicit measure of self, the positive 
and negative statements presented in the IRAP were taken directly from the Roseberg 
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Self-Esteem Scale (RSES) and particiants also completed this as an explicit measure. 
We predicted that participants high on explicit self-esteem would relate the self with 
the positive self-statements and not relate the self with negative self-statements. 
The findings indicated that participants significantly confirmed that they 
agreed with the positive (high self-esteem) statements and significantly disconfirmed 
that they disagreed with them. They also disconfirmed that they agreed with the 
negaative statements, although this effect was non-significant. Although these 
findings were largely as expected from participants who all scored as high in self-
esteem on the explicit RSES, there was no significant correlation between the two 
measures. 
In Experiment 8, we used the IRAP to  explore implicit attitudes towards 
acceptance and avoidance. For this purpose, we selected undergraduate students who 
showed an xplicit propensity towards high acceptance/ low avoidance on the 
Acceptaance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ-2). In order to enhance the potential 
overlap  between the two types of measure, as we had done in Experiment 7, we took 
opposing satements directly from the AAQ and inserted them into the IRAP as target 
stimuli. The results indicated that participants significantly confirmed that they agreed 
with the acceptance statements, but all other effects were non-significant. Closer 
inspection of the trial-types, however, were as expected and showed that particpants 
disconfirmed that they agreed with the avoidance statements and confirmed that they 
disagreed with them. In spite of these outcomes, the IRAP data did not correlate 
significantly with the AAQ. 
The current reaearch program offered preliminary investigations of the utility 
of the IRAP as a measure of impicit attitudes to a range of psychological phenomena, 
including race, self-esteem and acceptance. Although the IRAP effects in many cases 
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were not as significant and predicted, particularly in the context of race, there 
wasgood evidence thata further investigation would be promising. The findings here 
make a useful contribution to the small existing IRAP research base by highlighting 
key issues that influence IRAP outcomes in a range of areas. 
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Chapter 2 
Exploring IRAP Screen Presentations 
Experiment 1 
There are numerous experimental features of the IAT, and even the IRAP, that 
raise questions for behavioural psychologists. For example, would it be better to have 
the sample stimuli in the top centre of the screen, rather than at either corner? Or are 
simple left/right key presses the most effective means of facilitating the emission of 
appropriate responding? Because it is important for implicit measures to ensure that 
there is not adequate time for conscious responding, participants are all the more 
dependent on specific features of the stimulus presentation. Indeed, these questions 
are perhaps all the more important for the IRAP, where all trials are presented in the 
same format. Practically all available IRAP studies to date have employed a 
presentation format in which both the sample stimuli and response options randomly 
switch positions across trials within each block. However, there is no empirical 
evidence to suggest the superiority of this format over any others (e.g. keeping either 
of these features static).   
Prior to examining the utility of the IRAP in an ever-increasing area of 
psychological phenomena, Experiment 1 of the current research set out to address this 
simple experimental question. Its main aim was to systematically manipulate the 
presentation of stimuli on-screen to determine what influence this might have on 
responding. Naturally, a simple IRAP, rather than one on race or nationality for 
example, was chosen for this purpose. Although we made no firm predictions about 
which format would produce the best IRAP effect, we assumed that the commonly 
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used format in which both the individual sample stimuli and response options switch 
positions would be amongst the most effective. 
 
Participants 
 A total of sixty undergraduate students of the National University of Ireland, 
Maynooth (NUIM) participated in Experiment 1. All were aged between 18 and 26 
years old (M: 22 years and 11 months) and were recruited though notice boards and 
classroom announcements in the Department of Psychology. All participants 
presented with high levels of fluency in English and with normal or corrected to 
normal vision. Each participant was randomly allocated to one of four experimental 
conditions (12 participants in each condition), across which the on-screen stimulus 
arrangements were manipulated. No participants had previous experience of the IRAP 
and none received any remuneration for participating in the study. The data from 
twelve participants was removed from the analyses because these individuals failed to 
reach criterion during the practice blocks, leaving data from forty-eight participants. 
 
Settings 
 The current study was conducted in the Computer Laboratory in the 
Department of Psychology at NUIM. The room was generally free from noise and 
distraction. All participants conducted the study on an individual basis and only one 
was present in the Laboratory at any one time. In all cases, the Experimenter 
remained present in the Laboratory throughout participation and interacted directly 
with participants only during instructional, but not test, phases.  
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Apparatus and Materials 
 Experiment 1 involved two basic sets of materials. The explicit measures 
comprised of Likert scales and the implicit measure comprised of the IRAP.  
In the Likert scales, participants were presented with twelve 13-point scales, 
one for each of the target words that would subsequently be presented in the IRAP. 
Participants rated each word from +6/Pleasant to -6/Unpleasant -- see Appendix A.  
The IRAP. Participants completed all IRAP trials on a DELL desktop 
computer with a Pentium 4 processor. The procedure was delivered via a program 
written in Visual Basic (Version 6.0.) that controlled all aspects of stimulus 
presentation and the recording of all participant responses. There were minor software 
modifications that were necessary to distinguish the IRAP presentations that appeared 
during each of the four conditions (see below). 
The stimuli presented during the IRAP comprised of three groups of words.  
The sample stimuli contained the words PLEASANT and UNPLEASANT. The target 
stimuli contained twelve evaluative words -- six positive (CARESS, FREEDOM, 
HEALTH, LOVE, PEACE and CHEER) and six negative (ABUSE, CRASH, FILTH, 
MURDER, SICKNESS and ACCIDENT). Both of these word sets were taken from 
Greenwald et al. (1998). The response options contained the relational terms 
SIMILAR and OPPOSITE.  The stimulus arrangements employed in Experiment 1 
are presented in Table 1. 
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Table 1 
The Stimulus Arrangements Employed in Experiment 1 
 
Sample Stimulus 1 
PLEASANT 
Sample Stimulus 2 
UNPLEASEANT 
Response Option Consistent with Sample 1 
SIMILAR 
Response Option consistent with Sample 2 
OPPOSITE 
Targets Stimuli consistent with Sample 1 Targets Stimuli consistent with Sample 2 
CARESS ABUSE 
FREEDOM CRASH 
HEALTH FILTH 
LOVE MURDER 
PEACE SICKNESS 
CHEER ACCIDENT 
 
Experimental Conditions 
The four conditions in Experiment 1 varied only in terms of the randomisation 
algorithm that controlled the presentation of the sample stimuli and the response 
options (the target stimuli were always presented in the middle of the screen).  
Moving-Moving Condition. The Moving-Moving Condition contained two 
features that were alternated across trials (i.e. they were moving). Specifically, the 
order of the presentation of the sample stimuli (PLEASANT and UNPLEASANT) at 
the top of the screen alternated in a quasi-random manner throughout each block of 
trials. In addition, the left-right positions of the response options (SIMILAR and 
OPPOSITE) at the bottom of the screen also alternated in a quasi-random manner. 
Hence, the label Moving-Moving refers to the simultaneous randomisation of both 
samples (Moving) and response options (Moving, respectively). 
Moving-Static Condition. In this condition, the presentation of the samples 
was randomised as above, but the locations of the response options remained static or 
identical across all trials (hence the term Moving-Static). The actual presentation of 
each response option on either side of the screen was counterbalanced across 
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participants (i.e. for half, SIMILAR was always on the left and OPPOSITE on the 
right, with the reverse presented to the remaining half).  
Static-Moving Condition. In this condition, the sample stimuli remained static 
such that one appeared on the first twelve trials of each block and the second sample 
was then presented in the remaining twelve trials. The sequencing of the two samples 
was also counterbalanced across participants (i.e. half saw PLEASANT first, then 
UNPLEASANT, and this was reversed for the rest). The response options alternated 
in a quasi-random manner within blocks as before. 
Static-Static Condition. In this condition, the sample stimuli were static (i.e. 
their sequence was not random) and the response options were always in the same 
fixed locations (hence, the label Static-Static). Again, the sequencing of the individual 
sample stimuli and the response options were counterbalanced across participants.  
 
General Procedure 
 All participants completed the study in a single experimental session that 
lasted between 30 and 40mins. in total. Although made available, none of the 
participants opted for short breaks throughout the study. 
 
Procedure 
Verbal Instructions and Visual Aids. Because pilot studies involving the IRAP 
had previously noted difficulties in ensuring that participants understood clearly how 
to respond appropriately to IRAP trials (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2006), the current 
experiment involved the presentation of a series of visual aids or screen shots of each 
of the four basic trial-types (see Figure 1 for an example).  
 
 28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. A visual aid containing a schematic representation of an IRAP trial. 
 
In all cases, the screen shots were accompanied by additional verbal 
instructions along the following lines: 
This is a word-matching task that involves you having to match certain words 
together. Sometimes the computer will want you to match words in a way you agree 
with and sometimes it will want you to match words in a way you do not agree with. 
This is part of the experiment. For example, sometimes the computer might ask you 
to match the word PLEASANT with this set of words (participant is shown the six 
positive target stimuli), and sometimes it will want you to match the word 
UNPLEASANT to this set of words (participant is shown the six negative target 
stimuli). So, you might have to match PLEASANT with PEACE and 
UNPLEASANT with CRASH. Then you will have a break and the computer will let 
you know how you are doing. 
 
Then the computer will change and it will want you to match the word PLEASANT 
with this set of words (participant is shown the six negative target stimuli) and the 
word UNPLEASANT with this set of words (participant is shown the six positive 
target stimuli). So, now you might have to match PLEASANT with CRASH and 
UNPLEASANT with PEACE. A message will appear on-screen when the computer 
wants you to change the way you are responding. 
 
In order to match the words in this game you have to press either the ‘d’ or ‘k’ button 
on the keyboard. They are the only two keys you have to press.  
 
Now, there are two other words involved in this task -- OPPOSITE and SIMILAR.  
So if I tell you that the computer wants you to match the word PLEASANT to 
PEACE, FREEDOM, HEALTH, CARESS, LOVE and CHEER and you see this 
coming up on the screen (participant is presented with schematic representation of a 
consistent trial with PLEASANT) which key will you press? Will you press ‘d’ or 
‘k’?  
   
Ok, so what happens if UNPLEASANT and PEACE come up on the screen but I 
have told you that I want you to match PLEASANT to PEACE? What key would you 
press?  Would you press ‘d’ or ‘k’? 
 
If you press the wrong key during the experiment, a red X will appear on-screen. To 
continue, press the correct key. It is important that you go as fast as you can while 
still getting as many answers as possible correct. 
Pleasant 
Inconsistent Consistent 
Peace 
Select ‘d’ key Select ‘k’ key 
SIMILAIR OPPOSITE 
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At this point, minor variations were adopted in the verbal instructions 
provided to participants in each of the four conditions. Consider the following 
employed in the Moving-Moving Condition:  
 
In this task the word at the top of the screen will randomly change between 
PLEASANT and UNPLEASANT. The words OPPOSITE and SIMILAR will also 
switch places randomly during the experiment. Sometimes the word OPPOSITE is 
on the right-hand side of the screen and SIMILAR is on the left-hand side of the 
screen (participant is shown schematic representation with OPPOSITE on the right 
and SIMILAR on the left) and sometimes it is the reverse (participant is shown 
schematic representation with SIMILAR on the right and OPPOSITE on the left). So 
in this task you have to keep your eye on the word at the top (i.e. PLEASANT or 
UPLEASANT), the word in the middle (e.g. PEACE) and the places in which 
OPPOSITE and SIMILAR appear on the screen. Do you understand? 
 
Automated Instructions. In addition to the verbal instructions and the screen 
shots, the automated procedure commenced with a series of more detailed instructions 
for understanding and completing IRAP trials as follows:  
Our research investigates cognitive processes that are used in decisions that involve 
memory. We are seeking to develop and test theories of cognitive processes that 
occur inside and outside of awareness in the routine use of memory.  
 
Stimuli will be presented on this display screen and your responses will be entered 
on the keyboard. 
 
The research assumes that you can read English fluently, and that your vision is 
normal or corrected to normal. If you do not consider yourself fluent in English, or if 
your vision is not normal or corrected to normal, and ESPECIALLY IF YOU ARE 
HAVING SOME DIFFICULTY READING THIS DESCRIPTION, PLEASE ask 
the Experimenter now whether or not you should continue.  
 
Your identity as a participant is confidential. Further, you are free to discontinue 
participation at any time, without penalty.  
 
In keeping with standard practice, your data may be retained for 5 years or so, 
during which time only the investigators on this or successor projects will have 
access to them.  
 
PLEASE NOW READ THE STATEMENT BELOW, WHERE YOU WILL BE 
ASKED TO RESPOND TO A STANDARD INFORMED CONSENT QUESTION.  
CONSENT STATEMENT 
 
I have read the description of the procedure. I understand that the questions I may 
have about this research will be answered by Professor Barnes-Holmes or one of the 
other researchers working on this project.  
 
If you consent to participate in the research that has been described on the preceding 
display pages you should now read the Instructions for the sorting tasks below. 
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[INSTRUCTION: If you wish to ask any questions first, alert the experimenter now. 
IF YOU WISH NOT TO PROCEED, you should inform the experimenter]. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
Shown below are illustrations of the four different types of task [only one 
illustration is presented here] that will be presented repeatedly in this part of the 
experiment. To help you understand the tasks each of the four illustrations is 
explained immediately underneath. Please examine each illustration and then read 
carefully the explanation attached to it. Please make sure that you understand each 
task before continuing with the experiment.  
 
IMPORTANT: FROM TRIAL TO TRIAL THE POSITIONING OF THE 
RESPONSE OPTIONS (SIMILAR AND OPPOSITE) WILL VARY RANDOMLY 
BETWEEN LEFT AND RIGHT [THIS WAS ONLY PRESENTED, AS 
APPROPRIATE]. 
 
 
Illustration 1 
________________________________ 
Pleasant 
 
Crash 
 
 
Select ‘d’ for                        Select ‘k’ for 
 Similar                           Opposite 
________________________________ 
 
Explanation for Illustration 1 
 
If you select “Similar” by pressing the ‘d’ key, you are stating that “Crash 
IS Pleasant.” 
 
If you select “Opposite” by pressing the ‘k’ key, you are stating that 
“Crash IS NOT Pleasant.” 
 
NOTE: DURING THE EXPERIMENT A RANGE OF OTHER WORDS 
WILL BE PRESENTED, AS WELL AS THE ONES USED IN THE 
EXAMPLES. 
 
REMEMBER: FROM TRIAL TO TRIAL THE POSITIONING OF THE 
RESPONSE OPTIONS (SIMILAR AND OPPOSITE) WILL VARY 
RANDOMLY BETWEEN LEFT AND RIGHT [AS APPROPRIATE]. 
 
 
 
 
 
FINAL INSTRUCTIONS 
 
During the experiment you will be asked to respond as quickly and accurately as 
you can across all trials.  
 
The relating tasks will be presented in short sessions that are separated by the 
appearance of instructions on the computer screen. You can take a short break if you 
like while the instructions are on-screen.  
 
During each short session the relating task follows one general rule. An incorrect 
response on any trial is signalled by the appearance of a red ‘X’ in the centre of the 
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screen. To remove the red ‘X’ and move on to the next trial, please press the correct 
response key quickly.  
 
After each session, further instructions will appear and they will tell you that the 
general rule that applied in the previous session is now completely reversed. Please 
pay close attention to these instructions and do your best to follow them. 
 
So, just to clarify, there will be only two general relating rules, and so the first thing 
you should do at the beginning of each session is to discover the rule by using the 
feedback you get in the form of the red ‘X’.  
 
It is very important to understand that sometimes you will be required to respond to 
the tasks in a way that agrees with what you believe and at other times you will be 
required to respond in a way that disagrees with what you believe. This is part of 
the experiment. 
 
The first two sessions are for practice only and these are repeated until you respond 
accurately on at least 70% of the relating trials, and respond faster, on average, than 
3000 milliseconds (i.e. 3 seconds). When you complete the practice phase, the test-
phase will then start. Remember, you should try to make your responses as 
accurately and quickly as possible.  
 
Good Luck.  If you do not understand something about the foregoing instructions or 
have any further questions please talk to the researcher before clicking on the blue 
button. 
 
Feedback. Although IRAP trials are generally referred to as test trials (as with 
the IAT), all incorrect responses are consequated with automated written corrective 
feedback and a correction procedure. That is, after an incorrect response was emitted 
the stimuli remained on screen and a red ‘X’ appeared directly below the target word. 
The ‘X’ remained until the participant emitted a correct response and the next trial 
then appeared automatically. No feedback consequated responding. 
IRAP Trials. All blocks of IRAP trials (i.e. both practice and test blocks) were 
identical in format, and practice trials were always completed first. The number of 
practice blocks that participants received ranged from two to eight and was contingent 
upon their performances therein. Once participants had reached the mastery criteria 
(in terms of both accuracy and response latency) they preceded immediately to the 
first test block. All participants were exposed to a total of six test blocks. At the end 
of each block of trials, the IRAP presented participants with automated feedback on 
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the percentage of trials correct and the median response time (in ms.) achieved during 
that block.  
Trial-types. The IRAP comprised of four basic trial-types that were 
constructed from the configurations of the sample stimuli (PLEASANT and 
UNPLEASANT) and the two types of target stimuli (positive and negative words). 
For experimental purposes, these were referred to as: PLEASANT/Positive (top left 
of Figure 2); PLEASANT/Negative (top right); UNPLEASANT/Positive (bottom 
left); and UNPLEASANT/Negative (bottom right). Each block of IRAP trials 
contained six exposures to each of the four trial-types randomly presented across the 
block (i.e. a total of 24 trials in each block). On each of the six exposures to a trial-
type, each of the three target stimuli appeared twice with the same sample.  
 Consistent and Inconsistent Responding. Each block of IRAP trials was 
designated, for experimental purposes, as consistent or inconsistent. Participants were 
exposed to a minimum of two practice blocks (one consistent and one inconsistent) 
and six test blocks (three consistent and three inconsistent). The IRAP sequence was 
always presented as alternating blocks of consistent and inconsistent trials. As a 
result, participants were required to switch their patterns of correct responding across 
blocks (i.e. the contingencies were reversed). In order to control for potential order 
effects, the sequencing of the blocks was counterbalanced across participants. That is, 
half of the participants were presented with a consistent practice block first, followed 
by the inconsistent practice block, followed by a consistent test block and so on. In 
contrast, the other half were presented with an inconsistent practice block first, and so 
on.   
The recording of a response on any trial as correct or incorrect depended on 
whether the trial had been categorised as consistent or inconsistent. Trials were 
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referred to as consistent when the relations among the sample and target stimuli were 
consistent with the views believed to be held by participants prior to the study. That 
is, on these trials participants should more readily relate positive evaluations with 
PLEASANT, and the negative (rather than positive) evaluations with 
UNPLEASANT. Consider the trials presented in Figure 2. Correct responses here 
required participants to respond PLEASANT/PEACE/SIMILAR; 
PLEASANT/CRASH/OPPOSITE; UNPLEASANT/PEACE/SIMILAR; and 
UNPLEASANT/CRASH/OPPOSITE. 
 
 
                                  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. A schematic representation of the four basic trial-types in Experiment 1. 
Peace 
Consistent Inconsistent 
Select ‘d’ key Select ‘k’ key 
Pleasant 
Similar Opposite 
Crash 
Consistent Inconsistent 
Select ‘d’ key Select ‘k’ key 
Similar Opposite 
Pleasant 
PLEASANT/Positive PLEASANT/Negative 
Peace 
Inconsistent Consistent 
Select ‘d’ key Select ‘k’ key 
Unpleasant 
Similar Opposite 
Crash 
Inconsistent Consistent 
Select ‘d’ key Select ‘k’ key 
Similar Opposite 
Unpleasant 
UNPLEASANT/Positive UNPLEASANT/Negative 
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Trials were referred to as inconsistent when the relations among the sample 
and target stimuli were not consistent with views attributed to the participants. 
Consider again the trials in Figure 2. On inconsistent trials correct responses involved 
selecting PLEASANT/PEACE/OPPOSITE; PLEASANT/CRASH/SIMILAR; 
UNPLEASANT/PEACE/OPPOSITE; and UNPLEASANT/CRASH/SIMILAR.  
The end of the sixth test block marked the end of the experiment for all 
participants. At this point, all were debriefed and thanked for their participation. 
 
RESULTS 
The primary datum in the IRAP was response latency, defined as the time (in 
ms.) that elapsed between the onset of the trial and a correct response. Although 
accuracy was also recorded on every trial, the accuracy data were simply employed as 
a screening mechanism to ensure that all data contained within the subsequent 
analyses comprised of scores greater than 70% accurate. All others were removed 
from the analyses.   
In line with previous analyses of IRAP data, the response latency data for each 
participant were transformed into D-IRAP scores (see Cullen, & Barnes-Holmes, in 
press) using an adaptation of the D-algorithm by Greenwald, Nosek and Banaji 
(2003). The steps involved in calculating the D-IRAP scores were as follows: (i) only 
response-latency data from test-blocks were used; (ii) latencies above 10,000 ms. 
were eliminated from the dataset; (iii) all data for participants were removed if they 
produced more than 10% of test block trials with latencies less than 300ms; (iv) 12 
standard deviations for the four trial-types were computed: four for the response 
latencies from Test Blocks 1 and 2, four from the latencies from Test Blocks 3 and 4, 
and a further four from Test Blocks 5 and 6; (v) 24 mean latencies for the four trial-
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types in each test block were calculated; (vi) difference scores were calculated for 
each of the four trial-types, for each pair of test blocks, by subtracting the mean 
latency of the consistent block from the mean latency of the corresponding 
inconsistent block; (vii) each difference score was divided by its corresponding 
standard deviation from step 4, yielding 12 D-IRAP scores; one score for each trial-type 
for each pair of test blocks; (viii) four overall trial-type D-IRAP scores were calculated 
by averaging the three scores for each trial-type across the three pairs of test blocks; 
(ix) an overall D-IRAP score was calculated by averaging all 12 trial-type D-IRAP scores 
from step vii.  
Responding in the predicted direction was indicated in the graphs by bars 
above a D-IRAP score of zero (positive D-IRAP scores) and responding that was contrary 
to prediction was indicated by bars below a D-IRAP score of zero (negative D-IRAP 
scores). For example, in the current study we predicted that participants would 
respond that positive words such as peace were pleasant and negative words like crash 
were unpleasant. As a result, in Figure 3, bars above zero, positive D-IRAP scores 
indicated that participants were responding in the predicted direction while bars below 
zero indicated that participants were responding contrary to prediction, for example 
responding that positive words such as peace were unpleasant and negative words like 
crash were pleasant. 
Figure 3 presents the mean overall D-IRAP scores for each condition. All 
conditions generated D-IRAP scores that were in the predicted direction. The Moving-
Static Condition showed the largest D-IRAP score, followed closely by Moving-
Moving. The D-IRAP score for Static-Moving was considerably smaller and Static-
Static was the lowest of all. These findings suggest that the largest D-IRAP scores are 
obtained when the sample stimulus is randomised; the D-IRAP score is smaller when 
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only the response options are randomised, and the effect becomes very small when 
both are static.  
  
 
Figure 3. Mean overall D-IRAP score for each condition in Experiment 1.* Indicates 
that the D score was significant relative to zero. Arrow indicates conditions 
that were significantly different from each other. 
 
A mixed repeated measures 4x2 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was 
conducted with condition and sequence (consistent-first vs. inconsistent-first) as 
between-participant variables. The analysis revealed a significant main effect for 
condition [F (3, 40) = 2.839, p = .05, ηp2 = .175], but not for sequence (p = .439) and 
there was no significant interaction effect (p = .634). Post-hoc analyses (Fisher’s) 
indicated that the significant differences among conditions were between Moving-
Moving and Static-Static (p = .023) and between Moving-Static and Static-Static (p = 
.011), all other p’s  > .11.  
Four one-sample t-tests were conducted to identify if the overall D-IRAP score 
for each condition differed significantly from zero. For three conditions, this was the 
case: Moving-Moving [t (11)= 4.101, p = .002]; Moving-Static [t (11)= 4.307, p = 
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.001]; and Static-Moving [t (11)= 3.035, p = .011]. The D-IRAP score for Static-Static 
did not differ significantly from zero (p = .126). 
 
Split-half Correlations  
To assess the internal consistency of the IRAP, a split-half reliability score 
was calculated. This was based on two D-IRAP scores, one for odd trials and one for 
even trials, obtained in the same way as the four trial-type D-IRAP scores, except that 
the algorithm described previously was applied separately to all odd trials and to all 
even trials. The split-half correlation between odd and even scores, applying 
Spearman-Brown corrections, proved to be strong and significant, r =.644, n = 47, p < 
.001. This indicated a reasonably strong level of internal consistency for the IRAP. 
 
Explicit Measures 
 The Likert scales were designed to assess whether participants explicitly 
agreed with the experimental categorisations of the IRAP stimuli as positive or 
negative. The mean Likert ratings for the positive and negative words are presented in 
Table 2. Participants’ evaluations of the two word groups were entirely consistent 
with the experimental categorisations. 
 
Table 2 
The Mean Likert Rating for Each IRAP Stimulus Presented in Experiment 1. 
 
Positive 
Words 
Mean  
Rating 
Negative  
Words 
Mean  
Rating 
CARESS 3.9 ABUSE -5.1 
FREEDOM 5.2 CRASH -4.6 
HEALTH 4.8 FILTH -4 
LOVE 5.5 MURDER -5.3 
PEACE 4.9 SICKNESS -4.3 
CHEER 4.4 ACCIDENT -3.6 
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DISCUSSION 
 The basic aim of Experiment 1 was to determine the type of screen 
presentation that would yield the strongest IRAP effect. The key manipulation 
involved the presence or absence of the randomisation of the sample stimuli and/or 
the response options. The results indicated that the randomisation of the sample 
stimuli (with or without the randomisation of the response options) generated the 
strongest D-IRAP scores. Randomising the response options alone without randomising 
the samples produced a much smaller effect. The D-IRAP score that resulted from the 
static presentation of both samples and response options was almost negligible. 
 Practically all available IRAP studies to date have employed the Moving-
Moving presentation format, in spite of the lack of empirical evidence to suggest the 
superiority of this format over the others. Although the current work indicated that the 
strongest IRAP effects were observed with the randomisation of the sample stimuli 
but not response options (the Moving-Static Condition), the difference between this 
and the Moving-Moving condition was small and non-significant. This suggests, 
therefore, that the consistent use of the Moving-Moving format in IRAP research to 
date has been wise and has at least to some extent facilitated the strong IRAP effects 
reported therein. In line with these findings and the existing literature’s use of this 
format, all future studies in the current thesis will employ the Moving-Moving 
presentation. In any case, the current results also support those reported previously in 
the observation of strong and predicted IRAP effects. 
  With this relatively simple methodological question addressed, we turned our 
attentions in the rest of the thesis to broadening out the range of applications of the 
IRAP to more social and clinical phenomena. Towards this aim, Experiments 2-6 
presented in Chapter 3 employed the IRAP as a measure of implicit attitudes to race. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
Using the IRAP as a Measure of  
Implicit Attitudes to Race 
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Chapter 3 
Using the IRAP as a Measure of Implicit Attitudes to Race 
Experiments 2-6 
 
Discrimination and segregation, on the basis of race, religion, etc., were 
formerly openly expressed and commonplace in Western society. But, the expression 
of such views and open actions based upon them are now socially unacceptable. As a 
result, there has been a considerable decline in the expression of discriminatory views 
(Schuman, Steeth, & Bobo, 1997). However, this trend may be more indicative of a 
change in the verbal culture, rather than decreases in the occurrence of overtly 
discriminatory practices. McConaghy (1986) attempted to address this issue with the 
development of an explicit self-report measure, known as the Modern Racism Scale 
(MRS), which attempted to tap into beliefs that perhaps societies now treat various 
social sub-groups with positive discrimination. One item, for example, implies that 
Black people ‘have it too easy’ or ‘make life hard for themselves’. This scale has been 
shown to predict prejudiced behaviour in decision-making even when no overt racism 
was expressed (McConaghy, 1983). Other similar explicit measures include: the 
Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice Scale (MRWPS) which has been 
successfully used to identify the factors that may either promote or thwart prejudice 
reduction (Plant, & Devine, 1998) and the Discrimination and Diversity Scale (DDS) 
has been shown to correlate with racial prejudice on a priming task (Wittenbrink, 
Judd, & Park, 1997). 
In spite of researchers’ best efforts, however, the change in social climate has 
possibly meant that it is even more difficult to get questionnaire respondents to 
honestly report their opinions, particularly on sensitive issues such as race 
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(Greenwald, & Breckler, 1985; Lindeman, & Verkasalo, 1995). This has naturally set 
the stage for a potentially strong role for implicit measures, such as the IAT, in the 
study of socially sensitive phenomena. Indeed, many studies of race, for example, 
have employed a combination of both explicit and implicit methodologies, and have 
used this as a forum for determining the nature of correlation between the two. 
 
Using Implicit Measures to Study Race 
Numerous studies have used implicit measures to examine the implicit in-
group bias of White participants (Amodio, & Devine, 2006; McConnell, Rydell, 
Strain, & Mackie, 2008). At its simplest, participants have shown a significant 
implicit preference for White people over Black people even when the effect for 
implicit colour preference was controlled (Smith-McAllen, Johnson, Dovidio, & 
Pearson, 2006). More seriously, Eberherdt, Goff, Purdie and Davies (2004) 
demonstrated that White college students and White police officers implicitly 
associated criminality more with Black people than with White people, and this pro-
White/anti-Black bias was enhanced for Black persons with darker skin. Indeed, 
Maddox and Gray (2002) demonstrated that both Black and White participants more 
readily associated very dark–skinned Black persons with negative racial stereotypic 
characteristics (e.g. criminal, poor, aggressive) than Black persons of paler skin 
colour. 
 
Racial Bias as Safe and Dangerous 
Research on attitudes to race has employed a range of attributes against which 
White and Black comparisons can be drawn and one commonly used dimension is 
safe vs. dangerous (e.g. Devine, 1989). For instance, Duncan (1976) reported that 
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mildly aggressive behaviour is perceived as more threatening when performed by a 
Black person than by a White person (see also Sagar, & Schofield, 1980). In fact, 
safe/dangerous appears to be a particularly useful attribute for drawing such 
comparisons because attentional bias is believed to be enhanced in a context of 
perceived threat. Indeed, an attentional bias for weapons is commonly observed in the 
context of eye-witness testimony. That is, when a weapon is present an individual’s 
attention is focused on the weapon and many of the other contextual variables (e.g. 
the person holding the weapon) are ignored. For example, Yarmey and Jones (1983) 
reported that 88% of expert psychologists they interviewed believed that the presence 
of a weapon interferes with a witness’s ability to remember the perpetrator’s face. In 
fact, priming researchers have argued that weapon bias is such a powerful effect that 
participants report seeing a weapon in the context of racial stereotyping, even when 
none is present (Payne, 2006). This effect is more likely when participants are asked 
to respond at speed, rather than when the task is subject to conscious control (Payne, 
Lambert, & Jacoby, 2001). Hence, it is not clear in he literature to what extent 
attentional weapon bias interacts with racial discriminations. 
Of perhaps greater concern, researchers of implicit cognitions have also 
reported strong links between attentional bias and overt behaviour. In a video-game 
context, Correll, Wittenbrink and Judd (2002) explored the impact of ethnicity on 
participants’ decisions to ‘shoot’ and thus addressed the issue of the interaction of 
weapon bias and race. In this particular procedure, participants could see the ethnicity 
of the target persons and the objects held by them, but ethnicity was irrelevant to 
whether or not the targets were armed. The results indicated that armed targets who 
were African-American were shot more readily than armed-targets who were White 
and White unarmed targets were shot less than unarmed African-American (see 
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Greenwald et al., 2003 for a similar study). In this case race enhanced weapon bias. 
Implicit measures, therefore, appear to have been successful at highlighting strong 
and even dangerous implicit racial prejudice, even in a culture where overt racial 
practices are politically incorrect. 
 
The Current Research 
At the time of writing, there were no published studies that had employed the 
IRAP as a measure of implicit attitudes to race. The research reported in the current 
chapter (Experiments 2-6) attempted to address this issue directly. Experiment 2 was 
a preliminary study that attempted to explore pro-White and anti-Black bias by 
presenting an IRAP with the phrases WHITE PERSON and BLACK PERSON in 
conjunction with sets of target words that were readily categorised as safe (e.g. 
FRIENDLY) or dangerous (e.g. HOSTILE). In Experiments 3 and 4, new IRAPs 
containing White vs. Black pictures were presented and the items in the pictures were 
manipulated in order to determine what influence this might have on attitudes to race. 
Specifically, in Experiment 3, the IRAP contained pictures of White and Black men 
holding guns, while in Experiment 4 the White and Black men in the pictures all held 
mundane objects. In Experiments 5 and 6, both the White and Black men held guns 
and mundane objects. In Experiments 2 to 5, correct responding on consistent trials 
always involved categorising White as safe and Black as dangerous and responding 
on inconsistent trials required the reverse (Black as safe and White as dangerous). In 
other words, the item held in the pictures was actually irrelevant to correct 
responding. However in Experiment 6, correct responding was determined directly by 
the items held by the men in the pictures. In this case, guns were always categorised 
as dangerous and mundane objects as safe in consistent trials, but the reverse was true 
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for inconsistent trials. Hence, in Experiment 6 participants were not responding on the 
basis of race directly but we wanted to determine whether this would influence their 
reactions to the objects held. 
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
 
The primary aim of the preliminary study in Experiment 2 was to investigate 
the utility of the IRAP as an implicit measure of race. In this IRAP, participants were 
simply required to relate the phrases WHITE PERSON and BLACK PERSON to a 
range of simple positive and negative terms that could be readily categorised as safe 
and dangerous.  
 
Participants 
A sample of thirty participants was recruited for Experiment 2. All were 
Caucasian Irish undergraduate students at NUIM and were aged between 20 and 22 
years old (M: 21 years and 6 months). All participants were recruited through class 
announcements and notice boards in the Psychology Department. No participants had 
previous experience of the IRAP and they received no remuneration for their part in 
the research. All were required to have high fluency in English, as well as normal or 
corrected to normal vision. In this study, all participants reached criterion in practice 
trials for the IRAP, hence, all are included in the data analyses.  
 
Setting 
All aspects of the setting were identical to Experiment 1. 
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Materials and Apparatus 
Experiment 2 involved two basic sets of materials. The explicit measures 
comprised of a modified version of the Modern Racism Scale (MRS); the 
Discrimination and Diversity Scale (DDS); the Motive to Respond Without Prejudice 
Scale (MRWPS); a Racial Experience Questionnaire (REQ); a Feeling Thermometer; 
and Likert scales. The implicit measure comprised of the IRAP.  
Explicit Measures. The Modified Modern Racism Scale (MMRS) was based on 
the original by McConaghy (1986) that was adapted for use with Irish participants. 
The measure comprised of a 5-point scale ranging from –2/Strongly Disagree to 
+2/Strongly Agree, along which participants indicated their level of agreement or 
disagreement with each of six statements (e.g. “It is easy to understand the anger of 
black people”, see Appendix B). There was a maximum score of 10 and a minimum 
score of -10. A low score indicated an absence of racist attitudes. 
The Discrimination and Diversity Scale (DDS) is a measure of racial 
discrimination. It comprised of two separate sub-scales -- The Discrimination Scale 
and the Diversity Scale. The Discrimination Scale comprised of ten statements (e.g. 
“More and more, Blacks use accusations of racism for their own advantage”) that 
were scored from 1/Strongly Agree to 5/Strongly Disagree -- see Appendix C). There 
was a maximum score of 50 and a minimum score of 10. A high score indicated an 
absence of racist attitudes. The Diversity Scale was designed to measure explicit 
attitudes to ethnic diversity. It consisted of four statements (e.g. “There is real danger 
that too much emphasis on cultural diversity will tear Ireland apart”) and was scored 
from 1/Strongly Agree to 5/Strongly Disagree, see Appendix C. There was a 
maximum score of 20 and a minimum score of 4. A high score indicated an absence 
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of racist attitudes. In three instances the words United States were substituted with 
Ireland to ensure this measure would be suitable for Irish participants. 
The Racial Experience Questionnaire (REQ) was a closed questionnaire 
designed for current experimental purposes. It contained seven questions (e.g. “How 
many Black acquaintances do you have?”), five of which were scored on a 4-point 
scale from 1/None to 4/Many, see Appendix D. On one additional question, 
participants were asked to rate the positivity or negativity of their experiences with 
Black people on a 5-point scale from 1/Very Negative to 5/Very Positive.  
The Feeling Thermometer simply required participants to rate their explicit 
feelings towards Irish people and Black people on a scale of 0/Cold to 100/Warm, see 
Appendix E. 
In the Likert scales, participants were presented with a series of opposing 
terms (e.g. SAFE vs. DANGEROUS and FRIENDLY vs. HOSTILE) that were the 
juxtaposed target stimuli within the IRAP. Participants were asked to rate which term 
of each pair they considered Black People to be like using a 7-point scale, where -3 
was most associated with one term (e.g. DANGEROUS) and +3 was most associated 
with the opposing term (e.g. SAFE, see Appendix F). There was a maximum score of 
18 and a minimum score of -18. A high score indicated that participants considered 
Black People to be more positive (e.g. safe) than negative (e.g. dangerous). 
Implicit Measure. The IRAP employed in Experiment 2 was identical in 
format to the previous study, except for the target stimuli (see Table 3). The sample 
stimuli comprised the two phrases: WHITE PERSON and BLACK PERSON. The 
target stimuli contained twelve evaluative terms, six readily categorised as safe 
(SAFE, FRIENDLY, PEACEFUL, PASSIVE, HARMLESS and TRUSTWORTHY) 
and six readily categorised as dangerous (DANGEROUS, HOSTILE, VIOLENT, 
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AGGRESSIVE, THREATENING and MALICIOUS). The response options in the 
current IRAP were TRUE and FALSE. The screen shots employed as visual aids in 
the previous experiment were adapted for current purposes. 
Table 3 
The Stimulus Arrangements Employed in Experiment 2 
 
 
Sample 1 
WHITE PERSON 
Sample 2 
BLACK PERSON 
Response Option 1 
TRUE 
Response Option 2 
FALSE 
Target Deemed Consistent with Sample 1 Target Deemed Consistent with Sample 2 
SAFE DANGEROUS 
FRIENDLY HOSTILE 
PEACEFUL VIOLENT 
PASSIVE AGGRESSIVE 
HARMLESS THREATENING 
TRUSTWORTHY MALICIOUS 
 
Procedure 
 All participants completed the study in a single experimental session that 
lasted between 30 and 40mins. All were presented with the same experimental 
sequence that involved exposure to the explicit measures followed after a short break 
by the IRAP. 
 Explicit Measures. Participants were provided with the following verbal 
instructions regarding completion of the explicit measures: 
These questionnaires are trying to find out how more about your attitudes 
towards race. Please read all questions carefully and please answer all of the 
questions as honestly as you possibly can. Your answers are completely 
confidential and anonymous. 
 
The IRAP. All procedural aspects of the IRAP employed in Experiment 2 were 
identical to the previous study, in the context of the new stimuli. In this case, the four 
basic trial-types were referred to as: WHITE/Safe (top left of Figure 4); 
WHITE/Dangerous (top right); BLACK/Safe (bottom left); and BLACK/Dangerous 
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(bottom right). Each block of IRAP trials comprised of six exposures to each of the 
four trial-types – hence one exposure to each of the six target words. 
In the IRAP in Experiment 2, correct responses on consistent trials involved 
positivity towards WHITE PERSON and negativity towards BLACK PERSON. That 
is, participants, for example, were required to respond as follows: WHITE 
PERSON/SAFE/TRUE; WHITE PERSON/DANGEROUS/FALSE; BLACK 
PERSON/SAFE/FALSE; and BLACK PERSON/DANGEROUS/TRUE. In contrast, 
correct responses on inconsistent trials involved negativity towards WHITE PERSON 
and positivity towards BLACK PERSON (i.e. WHITE PERSON/SAFE/FALSE; 
WHITE PERSON/DANGEROUS/TRUE; BLACK PERSON/SAFE/TRUE; and 
BLACK PERSON/DANGEROUS/FALSE). 
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Figure 4. A schematic representation of the four basic trial-types in Experiment 2. 
 
RESULTS 
The primary analyses of the D-IRAP scores conducted here involved the D-IRAP 
trial-type data (rather than using overall D scores as had been the case in the previous 
study). The D-IRAP  trial-type data are particularly beneficial for analysing race 
because they permit distinctions between responding, for example, to Black versus 
White and would, in subsequent experiments, be used to compare responding to Black 
and White pictures involving different types of held objects.  
Safe 
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Select ‘d’ key Select ‘k’ key 
White Person 
True False 
Dangerous 
Consistent Inconsistent 
Select ‘d’ key Select ‘k’ key 
True False 
White Person 
WHITE/Safe White/Dangerous 
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Inconsistent Consistent 
Select ‘d’ key Select ‘k’ key 
Black Person 
True False 
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Inconsistent Consistent 
Select ‘d’ key Select ‘k’ key 
True False 
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 50 
Figure 5 shows the mean D-IRAP score for each of the four trial-types in 
Experiment 2 and highlights considerable differences in this regard. Similar to 
Experiment 1, responding in the predicted direction (that was, responding that White 
was safe and Black was dangerous) was indicated in the graphs by bars above a D-
IRAP score of zero (positive D-IRAP scores) and responding that was contrary to 
prediction (responding that Black was safe and White was dangerous) was indicated 
by bars below a D-IRAP score of zero (negative D-IRAP scores). The largest D-IRAP score 
was recorded for BLACK/Safe, but this was not in the predicted direction. That is, 
contrary to predictions, participants more readily confirmed than denied that Black 
was safe. WHITE/Safe produced a smaller but sizeable D-IRAP score and this was in 
the predicted direction. Hence, participants more readily confirmed than denied that 
White was safe. The D-IRAP scores for the two remaining trial-types were considerably 
smaller. WHITE/Dangerous was only marginally above zero, but was in the predicted 
direction. This indicated that participants marginally more readily denied than 
confirmed that White was dangerous. The smallest D-IRAP score recorded was for 
BLACK/Dangerous which was negligibly below zero, thus indicating that participants 
neither confirmed nor denied that Black was dangerous. 
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Figure 5. The mean D-IRAP trial-type scores recorded in Experiment 2. * Indicates that 
the trial-type was significant relative to zero. Arrow indicates trial-types 
that were significantly different from each other. 
 
A 2x3x4 mixed repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with sequence 
(consistent-first vs. inconsistent-first) as the between participant variable and test 
order  (Test 1 vs. 2, Test 3 vs. 4 and Test 5 vs. 6) and trial-type as within participant 
variables. There was a highly significant main effect for trial-type [F (3, 84) =7.302, p 
= .001,  ηp2  = 0.206], but not for test order or sequence (both p’s > .211), all other p’s  
> .14. Post-hoc analyses (Fisher’s PLSD) indicated, as expected, that BLACK/Safe 
was significantly different from the other three trial-types: WHITE/Safe (p < .001); 
WHITE/Dangerous (p = .001); and BLACK/Dangerous (p = .012). WHITE/Safe and 
BLACK/Dangerous were marginally significantly different from each other (p = .059, 
all other p’s  > .237). 
Four one sample t-tests were conducted to determine if the D-IRAP score for 
each trial-type differed significantly from zero. As expected, only WHITE/Safe [t (29) 
WHITE 
Safe 
WHITE 
Dangerous 
BLACK 
Safe 
  BLACK 
  Dangerous 
Trial-type 
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= 2.179, p = .038] and BLACK/Safe [t (29) =-4.504, p < .001] were significant. 
WHITE/Dangerous and BLACK/Dangerous were not (both p’s > .416).  
 
IRAP Summary 
The D-IRAP trial-type scores were in part consistent with experimental 
predictions. Specifically, responding on both of the White trial-types indicated the 
expected pro-White bias, although responding on WHITE/Dangerous was not 
significant. Hence, participants significantly confirmed that White was safe and to a 
lesser extent they denied that White was dangerous. However, responding on the two 
Black trial-types was contrary to predictions and failed to show an anti-Black bias. 
Specifically, participants significantly confirmed that Black was safe and neither 
confirmed nor denied that Black was dangerous. 
 
Explicit Measures 
 A summary of the outcomes (i.e. means, percentages etc.) recorded on the 
explicit measures and a brief interpretation of these outcomes is presented in Table 4. 
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Table 4 
A Summary and Interpretations of Outcomes on the Explicit Measures in Experiment 
2. 
 
Explicit Measures Mean/Score Participants 
Range 
Interpretation of Attitudes 
The Feeling 
Thermometer-Irish 
83 50-100 High warmth towards Irish people. 
The Feeling 
Thermometer-Black 
63.33 0-100 Medium warmth towards Black people. 
35.2 24-42 Not racially biased  
against Black people. 
Discrimination Scale 
 
Diversity Scale 12.7 9-17 Not racially biased  
against Black people. 
Modified Modern Racism 
Scale (MMRS) 
-4.4 -9 to +1 Not racially biased  
against Black people. 
The Racial Experience Questionnaire Sub-Scales 
92.4%= Yes 
7.6% = No 
Most participants knew Black people. 
62.7%= Yes 
36.3% = No 
Two thirds of participants had a Black 
friend. 
23.1%= Yes 
75.9% = No 
One quarter of participants had a Black 
colleague. 
36.3%= Yes 
62.7% = No 
One third of participants had a close 
Black relationship. 
75.9%= Yes 
23.1% = No 
Three quarters of participants had 
Black neighbours. 
Black Acquaintance 
 
Black Friend 
 
Black Colleague 
 
Black Relationship 
 
 
Black Neighbour 
 
 
Black Encounters 
42.9% = Positive 
46.2%= Neutral       
9.9% = Negative 
 
Just under half of participants had 
positive and equally positive/negative 
Black experiences. 
Likert Scales 3.83 +16 to -13 Black persons perceived as safe rather 
than dangerous. 
 
On the majority of the explicit measures, participants indicated the absence of 
racial bias against Black people (e.g. on the DDS and the MMRS). Furthermore, on 
the Feeling Thermometer, they rated Irish people only slightly higher than Black 
people and on the Likert scales they more readily associated Black people with safe 
than dangerous. The other explicit measures appear to provide some explanation for 
these outcomes in terms of direct experiences participants reported with Black 
persons. Specifically, the majority of participants had positive acquaintances, friends 
and neighbours who were Black and a smaller percentage had Black work colleagues 
and close relationships with Black people.  
 Correlations Among Explicit Measures 
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 A series of Fishers r to z correlations were undertaken among the explicit 
measures in order to determine the potential relationships therein. The correlation 
coefficients and significance values for all of the planned comparisons that proved 
significant are presented in Table 5.  
 
Table 5  
Observed Correlations Among the Explicit Measures Employed in Experiment 2 
 
 
Overall, there were numerous correlations amongst the explicit measures that 
suggested that they may have been measuring the same attitudes. For example, the 
correlations were as expected and significant between the DDS sub-scales and the 
MMRS; and the Discrimination Scale with the Likert scales. Interestingly, the Feeling 
Thermometer for Black persons correlated also with the Discrimination Scale and 
with the Likert scales, indicating that they were tapping into the same attitudes to 
Black people. The negative correlation between the Discrimination Scale and the Irish 
Feeling Thermometer suggested that favourability towards Irish did not assume 
disfavour towards Black. This view was also supported by the positive correlation 
between the Discrimination Scale and the Black Feeling Thermometer. The 
correlation between the Likert scales and responding on the Black Acquaintance sub-
Measures Compared 
 
Correlation P-Value 
Correlations Expected to be Positive 
Discrimination vs. Diversity .508 .004 
Discrimination vs. Feeling Thermometer Irish -.448 .012 
Discrimination vs. Feeling Thermometer Black .522 .003 
Correlations Expected to be Negative 
MMRS vs. Discrimination Scale -.612   0.00 
MMRS vs. Diversity -.415 .022 
Likert Scales vs. Feeling Thermometer Black -.511 .003 
Discrimination vs. Likert Scales -.506 .004 
Diversity vs. Encounters with Black People -.404 .026 
Feeling Thermometer Black vs. Black Acquaintance - .417 .021 
Likert Scales vs. Black Acquaintance -.517 .003 
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scale of the REQ suggested that having a Black acquaintance increased the likelihood 
of responding to Black as safe. Furthermore, the correlation between the Diversity 
Scale and the Encounters with Black People sub-scale suggested that greater 
neutrality towards Black people was associated with greater diversity. Again, the 
negative correlation between the Black Feeling Thermometer and the Black 
Acquaintance sub-scale suggested that more acquaintances were correlated with 
greater warmth. 
 
Explicit and Implicit Correlations   
Although the majority of IRAP studies frequently do not find significant 
correlations between the IRAP and explicit measures, a series of Fishers r to z 
correlations were conducted here to correlate the overall D-IRAP scores with the 
explicit measures. Only the Black Encounters sub-scale (r =.433, n = 29, p = .016) 
and the Black Acquaintance sub-scale (r= .356, n= 29, p = .053) correlated 
significantly with the IRAP (all p’s > .105). That is, high overall D-IRAP scores 
showing stronger racial bias correlated with more negative experiences with Black 
people.  
 
Results Summary 
The D-IRAP trial-type scores were in part consistent with experimental 
predictions in showing some element of a pro- White bias. Specifically, participants 
significantly confirmed that White was safe and had mixed views about Black as 
dangerous. However, the two Black trial-tpes were unexpectedly similar to the White 
trial-types. That is, paarticipants significantly confirmed that Black was safe and had 
mixed views of Black as dangerous. Hence, there was no anti-Black bias. On 
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practically all of the explicit measures, participants indicated the absence of racial 
bias against Black people. While there were numerous correlations amongst the 
explicit measures that suggessted that they may be measuring the same attitudes, 
overall D-IRAP score correlated only with the level of Black acquaintances. 
 
DISCUSSION 
The primary aim of Experiment 2 was to examine the IRAP as an implicit 
measure of race, and in particular to examine evaluations of Black vs. White as safe 
and dangerous. In the current study, this was achieved by examining the relationships 
between the phrases WHITE PERSON and BLACK PERSON and a range of 
evaluative terms, readily dichotomised as safe or dangerous (e.g. FRIENDLY and 
HARMLESS). In this context, responding on both White trial-types showed similar 
pro- White and pro- Black effects in terms of evaluating both as safe, but they had 
mixed views on both as dangerous. Hence there was no anti- Black effect. 
The current findings in terms of the absence of an anti-Black bias are 
inconsistent with practically all of the IAT studies of race (McConnell et al., 2008, 
Dasgupta, McGee, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2000). This discordance of evidence in the 
latter may have occurred for a variety of reasons. (1) The current experiment was 
conducted with an Irish population, whereas the majority of IAT studies have 
employed American participants, who live in a much more multi-cultural 
environment. (2) Numerous IAT studies have employed picture, rather than word, 
stimuli and the latter may be particularly useful in distinctions that involve safe vs. 
dangerous (rather than more simplistic good vs. bad distinctions -- Greenwald, Oakes, 
& Hoffman, 2002). Experiment 3 attempted to address this latter possibility directly 
by employing a picture-based, rather than word-based, IRAP. 
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EXPERIMENT 3 
 
The primary aim of Experiment 3 was to extend the preliminary work in 
Experiment 2 that had used word stimuli to examine implicit attitudes to race in terms 
of evaluations of safe and dangerous. In short, we wanted to determine if stronger 
IRAP outcomes, particularly in terms of anti-Black, would be recorded with picture 
stimuli. Hence, in this study, participants were presented with pictures of Black and 
White men. In order to enhance the Black vs. White distinction and to examine the 
possible role of attentional weapon bias, Experiment 3 presented pictures in which 
both the Black and White men were holding guns. However, it is important to 
emphasise that consistent and inconsistent responding on the IRAP were not 
differentiated by the presence of the guns. Put simply, in this IRAP consistent 
responding required relations in which White was always safe and Black was always 
dangerous and inconsistent responding required the reverse.  
 
Participants 
A sample of twenty-seven participants, aged between 18 and 30 years of age 
(M: 24 years and 2 months) were recruited for Experiment 3. All were Caucasian Irish 
undergraduates at NUIM and were recruited through class announcements and 
Departmental notice boards. They had no experience of the IRAP and received no 
remuneration for their involvement in the research. All participants presented with 
high levels of fluency in English and normal or corrected to normal vision. Only one 
participant was removed from the data analyses for failing to reach criterion during 
the IRAP practice blocks, thus leaving a sample of twenty-six. 
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Setting 
The setting was identical to Experiment 2. 
 
Materials and Apparatus 
Experiment 3 involved the same two basic sets of materials as Experiment 2, 
except for the new IRAP stimuli and the related adjustments to the visual aids and 
Likert scales.  
Likert scales. The Likert scales employed here each comprised of a 13-point 
scale that assessed participants’ explicit attitudes towards the six pictures of Black 
and White men holding guns that would subsequently be presented in the IRAP. On 
each rating, participants were required to indicate the extent to which they rated the 
man in the picture as SAFE or DANGEROUS from -6/Extremely Safe to 
+6/Extremely Dangerous, see Appendix H.  
The IRAP. The IRAP employed in Experiment 3 was identical in format to the 
previous study, except for the different sample and target stimuli (see Table 6). In the 
current case, the sample stimuli were the words SAFE and DANGEROUS. The target 
stimuli were three pictures of Black men holding guns and three pictures of White 
men holding (the same three) guns. The response options were TRUE and FALSE. 
The six pictures comprised of digital coloured photographs taken from the 
International Affective Picture System (IAPS: Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1999) and 
had been previously employed in IAT research by Greenwald et al., (2003). All 
pictures were 259 pixels wide, 305 pixels tall, in 256-colour greyscale format and 
presented against a white background.  
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Table 6 
The Stimulus Arrangements Employed in Experiment 3 
 
 
Sample 1 
SAFE 
Sample 2 
DANGEROUS 
Response Option 1 
TRUE 
Response Option 2 
FALSE 
Targets deemed consistent with Sample 1 Targets deemed consistent with Sample 2 
White man with gun 1 Black man with gun 1 
White man with gun 2 Black man with gun 2 
White man with gun 3  Black man with gun 3 
White man with gun 1 Black man with gun 1 
White man with gun 2  Black man with gun 2 
White man with gun 3 Black man with gun 3 
 
Procedure 
 All participants completed the study in a single experimental session that 
lasted between 30 and 40mins. in total. Although made available to them, none of the 
participants opted for short breaks at any point.  
The IRAP. All procedural aspects of the IRAP employed in Experiment 3 were 
identical to the previous studies. The trial-types presented here were referred to as: 
SAFE/White (top left of Figure 6); SAFE/Black (top right); DANGEROUS/White 
(bottom left); and DANGEROUS/Black (bottom right). As before, each block of trials 
was composed of six exposures to each of the four trial-types, hence two exposures to 
each of three photos for each trial-type.  
Correct responses on consistent trials involved indicating that the White 
pictures were SAFE and the Black pictures were DANGEROUS (irrespective of the 
fact that both held guns). That is, participants were required to respond as follows: 
SAFE/White/TRUE; SAFE/Black/FALSE; DANGEROUS/White/FALSE and 
DANGEROUS/Black/TRUE. In contrast, correct responses on inconsistent trials 
involved indicating that the Black pictures were SAFE and the White pictures were 
DANGEROUS. That is, participants were required to respond as follows: 
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SAFE/White/FALSE; SAFE/Black/TRUE; DANGEROUS/White/TRUE; and 
DANGEROUS/Black/FALSE. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.  A schematic representation of the four basic trial-types in Experiment 3. 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
The mean D-IRAP scores for the four trial-types in Experiment 3 are presented 
in Figure 7. Again,responding in the predicted direction (that was, responding that 
White was safe and Black was dangerous) was indicated in the graphs by bars above a 
SAFE/White SAFE/Black 
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Select‘d’ key Select ‘k’ key 
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Consistent Inconsistent 
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Dangerous 
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D-IRAP score of zero (positive D-IRAP scores) and responding that was contrary to 
prediction (responding that Black was safe and White was dangerous) was indicated 
by bars below a D-IRAP score of zero (negative D-IRAP scores).  The largest D-IRAP 
scores were recorded for the SAFE/White and DANGEROUS/Black trial-types, both 
of which were in the predicted direction. That is, participants more readily confirmed 
than denied that White was safe (thus showing a pro- White bias) and that Black was 
dangerous (thus showing an anti-Black bias). The D-IRAP for SAFE/Black was also 
sizable, but was in the non-predicted direction. That is, participants more readily 
confirmed than denied that Black was safe, hence showing a pro-Black bias. The D-
IRAP scores for DANGEROUS/White was the smallest and was also in the non-
predicted direction. That is, participants more readily confirmed than denied that 
White was dangerous. 
 
 
 
Figure 7. The mean D-IRAP trial-type scores recorded in Experiment 3.*Indicates that  
the trial-type was significant relative to zero. Arrow indicates trial-types 
that were significantly different from each other. 
 
The D-IRAP trial-type scores were subjected to a 2x3x4 mixed repeated 
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order and sequence were not (both p’s > .277), all other p’s > .164. Post-hoc tests 
(Fishers’ PLSD) indicated that SAFE-White differed significantly from SAFE/Black 
(p = .001) and from DANGEROUS/White (p = .005). DANGEROUS/Black differed 
significantly from SAFE/Black (p = .004) and from DANGEROUS/White (p = .002), 
all other p’s > .592.  
Four one-group t-tests were conducted to determine whether the D-IRAP scores 
for each trial-type differed significantly from zero. SAFE/White [t (23) = 3.358, p < 
.003] and DANGEROUS/Black [t (23) = 2.483, p < .021] were significant, and 
SAFE/Black was approaching significance [t (23) = -1.779, p = .088]. Only 
DANGEROUS/White was not significant (p = .411). 
 
IRAP Summary 
Large and significant D-IRAP scores were recorded for SAFE/White and 
DANGEROUS/Black and both were in the predicted direction. That is, participants 
more readily confirmed than denied that White was safe and that Black was 
dangerous showing a pro-White and anti-Black bias respectively. The D-IRAP score for 
SAFE/Black was also significant but was not in the predicted direction, indicating that 
participants confirmed rather than denied that Black was safe (thus showing a pro-
Black bias). Participants had mixed views on White as dangerous. 
 
Explicit Measures 
 A summary of the outcomes (i.e. means, percentages etc.) recorded on the 
explicit measures and a brief interpretation of these outcomes is presented in Table 7. 
On the majority of explicit measures, participants again indicated the absence of racial 
bias against Black people. Again, most had numerous and positive experiences with 
Black persons. 
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Table 7  
A Summary and Interpretations of Outcomes on the Explicit Measures in Experiment 
3 
 
Explicit Measures Mean/Score Participants 
Range 
Interpretation of Attitudes 
The Feeling 
Thermometer-Irish 
70 65-80 Medium warmth towards Irish people. 
The Feeling 
Thermometer-Black 
60 50-70 Medium warmth towards Black people. 
39 37-43 Not racially biased  
against Black people. 
Discrimination Scale 
 
Diversity Scale 12 10-13 Not racially biased  
against Black people. 
Modified Modern Racism 
Scale (MMRS) 
-10 -6 to -11 Not racially biased  
against Black people. 
The Racial Experience Questionnaire Sub-Scales 
100%= Yes 
0% = No 
All participants knew Black people. 
66%= Yes 
33% = No 
Two thirds of participants had a Black 
friend. 
25%= Yes 
75% = No 
One quarter of participants had a Black 
colleague. 
33%= Yes 
66% = No 
One third of participants had a close 
Black relationship. 
25%= Yes 
75% = No 
One quarters of participants had Black 
neighbours. 
Black Acquaintance 
 
Black Friend 
 
Black Colleague 
 
Black Relationship 
 
 
Black Neighbour 
 
 
Black Encounters 
50% = Positive 
50%= Neutral       
0% = Negative 
 
Half of participants had positive and 
half had equally positive/negative 
Black experiences. 
Likert Scales -12 -6 to -14 Black and White persons with guns 
perceived as dangerous. 
 
On the majority of the explicit measures, participants again indicated the 
absence of racial bias against Black people. Again, most had numerous and positive 
experiences with Black persons. Participants were moderately motivated to respond in 
a non-prejudiced way and were slightly more motivated by internal than external 
constructs in this regard.  
 
Correlations Amongst Explicit Measures 
Statistical analyses (Fisher’s r to z) were conducted to determine whether any 
correlations existed among the explicit measures. The results are presented in Table 8. 
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Table 8 
Statistically Significant Correlations among Explicit Measures in Experiment 3  
 
Planned Comparisons between  
Explicit Measures 
Correlation P-value 
Correlations Expected to be Positive 
Discrimination vs. Diversity .557 .024 
Diversity vs. REQ 1 .641 .003 
Correlations expected to be Negative 
Discrimination vs. MMRS -.623 .002 
 
A number of expected correlations were observed amongst the explicit 
measures that indicated that they were likely tapping into the same explicit attitudes. 
Not surprisingly, there was a strong correlation between the DDS sub-scales. The 
Diversity scale was also positively correlated with Black acquaintances, indicating 
that more acquaintances was correlated with greater diversity. The Discrimination 
scale was positively correlated with Black acquaintances, indicating that more 
acquaintances was correlated with greater diversity. There was a negative correlation 
between the MMRS and Discrimination scale, but this is expected because a low 
MMRS score and a high Discrimination score both equate to non-racist views.  
 
Explicit-Implicit Correlations 
A series of correlations (Fisher’s r to z) were conducted between the overall 
D-IRAP score and the explicit measures. None of these proved significant (all p’s > 
.125). 
 
Results Summary 
Large and significant D-IRAP scores were recorded for SAFE/White and 
DANGEROUS/Black and both were in the predicted direction. That is, participants 
more readily confirmed than denied that White was safe (pro-White bias) and that 
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Black (anti-Black bias) was dangerous. The D-IRAP score for SAFE/Black was also 
significant but was not in the predicted direction, indicating that participants 
confirmed rather than denied that Black was safe (Pro- Black bias). Participants had 
mixed views on White as dangerous. On the majority of explicit measures, 
participants indicated that absence of racial bias against Black people. While there 
were a number of significant correlations among the explicit measure none of these 
correlated with the IRAP.  
 
DISCUSSION 
One of the primary aims of Experiment 3 was to assess racial bias by 
juxtaposing Black and White pictures in an IRAP and to determine the extent to 
which guns presented in all pictures might interfere with the participants’ implicit 
reactions to the Black and White men. The findings indicated that participants showed 
significant pro-White and pro-Black bias for both the White and Black men in the 
pictures as safe even when they held guns. However, participants differed in their 
attitudes to Black and White as dangerous in a manner that may have reflected the 
influence of the guns. That is, they had mixed views about whether the White men 
with guns were dangerous, but significantly confirmed that the Black men with guns 
were dangerous. 
 A key difference, therefore, between Experiments 2 and 3 lay in the responses 
to Black and White as dangerous, because in both studies participants significantly 
confirmed that White and Black were safe. However, in Experiment 2, they had 
mixed views about both White and Black as dangerous, whereas in Experiment 3 
when the pictures contained guns, they had mixed views about White as dangerous 
but significantly confirmed that Black was dangerous. 
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 One alternative interpretation of the findings, of course, could simply be that 
the differences across the studies resulted from the fact that one IRAP presented 
words, while the other presented pictures. While this seemed unlikely given that the 
guns quite predictably appeared to affect the dangerous trial-types, rather than the safe 
trial-types, the IRAP in Experiment 4 presented pictures of Black and White men, all 
holding mundane objects. 
EXPERIMENT 4 
 
In order to determine if the weapons presented within the IRAP pictures in the 
previous study had facilitated different Black and White discriminations in terms of 
dangerousness, Experiment 4 presented Black and White pictures involving mundane 
objects. 
 
Participants 
A sample of twenty-five participants was recruited for Experiment 4. All were 
Caucasian Irish undergraduate students at NUIM and were aged between 18 and 28 
years old (M: 20 years and 9 months). All participants were recruited through class 
announcements and notice boards in the Psychology Department. No participants had 
previous experience of the IRAP and they received no remuneration for their part in 
the research. All were required to have high fluency in English, as well as normal or 
corrected to normal vision. In this study, all participants reached criterion in practice 
trials for the IRAP, hence all are included in the data analyses.  
 
Setting 
 The setting was identical to Experiment 3. 
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Materials and Apparatus 
Experiment 4 involved the same two basic sets of materials employed in 
Experiment 3, with the exception of the new IRAP stimuli and the related 
modifications to the IRAP visual aids and the Likert scales.  
The IRAP. The IRAP employed in Experiment 4 was identical in format to the 
previous study. Again, the sample stimuli were the words SAFE and DANGEROUS. 
The target stimuli here were three pictures of Black men holding mundane objects (a 
torch, a camera and a beer bottle) and three pictures of White men holding (the same 
three) mundane objects. Again, the response options were TRUE and FALSE (see 
Table 9). The six pictures were again digital coloured photographs taken from the 
IAPS and previously employed by Greenwald et al. (2003) and the White and Black 
men pictured here were identical to the previous study (only the items they held were 
different).  
 
Table 9 
The Stimulus Arrangements Employed in Experiment 4 
 
Sample 1 
SAFE 
Sample 2 
DANGEROUS 
Response Option 1 
TRUE 
Response Option 2 
FALSE 
Targets deemed consistent with Sample 1 Targets deemed consistent with Sample 2 
White Man with Torch Black Man with Torch 
White Man with Camera Black Man with Camera 
White Man with Bottle Black Man with Bottle 
White Man with Torch Black Man with Torch 
White Man with Camera Black Man with Camera 
White Man with Bottle Black Man with Bottle 
 
Procedure 
 All participants completed the study in a single experimental session that 
lasted between 30 and 40mins. in total. Although made available to them, none of the 
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participants opted for short breaks at any point. All participants were presented with 
the same experimental sequence that involved exposure to the explicit measure 
followed after a short break by the IRAP. 
 The IRAP. All procedural aspects of the IRAP employed in Experiment 4 were 
identical to the previous study, except for the different target stimuli. Because the 
change in the target stimuli only affected the items held by the men in the pictures, the 
trial-types remained the same -- SAFE/White (top left of Figure 8); SAFE/Black (top 
right); DANGEROUS/White (bottom left); and DANGEROUS/Black (bottom right). 
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Figure 8. A schematic representation of the four basic trial-types in Experiment 4. 
 
Figure 8. A schematic representation of the four basic trial-types in Experiment 4. 
 
Once again, correct responses on consistent trials involved indicating that 
White was SAFE and Black was DANGEROUS. That is, participants were required 
to respond as follows: SAFE/White/TRUE; SAFE/Black/FALSE; 
DANGEROUS/White/FALSE and DANGEROUS/Black/TRUE. Once again, on 
these trials, White was always safe and Black was always dangerous. Again, correct 
responding on inconsistent trials involved indicating that Black was SAFE and White 
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was DANGEROUS. That is, participants were required to respond as follows: 
SAFE/White/False; SAFE/Black/TRUE; DANGEROUS/White/TRUE and 
DANGEROUS/Black/FALSE. Once again, on these trials, White was always 
dangerous and Black was always safe. 
  
RESULTS 
The mean D-IRAP scores for the four trial-types in Experiment 4 are presented 
in Figure 9. Responding in the predicted direction (that was, responding that White 
was safe and Black was dangerous) was indicated in the graphs by bars above a D-
IRAP score of zero (positive D-IRAP scores) and responding that was contrary to 
prediction (responding that Black was safe and White was dangerous) was indicated 
by bars below a D-IRAP score of zero (negative D-IRAP scores). The largest D-IRAP score 
was recorded in the SAFE/White trial-type, which was in the predicted direction. That 
is, participants more readily confirmed than denied that White was safe (pro= White 
bias). A smaller D-IRAP score was recorded in the SAFE/Black trial-type, but 
responding here was not in the predicted direction. Contrary to the experimental 
predictions then, participants more readily confirmed than denied that Black was safe 
(pro- Black bias). The D-IRAP scores for the DANGEROUS/Black and 
DANGEROUS/White trial-types were considerably smaller and indeed both were in 
the predicted direction. Participants had mixed view on Black as dangerous. On 
DANGEROUS/White the effect was so small that it is reasonable to assume that 
participants neither confirmed nor denied that White was dangerous. 
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Figure 9. Mean D-IRAP scores recorded for the four trial-types in Experiment 4. 
 
The D-IRAP trial-type scores were subjected to a 2x3x4 mixed repeated 
measures ANOVA. Trial-type was significant [F(3, 66) = 1.481, p = .01,  ηp2 = .156], 
but test order, sequence and the interaction effects were not, all p’s > .174. Post-hoc 
tests (Fishers’ PLSD) indicated that the only significant trial-type differences were 
between SAFE/White and SAFE/Black (p = .005) and between SAFE/Black and 
DANGEROUS/Black (p = .048), all other p’s > .105 (see Figure 9). 
  Four one-sample t-tests (one per trial-type) were conducted to determine 
whether each of the D-IRAP scores differed significantly from zero. The results 
indicated that only SAFE/White [t (23) = 2.642, p = .015] was significant. 
SAFE/Black approached a significant difference from zero (p = .081), but 
DANGEROUS/White and DANGEROUS/Black were not significant (both p’s > .16).  
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IRAP Summary 
The D-IRAP scores in the current experiment indicated that participants 
significantly confirmed that White persons were safe (pro-White bias) and to a lesser, 
marginally significant extent they also confirmed that Black was safe (pro-Black 
bias). On the Dangerous/Black trial-type participants more readily confirmed than 
denied that Black was dangerous, but this was not significant. Participants had mixed 
views about White as dangerous.  
 
Explicit Measures 
The mean outcomes on the explicit measures along with a brief interpretation 
of each are presented in Table 10. On the majority of the explicit measures, 
participants indicated the absence of racial bias against Black people. Again, the 
majority reported many positive relationships with Black people. 
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Table 10  
A Summary and Interpretations of Outcomes on the Explicit Measures in Experiment 
4 
 
Explicit Measures Mean/Score Participants 
Range 
Interpretation of Attitudes 
The Feeling 
Thermometer-Irish 
84.38 
 
70-100 High warmth towards Irish people. 
The Feeling 
Thermometer-Black 
64.79 30-90 Medium warmth towards Black people. 
 
35.63 
 
26-47 
Not racially biased  
Against Black people. 
 
Discrimination Scale 
 
Diversity Scale 
12.9 10-16 Not racially biased  
Against Black people. 
Modified Modern Racism 
Scale (MMRS) 
-5.6 -10- +1 Not racially biased  
Against Black people. 
The Racial Experience Questionnaire Sub-Scales 
 
95.8%= Yes 
4.2% = No 
Most participants knew Black people. 
75% = Yes 
25% = No 
Three quarters of participants had a 
Black friend. 
20.8% = Yes 
79.2% = No 
One fifth of participants had a Black 
colleague. 
62.5% = Yes 
37.5% = No 
Almost two thirds of participants had a 
close Black relationship. 
62.5% = Yes 
37.5% = No 
Almost two thirds of participants had 
Black neighbours. 
Black Acquaintance 
 
 
Black Friend 
 
Black Colleague 
 
Black Relationship 
 
 
Black Neighbour 
 
 
Black Encounters 
50% = Positive 
37.5%= Neutral       
12.5% = Negative 
 
The majority of participants had 
positive or equally positive/negative 
Experiences with Black people 
Likert Scales 3.83 +16- to -13 Black persons perceived as safe rather 
than dangerous. 
 
 
Correlations Among Explicit Measures 
Statistical analyses (Fisher’s r to z) were conducted to determine whether any 
correlations existed among the explicit measures. The results are presented in Table 
11. 
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Table 11 
The Statistically Significant Correlations Among Explicit Measures in Experiment 11.  
 
Planned Comparisons between  
Explicit Measures 
Correlation P-value 
Correlations Expected to be Positive 
Discrimination vs. Diversity .457 .0238 
Discrimination vs. Feeling Thermometer Black .578 .0025 
Discrimination vs. REQ- Experience .564 .0034 
Diversity vs. Feeling Thermometer Black .456 .0241 
Diversity vs. Feeling Thermometer Irish -.464 .0212 
Feeling Thermometer Black vs. REQ- 
Experience 
.488 .0144 
Correlations expected to be Negative 
Discrimination vs. MMRS -.591 .0018 
REQ- Experience vs. MMRS -.493 .0133 
 
A number of expected correlations were observed amongst the explicit 
measures that indicated that they were likely tapping into the same explicit attitudes. 
Again, there was a strong correlation within the DDS and Discrimination also 
correlated with the MMRS. Interestingly, the Black Feeling Thermometer correlated 
positively with the Diversity Scale, but there was a negative correlation between the 
Irish Feeling Thermometer and the Diversity Scale, indicating that participants were 
both pro-Irish and pro-diversity. There were also correlations between the Experience 
sub-scale of the REQ and the MMRS and the Black Feeling Thermometer, suggesting 
that the low racism on the latter measures correlated with direct positive experiences 
with Black people.  
 
Explicit-Implicit Correlations 
A series of correlations (Fisher’s r to z) were conducted here between the 
overall D-IRAP score and the explicit measures. No significant correlations were found 
(all p’s > .336).  
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Results Summary 
On the IRAP, participants significantly confirmed that the White men with 
mundane objects, hence showing a pro-White bias. However, they also significantly 
confirmed that the Black men in the pictures with mundane objects were safe, thus 
showing a pro-Black bias.. Although they more readily confirmed than denied that 
Black was dangerous, this was not significant and participants also had mixed views 
about White as dangerous. On the majority of explicit measures, participants indicated 
the absence of racial bias against Black people.  
 
DISCUSSION 
One of the primary aims of Experiment 4 was to assess racial bias by 
juxtaposing Black and White pictures in an IRAP, as we had done in the previous 
study, and to determine the extent to which mundane objects (rather than guns) 
presented in all pictures might influence participants’ implicit reactions to the Black 
and White men. The findings indicated that participants showed significant pro-White 
and pro-Black bias for both the White and Black men in the pictures as safe when 
they held mundane objects. Participants showed mixed views about White and Black 
as dangerous. 
 A key difference, therefore, between Experiments 3 and 4 lay in the responses 
to Black and White as dangerous, because in both studies participants significantly 
confirmed that White and Black were safe, hence the presence of guns or mundane 
objects appeared to have no influence on these discriminations. However, in 
Experiment 3 when the pictures contained guns, they had mixed views about White as 
dangerous but significantly confirmed that Black was dangerous, whereas in 
Experiment 4 when the men held mundane objects, they had mixed views about both 
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White and Black as dangerous. Indeed, the outcome overall for Experiment 4 was 
almost identical to the word-based IRAP in Experiment 2. This latter similarity also 
suggested that the differences between Experiments 2 and 3 could not be attributed to 
contrasts per se between word- and picture-based IRAPs. 
 The three race studies conducted thus far were the first to employ the IRAP as 
a measure of implicit attitudes to race, so there was no existing IRAP research to 
which it could be compared. However, there exists numerous IAT studies of race, 
which have generally reported a combination of pro-White and anti-Black bias. 
However, the latter was not recorded with the IRAP’s here. Several IAT studies 
reporting these effects have presented pictures of Black and White men holding both 
guns and mundane objects, which we had not yet done with the IRAP (Greenwald et 
al., 2003). We addressed this issue in Experiment 5.     
  
EXPERIMENT 5 
  
In line with previous IAT studies of race, Experiment 5 presented pictures of 
Black and White men holding both guns and mundane objects. We were also 
concerned with the potential overlap of findings from such a manipulation we the data 
we had recorded for the IRAP and race thus far. 
 
Participants 
A sample of twenty-seven participants was recruited for Experiment 5. All 
were Caucasian Irish undergraduate students at NUIM and were aged between 18 and 
30 years old (M: 25 years and 4 months). All participants were recruited through class 
announcements and notice boards in the Psychology Department. No participants had 
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previous experience of the IRAP and they received no remuneration for their part in 
the research. All were required to have high fluency in English, as well as normal or 
corrected to normal vision. In this study, three participants failed to reach criterion in 
practice trials for the IRAP, hence the data from twenty-four participants are included 
in the analyses.  
  
Setting 
All aspects of the setting were identical to previous experiments. 
  
Materials and Apparatus 
Experiment 5 involved two basic sets of materials, identical to those used 
previously, but with relevant modifications to the IRAP stimuli and visual aids and 
the Likert scales. 
The IRAP. The sample stimuli in Experiment 5 were the words SAFE and 
DANGEROUS. The target stimuli were twelve pictures -- six of White men and six of 
Black men. Three pictures involved a White man holding a gun (with a different gun 
in each picture) that were taken from Experiment 3 and three involved a White man 
holding a mundane object (a beer bottle, a camera or a torch) taken from Experiment 
4. Similarly, three pictures involved a Black man holding a gun and three involved a 
Back man holding a mundane object (see Table 12). Again, the response options 
comprised the words TRUE and FALSE. 
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Table 12  
The Stimulus Arrangements Employed in Experiment 5 
 
 
Sample 1 
SAFE 
Sample 2 
DANGEROUS 
Response Option 1 
TRUE 
Response Option 2 
FALSE 
Targets deemed consistent with Sample 1 Targets deemed consistent with Sample 2 
White man with beer bottle Black man with beer bottle 
White man with camera Black man with camera 
White man with torch Black man with torch 
White man with gun 1 Black man with gun 1 
White man with gun 2 Black man with gun 2 
White man with gun 3 Black man with gun 3 
 
Procedure 
 All participants completed the study in a single experimental session that 
lasted 30-40mins and none opted for short breaks available at any point. All were 
presented with the same experimental sequence that involved exposure to the explicit 
measures followed after a short break by the IRAP. 
The IRAP. All procedural aspects of the IRAP employed in Experiment 5 were 
identical to the previous studies, in the context of the new stimuli. However, because 
the picture stimuli employed here contained both guns and mundane objects, it was 
necessary to sub-divide the standard four trial-types into eight. This would permit an 
analysis of whether participants were discriminating Black and White on the basis of 
either type of object presented in the pictures. The eight trial-types are presented in 
Figure 10 and may be summarised as follows: SAFE/White/Mundane; 
SAFE/White/Gun; SAFE/Black/Mundane; SAFE/Black/Gun; 
DANGEROUS/White/Mundane; DANGEROUS/White/Gun; 
DANGEROUS/Black/Mundane; and DANGEROUS/Black/Gun.  
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Figure 10. A schematic representation of the eight trial-types in Experiment 5. 
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RESULTS  
In Experiment 5, the data was analysed in terms of eight trial-types. The mean 
D-IRAP scores for the eight trial-types were calculated through the same process as the 
four trial-types before: (i) only response-latency data from test-blocks were used; (ii) 
latencies above 10,000 ms. were eliminated from the dataset; (iii) all data for 
participants were removed if they produced more than 10% of test block trials with 
latencies less than 300ms.; (iv) eight standard deviations for the eight trial-types were 
computed: one for each trial-type using the response latencies from the three Test 
Blocks combined; (v) two mean latencies for the eight trial-types in each test block 
were calculated; (vi) difference scores were calculated for each of the eight trial-
types, by subtracting the mean latency of the consistent block from the mean latency 
of the corresponding inconsistent block; (vii) each difference score was divided by its 
corresponding standard deviation from step 4, yielding eight D-IRAP scores; one score 
for each trial-type for each pair of test blocks. 
The mean D-IRAP scores for the eight trial-types in Experiment 5 are presented 
in Figure 11. Responding consistent with predictions (that was, responding that White 
was safe and Black was dangerous) was indicated in Figure 11 by bars above zero 
(positive D-IRAP scores) and responding inconsistent with predictions (responding that 
Black was safe and White was dangerous) was indicated by bars below zero (negative 
D-IRAP scores). The largest D-IRAP score was recorded for SAFE/White/Mundane and 
this was in the predicted direction, thus indicating that participants more readily 
confirmed than denied that White with a mundane object was safe (pro-White bias). A 
smaller D-IRAP score was recorded for SAFE/White/Gun, but this was not in the 
predicted direction, indicating that participants more readily denied than confirmed 
that White with a gun was safe. Responding on SAFE/Black/Mundane was not 
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noticeably different from zero (hence the lack of data on the graph), thus indicating 
that participants had mixed views about Black with a mundane object as safe. A small 
D-IRAP score was recorded for SAFE/Black/Gun, but again this was not in the 
predicted direction, indicating that participants more readily confirmed than denied 
that Black with a gun was safe. Responding on DANGEROUS/White/Mundane was 
barely noticeably different from zero although in the predicted direction, thus 
indicating that participants had mixed views about White with a mundane object as 
dangerous. A sizeable D-IRAP score was recorded for DANGEROUS/White/Gun, but 
again this was not in the predicted direction, indicating that participants more readily 
confirmed than denied that White with a gun was dangerous. A sizeable D-IRAP score 
was also recorded for DANGEROUS/Black/Mundane, but again this was not in the 
predicted direction, indicating that participants more readily denied than confirmed 
that Black with a mundane object was dangerous. A small D-IRAP score was recorded 
for DANGEROUS/Black/Gun and this was in the predicted direction, indicating that 
participants more readily confirmed than denied that Black with a gun was dangerous. 
 
Figure 11. Mean D-IRAP scores for the eight trial-types in Experiment 5. * Indicates 
that the trial-type was significant relative to zero. 
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In order to determine if these differences were significant, the D-IRAP scores 
were subjected to a 2x8 mixed ANOVA with sequence (consistent-first vs. 
inconsistent-first) as the between participant variable and trial-type as within-
participant variables. This analysis did not include test order, because doing so would 
have resulted in a sample size that was too small. The results revealed no significant 
main effects for trial-type or sequence and the interaction effect was also non-
significant (all p’s > .134).  
Eight one sample t-tests were conducted to determine if the D-IRAP scores for 
trial-type differed significantly from zero. Only SAFE/White/Mundane was 
significant (t (23) = 3.195, p = .024,  ηp2 = 0.19), all other p’s > .137.  
 
IRAP Summary 
Only one IRAP effect was significant in Experiment 5, where participants 
significantly confirmed that White men with mundane objects were safe (pro-White 
bias). Overall there were more pro-Black effects than expected. 
 
Explicit Measures 
The mean outcomes on the explicit measures along with a brief interpretation 
of each are presented in Table 13. On the majority of the explicit measures, 
participants indicated the absence of racial bias against Black people (e.g. on the DDS 
and the MMRS). On the Likert scales, they more readily associated men holding 
mundane objects as safe and men holding weapons as dangerous, irrespective of race.  
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Table 13 
A Summary and Interpretations of Outcomes on the Explicit Measures in Experiment 
5 
 
Explicit Measures Mean/Score Participants 
Range 
Interpretation of Attitudes 
The Feeling 
Thermometer-Irish 
75 
 
60-100 Medium warmth towards Irish people. 
The Feeling 
Thermometer-Black 
75 50-100 Medium warmth towards Black people. 
37.8 30-45 Not racially biased  
against Black people. 
 
Discrimination Scale 
 
Diversity Scale 
15.4 11 - 20 Not racially biased  
against Black people. 
Modified Modern Racism 
Scale (MMRS) 
-7 -6 to -9 Not racially biased  
against Black people. 
The Racial Experience Questionnaire Sub-Scales 
 
100%= Yes 
0% = No 
All participants knew Black people. 
50% = Yes 
50% = No 
Half of participants had a Black friend. 
66.6% = Yes 
33.6% = No 
Two thirds of participants had a Black 
colleague. 
66.6% = Yes 
33.3% = No 
Two thirds of participants had a close 
Black relationship. 
66.6% = Yes 
33.3% = No 
Almost two thirds of participants had 
Black neighbours. 
Black Acquaintance 
 
 
Black Friend 
 
Black Colleague 
 
Black Relationship 
 
 
Black Neighbour 
 
 
Black Encounters 
66.6% = Positive 
33.3%= Neutral       
0% = Negative 
 
Two thirds of participants had positive or 
equally positive/negative 
Experiences with Black people 
14.5 -30 to 36 Pictures with Mundane objects perceived 
as safe rather than dangerous. 
Likert Scales     -Mundane 
 
                       -Weapon 24.6 0 to -33 Pictures with Weapons perceived as 
Dangerous rather than safe. 
 
 
Correlations among Explicit Measures 
Statistical analyses (Fisher’s r to z) were conducted to determine whether any 
correlations existed among the explicit measures. Only the DDS sub-scales correlated 
significantly (r = .457, n = 23, p <.012) 
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Explicit and Implicit Correlations  
Planned comparisons (Fisher’s r to z) were performed in order to determine if 
any significant correlations existed between the implicit (i.e. the final D-IRAP score) 
and explicit measures.  The correlations found are reported in Table 14. 
 
 
Table 14 
Correlations Between the Implicit and Explicit Measures in Experiment 5 
 
Planned Comparisons between Implicit 
and Explicit Measures 
Correlation P-value 
Correlations Expected to be Positive 
IRAP vs. MMRS .512 .051 
Correlations expected to be Negative 
IRAP vs. REQ 2 -.956 .002 
IRAP vs. REQ 5   -.965 .045 
 
The overall D-IRAP score was positively correlated with racist views on the 
MMRS. The overall D-IRAP score was negatively correlated with the number of Black 
friends and neighbours, suggesting that the more Black acquaintances participants had 
in this regard, the less racist they were on the IRAP.  
 
Results Summary 
The D-IRAP trial-type scores were only partly consistent with experimental 
predictions. Specifically, only responding on the SAFE/White/Mundane trial-type 
indicated the expected pro-White bias and none of the other effects were significant. 
On closer inspection, however, participants were more pro-Black than expected, for 
example by indicating that Black with a gun was safe. On practically all of the 
explicit measures, participants indicated the absence of racial bias against Black 
people. While, there were numerous correlations amongst the explicit measures that 
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suggested that they may be measuring the same attitudes, the overall D-IRAP score did 
not correlate with the majority of explicit measures.  
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Several IAT studies have reported strong pro-White and anti-Black bias using 
pictures of Black and White men holding both guns and mundane objects, which we 
had not yet done with the IRAP (e.g. Greenwald et al., 2003). This was the focus of 
Experiment 5. The data indicated that the only significant IRAP effect was for White 
men with a mundane object as safe and all other effects were non-significant. 
However, closer inspection of the data actually indicated that participants showed a 
greater than pro-Black bias. Hence, the data here were not consistent with existing 
IAT studies, but did suggest that the negative influence the guns had on attitudes to 
the Black men in the pictures in Experiment 3 was softened when Black men held 
both mundane objects and guns. In short, the data from Experiment 5 more closely 
resembled those from Experiment 4 than those from Experiment 3. 
 In all of the IRAP’s conducted thus far, correct responding was always based 
on race such that consistent trials required that participants categorise White as safe 
and Black as Dangerous, while inconsistent trials require the reverse. In the current 
series of studies the word-based IRAP in Experiment 2 failed to show an anti- Black 
bias and this was also the case when the pictures in Experiment 4 contained mundane 
objects. An anti- Black bias, however, began to emerge in Experiment 3 when the 
pictures contained guns. Nonetheless, this effect was not recorded in Experiment 5 
that presented both guns and mundane objects. Taken together, it was difficult to 
determine to what extent participants had been responding on the basis of race, even 
though the experimental contingencies required this. In order to address this issue 
Experiment 6 replicated Experiment 5 but had the IRAP now presented contingencies 
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in which correct responding was based on the items held in the pictures are not on the 
race of the people who held them. Un short, race was not irrelevant and we wanted to 
determine the potential overlap of findings between this and Experiment 5. 
 
EXPERIMENT 6 
In Experiment 6, we created an IRAP in which participants were required to 
discriminate the objects in the pictures as the basis for correct responding and ignore 
race. That is, on consistent trials guns were always dangerous and mundane objects 
were always safe (irrespective of whether the men holding them were Black or 
White). Correct responding on inconsistent trials was reverse (guns always safe and 
mundane objects always dangerous), but again race was irrelevant to correct 
responding. 
 
Participants 
A sample of twenty-nine naive participants was recruited for Experiment 6. 
All were Caucasian Irish undergraduate students at NUIM and were aged between 18 
and 23 years old (M: 20 years and 6 months). All participants were recruited through 
class announcements and notice boards in the Psychology Department. No 
participants had previous experience of the IRAP and they received no remuneration 
for their part in the research. All were required to have high fluency in English, as 
well as normal or corrected to normal vision. In this study, five participants failed to 
reach criterion in practice trials for the IRAP, hence the data from twenty-four 
participants are included in the analyses.  
 
 87 
Setting 
All aspects of the setting were identical to previous studies. 
 
Materials and Apparatus 
All aspects of the materials and apparatus from Experiment 6 were identical to 
Experiment 5. 
 
Procedure 
All participants completed the study in a single experimental session that 
lasted between 30 and 40mins. in total. Although made available to them, none of the 
participants opted for short breaks at any point. All participants were presented with 
the same experimental sequence that involved exposure to the explicit measure 
followed by the IRAP.  
All procedural aspects of the IRAP here were identical to Experiment 5, 
except that correct responding was determined by the items in the pictures, not by the 
race of the person holding them. That is, on consistent trials guns were always 
categorised as dangerous and mundane objects as safe (e.g. 
SAFE/White/Mundane/TRUE; SAFE/White/Gun/FALSE; 
DANGEROUS/Black/Gun/TRUE; and DANGEROUS/Black/Mundane/FALSE). The 
reverse was true for inconsistent trials (e.g. SAFE/White/Mundane/FALSE; 
SAFE/White/Gun/TRUE; DANGEROUS/Black/Gun/FALSE; and 
DANGEROUS/Black/Mundane/TRUE).  
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RESULTS 
The mean D-IRAP scores for the eight trial-types in Experiment 6 are presented 
in Figure 12. Responding consistent with predictions (that was, responding that 
mundane objects were safe and weapons were dangerous) was indicated in Figure 12 
by bars above zero (positive D-IRAP scores) and responding inconsistent with 
predictions (responding that weapons were safe and mundane objects were 
dangerous) was indicated by bars below zero (negative D-IRAP scores). Responding on 
each of the eight trial-types will now be described in the order they appear in Figure 
12. SAFE/White/Mundane generated only a small D-IRAP score, although it was in the 
predicted direction, thus indicating that participants more readily confirmed than 
denied that White with a mundane object was safe. SAFE/White/Gun was only 
negligibly different from zero and going in the wrong direction, indicating that 
participants had mixed views about White men with a gun as safe. There was a larger 
D-IRAP score for SAFE/Black/Mundane that was in the predicted direction, indicating 
that participants more readily confirmed than denied that a Back man with a gun was 
safe. The largest D-IRAP score was recorded for SAFE/Black/Gun and again this was 
in the predicted direction, indicating that participants more readily denied than 
confirmed that Black with a gun was safe. A small D-IRAP score was recorded on 
DANGEROUS/White/Mundane and this was not in the predicted direction, indicating 
that participants more readily confirmed than denied that a White man with a 
mundane object was dangerous. A large D-IRAP score was recorded for 
DANGEROUS/White/Gun and this was in the predicted direction, indicating that 
participants more readily confirmed than denied that a White man with a gun was 
dangerous. DANGEROUS/Black/Mundane generated a small D-IRAP score that was 
not in the predicted direction, indicating that participants more readily confirmed than 
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denied that a Black man with a mundane object was dangerous. The D-IRAP score for 
DANGEROUS/Black/Gun was negligibly different from zero, indicating that 
participants had mixed views about whether a Black with a gun was dangerous. 
  
 
Figure 12. Mean D-IRAP scores for the eight trial-types in Experiment 6. * Indicates 
that the trial-type was significant relative to zero. Arrow indicates trial-
types that were significantly different from each other. 
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IRAP Summary 
 The only significant IRAP effects recorded in the current study were consistent 
with predictions and indicated that a Black man with a gun is not safe and that a 
White man with a gun is dangerous, all other effects were non-significant. 
 
Explicit Measures 
A summary of the outcomes obtained across the explicit measures are 
presented in Table 17. On the majority of the explicit measures, participants indicated 
the absence of racial bias against Black people and on the Likert scales they more 
readily associated Black people with safe than dangerous.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 91 
 
Table 17 
A Summary and Interpretations of Outcomes on the Explicit Measures in Experiment 
6 
 
Explicit Measures Mean/Score Participants 
Range 
Interpretation of Attitudes 
The Feeling 
Thermometer-Irish 
75.6 
 
40-100 High warmth towards Irish people. 
The Feeling 
Thermometer-Black 
65.2 40-100 Medium warmth towards Black people. 
 
37 
 
21-48 
Not racially biased  
against Black people. 
 
Discrimination Scale 
 
Diversity Scale 
12 5-16 Not racially biased  
against Black people. 
Modified Modern Racism 
Scale (MMRS) 
-5 -10- +1 Not racially biased  
against Black people. 
The Racial Experience Questionnaire Sub-Scales 
 
75%= Yes 
25% = No 
Most participants knew Black people. 
66.6% = Yes 
33.3% = No 
Three quarters of participants had a Black 
friend. 
16.7% = Yes 
83.3% = No 
One fifth of participants had a Black 
colleague. 
66.6% = Yes 
33.3% = No 
Almost two thirds of participants had a 
close Black relationship. 
62.5% = Yes 
37.5% = No 
Almost two thirds of participants had 
Black neighbours. 
Black Acquaintance 
 
 
Black Friend 
 
Black Colleague 
 
Black Relationship 
 
 
Black Neighbour 
 
 
Black Encounters 
50% = Positive 
41.67%= Neutral       
8.33% = Negative 
 
The majority of participants had positive 
or equally positive/negative 
Experiences with Black people 
14.5 -30 to 36 Pictures with Mundane objects perceived 
as safe rather than dangerous. 
Likert Scales     -Mundane 
 
                       -Weapon 24.6 0 to –33 Pictures with Weapons perceived as 
Dangerous rather than safe. 
 
Correlations among Explicit Measures 
Statistical analyses (Fisher’s r to z) were conducted to determine whether any 
correlations existed among the explicit measures. The results are presented in Table 
16. 
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Table 16  
Planned Comparisons Among Explicit Measures in Experiment 6 
 
Planned Comparisons between  
Explicit Measures 
Correlation P-value 
Correlations Expected to be Positive 
Discrimination vs. Diversity .515 .009 
Diversity vs. Black Encounters .446 .028 
Correlations expected to be Negative 
MMRS vs. Discrimination -.549 .005 
MMRS vs. Diversity -.779 < .001 
MMRS vs. Black Encounters -.496 .013 
 
 
Again, there was a positive correlation between the DDS sub-scales. The DDS 
sub-scales also correlated with the MMRS, indicating lack of racism on all three 
measures. The MMRS was also correlated with number of Black acquaintances 
suggesting that more acquaintances correlated with lower racism scores. 
 
Explicit and Implicit Correlations 
Planned comparisons (Fisher’s r to z) were performed in order to determine if 
any significant correlations existed between the overall D-IRAP score and the explicit 
measures. No significant correlations were recorded (all p’s > .238). 
 
Results Summary 
The data from the current study showed in one respect that participant 
confirmed that guns were dangerous and not safe, but this effect was not related to 
race. Overall discriminations on the basis of race or items held were not strong. 
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DISCUSSION 
Experiments 5 and 6 did not show clear patterns of responding like those found in 
Experiments 2 to 4. One possible explanation noisy patterns of responding was the 
increased complexity of the target stimuli employed in those experiments. The target 
stimuli employed in these Experiments 5 and 6 had two critical features whereas in 
previous experiments the target stimuli has only had one critical feature. For example, 
in Experiments 3 the target stimuli showed pictures of Black and White men holding 
weapons, therefore the critical features was race of the man in the picture. In 
Experiments 5 and 6 the target stimuli showed pictures of Black and White men 
holding weapons and mundane objects, therefore the critical features was race of the 
man in the picture and also the object the man held. The increased complexity of the 
stimuli would mean it was more difficult for participants to respond quickly and 
accurately and therefore may account for the noise in the data. 
 A more probable reason for the noisy data in these experiments is the fact that 
participants received fewer exposures to each of the target stimuli and thus we did not 
have enough data to get a clear picture of participant’s attitudes to each of the stimuli. 
This point is illustrated when you consider that in all previous experiments 
participants received six exposures to the target stimuli in each trial type in each of 
the three test blocks, a total of eighteen exposures over the course of the IRAP. 
However, in Experiments 5 and 6 participants only received three exposures to the 
target stimuli in each trial type in each of the three test blocks, a total of nine 
exposures over the course of the IRAP. Since these studies were completed a new 
IRAP software package has become available which will allow participant receive 
more exposures to the target stimuli. This may dramatically increase the scope for 
allowing researcher’s employ complex stimuli in their experiments. 
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CHAPTER DISCUSSION 
Across the five studies of race conducted here using the IRAP, it is fair to say 
that the effects were mixed. Even in Experiment 2 when participants were required to 
discriminate Black and White words, there was no anti-Black bias. This pattern was 
matched in three of the remaining experiments, with the exception of Experiment 3 
where an anti- Black bias emerged but this appeared to be largely the result of 
attentional weapon bias. Overall, the studies generally showed pro-White effects, but 
anti-Black remained elusive. In the latter two studies the data from the eight trial-
types was particularly mixed and showed no clear patterns of responding on the basis 
or items held in the pictures. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 
Using the IRAP to Explore  
Clinically Relevant Phenomena 
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 Chapter 4 
Using the IRAP to Explore  
Clinically Relevant Phenomena 
Experiments 7 and 8 
 
The study of the self, and beliefs that are potentially relevant to clinical 
phenomena have traditionally been examined using explicit measures. However, these 
explicit measures appear to be no less sensitive to the types of bias commonly 
observed with explicit measures in general (e.g. self presentation bias ect, see de Jong, 
2001; Sackheim, &Gur, 1978). As a result, researchers of implicit cognition have 
argued for the potential role of measures of implicit attitudes in clinical research and 
practice (de Jong, Pasman, Kindt, & van den Hout, 2001). 
Several studies have reported discordance between implicit and explicit 
measures in assessments of clinical phenomena. For example, de Jong (2002) 
recorded implicit-explicit discrepancies on self-esteem evaluations in a study of 
socially anxious women. In short, the women displayed relatively low self-esteem on 
the explicit measure, but high self-esteem on the implicit measure. In response to this 
type of discrepancy, Haeffel et al. (2007) have suggested that implicit and explicit 
cognitions may play separate roles in depressive reactions to stressful life events. 
Specifically, implicit processes may be critical in determining immediate affective 
reactions to stress, while explicit processes may be more relevant to long-term 
depressive reactions. In any case, even this latter evidence points to a potentially 
important role for the study of implicit cognitions that relate to clinical phenomena. 
There is now a considerable number of studies that have used implicit 
measures to explore clinically relevant phenomena. These include: anxiety (de Jong, 
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van den Hout, Rietbroek, &Huijdig, 2003); phobias (Teachman, Gregg, & Woody, 
2001); eating behaviour (Vartanian, Herman, &Polivy, 2004); paedophilia (Gray, 
Brown, MacCulloch, & Smith, 2005); alcohol abuse (Wiers, van Woerden, 
&Smulders, 2002); drug use (Wiers, de Jong, Haverman, &Jelicic, 2004); depression 
(Haeffel, Abramson, Brazy, Shah, Teachman et al., 2007); and sexual risk behaviour 
(Stacy, Newcomb, & Ames, 2000).  
Several studies have also differentiated participant groups on the basis of 
implicit attitudes to clinical phenomena. For example, Gray et al. (2005) used the IAT 
to successfully distinguish between paedophilic offenders and a control group. 
Specifically, the paedophile sample demonstrated an association between children and 
sex, while non-paedophile controls showed an association between adults and sex. 
Similar results were recorded by Nunes, Firestone and Baldwin (2007) who reported 
that paedophiles viewedchildren as more sexually attractive than non-sexual 
offenders. Furthermore, the extent to which children were viewed as sexually 
attractive was correlated with greater risk of sexual recidivism. 
Perhaps one of the most promising applications of implicit measures in 
clinical phenomena is their apparent sensitivity to clinical change. For example, 
Teachman and Woody (2003) investigated treatment-related changes in the implicit 
cognitions of spider phobic participants compared to control participants over a 
course of exposure therapy. The results indicated that associations for spider-fear and 
spider-disgust were reduced for the phobic participants after treatment, but remained 
stable across a similar time frame for the controls. 
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Self-Esteem 
Self-esteem is one of the most widely used concepts in psychology. Common 
definitions include: a self-feeling that is determined by a comparison between the self 
and the ideal self (James, 1980); an individual's sense of own value or worth (Pelham, 
& Swann, 1989); the extent to which a person values, approves of, appreciates, prizes, 
or likes themselves (Blascovich, &Tomaka, 1991); and a favourable or unfavourable 
attitude toward the self (Rosenberg, 1965). 
 A body of literature attests to the link between low self-esteem and 
psychological ill-health, including depression, social anxiety, loneliness and 
alienation. For example, Kernis, Weisenhunt, Waschull, Greenier, Berry et al. (1998) 
reported that individuals with fragile self-esteem was less equipped to deal with the 
hassles of daily life, which in turn resulting in increases in depressive symptoms. On 
the flip side, Bernard, Hutchison, Lavin and Pennington (1996) reported that high 
self-esteem correlated positively with self-efficacy, ego strength, hardiness, optimism 
and maladjustment, and that all of these constructs were significantly related to 
positive health.  
The majority of studies of self-esteem to date have relied almost entirely on 
explicit methodologies that assume that respondents are giving honest impressions of 
themselves and that they have enough accurate insight into themselves to be able to 
do so (Blascovich, et al., 1991). However, explicit measures of self may be 
particularly sensitive to the types of bias commonly observed with explicit measures 
in general, including self-presentational bias and self-deception (Sackheim, &Gur, 
1978). 
As a result, researchers of implicit cognition have argued for the potential role 
of measures of implicit attitudes in the broader study of the self (Greenwald et al., 
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2000). A number of IAT researchers have attempted to use the procedure to examine 
implicit attitudes to self and to assess the potential overlap between these and explicit 
outcomes. For example, Farnham, Greenwald and Banaji (1999) presented target 
words relating to the self (ME) and not relating to the self (NOT ME) in the context of 
positive and negative attributes. Because they assumed that their sample of ‘normal’ 
participants also presented as high in self-esteem on explicit measures, they predicted 
that these individuals would more readily associate positive attributes with self and 
negative with not-self. And this is exactly what they observed. In spite of this 
apparent overlap between the explicit and implicit measures, however, the researchers 
failed to find any significant correlations when they compared the IAT outcomes with 
the Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale (RSES: Rosenberg, 1965) and the Self-Affect Scale 
(SAS). Indeed, they accounted for these findings by suggesting that the implicit and 
explicit measures in this case accessed different aspects of the self.  
 
The Current Research 
Experiment 7 was the first study to employ the IRAP as a measure of implicit 
attitudes to the self. Participants were required to indicate their agreement or 
disagreement with a range of statements that reflected high self-esteem (i.e. were 
positive about the self) or reflected low self-esteem (i.e. were negative about the self). 
Because the study was also concerned with whether or not the IRAP would correlate 
with an explicit measure of self, the positive and negative statements presented in the 
IRAP were taken directly from the RSES and participants also completed this as an 
explicit measure. We predicted that participants high on explicit self-esteem would 
also show high implicit self-esteem.  
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EXPERIMENT 7 
Participants 
A sample of thirty participants was recruited for Experiment 7. All were 
undergraduate students at NUIM and were aged between 19 and 23 years old (M: 21 
years and 7 months). All participants were recruited through class announcements and 
notice boards in the Psychology Department. Participants had no experience of the 
IRAP and received no remuneration for their involvement in the research. All were 
required to have high fluency in English, as well as normal or corrected to normal 
vision. In the current study, six participants failed to reach criterion during the 
practice blocks, hence the data from twenty-four participants were contained in the 
analyses.  
 
Setting 
The setting was identical to the previous studies. 
 
Apparatus and Materials 
Experiment 8 involved two basic sets of materials. The explicit measure 
comprised of the RSES and the implicit measure comprised of the IRAP.  
The RSES. The RSES is a measure of global self-esteem consisting of ten 
statements (copy provided in Appendix I). Five of the statements indicate positive 
self-regard or high self-esteem (e.g. “I take a positive attitude toward myself”), while 
the other five indicate negative self-regard or low self-esteem (e.g. “I certainly feel 
useless at times”). Participants identified with each statement using a four-point 
Likert scale that ranged from 1/Strongly Agree to 4/Strongly Disagree. The maximum 
RSES score is 40, the minimum is 0. A score of <15 indicates low self-esteem and a 
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score >15 indicates high self-esteem. The RSES generally has high reliability with 
test-retest correlations typically in the range of .82 to .88, and Cronbach's alpha for 
various samples in the range of .77 to .88 (Blascovich et al., 1991). 
The IRAP. The IRAP employed in Experiment 7 was identical in format to 
previous word-based IRAPs, with the exception of the new stimuli (see Table 17). 
The sample stimuli comprised of the phrases I AGREE and I DISAGREE. The target 
stimuli comprised of six statements taken directly from the RSES -- three positive 
statements that signified high self-esteem (e.g. ON THE WHOLE, I AM SATISFIED 
WITH MYSELF) and three negative statements that signified low self-esteem (e.g. 
AT TIMES I THINK I AM NO GOOD AT ALL). The response options were TRUE 
and FALSE. The previous screen shots employed as visual aids were adapted for 
current purposes. 
 
Table 17 
The Stimulus Arrangements Employed in Experiment 7 
 
Sample 1 
I AGREE 
Sample 2 
I DISAGREE 
Response Option 1 
TRUE 
Response Option 2 
FALSE 
Positive Target Phrases Negative Target Phrases 
On the whole, I am satisfied with myself. At times, I think I am no good at all. 
I feel I have a number of good qualities. I certainly feel useless at times. 
I take a positive attitude toward myself. I wish I could have more respect for myself. 
On the whole, I am satisfied with myself. At times, I think I am no good at all. 
I feel I have a number of good qualities. I certainly feel useless at times. 
I take a positive attitude toward myself. I wish I could have more respect for myself. 
 
Procedure 
All participants completed the study in a single experimental session that 
lasted between 30 and 40mins. in total. Although made available to them, none opted 
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for short breaks at any point. All participants were presented with the same 
experimental sequence that involved exposure to the RSES followed after a short 
break by the IRAP. 
 All procedural aspects of the IRAP employed in Experiment 7 were identical 
to the previous studies. The four trial-types employed here were referred to as: I 
AGREE/Positive (top left of Figure 13); I AGREE/Negative (top right); I 
DISAGREE/Positive (bottom left); and I DISAGREE/Negative (bottom right). The 
six exposures to each trial-type comprised of two exposures to each of the three target 
statements.   
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    Figure 13. A schematic representation of the four basic trial-types in Experiment 7. 
 
Correct responses on consistent trials involved indicating agreement with 
positive statements and disagreement with negative statements (i.e. responding here 
was biased towards high self-esteem). That is, participants were required to respond 
as follows, for example: I AGREE/I HAVE A POSITIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD 
MYSELF/TRUE; I AGREE/I CERTAINLY FEEL USELESS AT TIMES /FALSE; I 
DISAGREE/I HAVE A POSITIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD MYSELF/FALSE; and I 
DISAGREE/I CERTAINLY FEEL USELESS AT TIMES /TRUE. In contrast, correct 
I have a positive attitude toward myself 
Consistent Inconsistent 
Select ‘d’ key Select ‘k’ key 
I AGREE 
True False 
  I certainly feel useless at times 
Consistent Inconsistent 
Select ‘d’ key Select ‘k’ key 
True False 
I Agree 
I AGREE/Positive I AGREE/Negative 
I have a positive attitude toward myself 
Consistent Inconsistent 
Select ‘d’ key Select ‘k’ key 
I Disagree 
False True 
  I certainly feel useless at times 
Consistent Inconsistent 
Select ‘d’ key Select ‘k’ key 
False True 
I Disagree 
I DISAGREE/Positive I DISAGREE/Negative 
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responses on inconsistent trials involved indicating agreement with negative 
statements and disagreement with positive statements (i.e. responding here was biased 
towards low self-esteem). That is, participants were required to respond as follows, 
for example: I AGREE/I HAVE A POSITIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD 
MYSELF/FALSE; I AGREE/I CERTAINLY FEEL USELESS AT TIMES/TRUE; I 
DISAGREE/I HAVE A POSITIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD MYSELF/TRUE; and I 
DISAGREE/I CERTAINLY FEEL USELESS AT TIMES/FALSE. 
 
RESULTS 
 All analyses and interpretations of the IRAP data were consistent with 
previous analyses involving four trial-types. As in previous experiments, responding 
consistent with predictions (that was, responding I agree with positive statements, and 
the reverse, I disagree with negative statements) was indicated in Figure 13 by bars 
above zero (positive D-IRAP scores) and  responding inconsistent with predictions 
(responding that I agree negative statements, and the reverse, I disagree with positive 
statements) was indicated by bars below zero (negative D-IRAP scores).The mean D-
IRAP trial-type scores are presented in Figure 13. I AGREE/Positive and I 
DISAGREE/Positive produced similarly large D-IRAP scores that were both in the 
predicted direction. That is, participants readily confirmed that they agreed with the 
positive statements and disconfirmed that they disagreed with them. Responding on I 
AGREE/Negative produced a lower D-IRAP score, but this was also in the predicted 
direction. Hence, participants disconfirmed that they agreed with the negative 
statements. I DISAGREE/Negative yielded a D-IRAP score that was only marginally 
different from zero, and which was not in the predicted direction. This indicated that 
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participants had no strong reaction to whether they disagreed with the negative 
statements. 
 
 
Figure 13. Mean D-IRAP trial-type scores in Experiment 7. * Indicates that the trial-
type was significant relative to zero. Arrow indicates trial-types that were  
                   significantly different from each other. 
 
A 2x3x4 mixed repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant main effect 
for trial-type [F(3, 66)=4.323, p < .001,  ηp2 = .418], but not for test or sequence (p’s > 
= .101), and the interaction effects were non-significant (all p’s > .102). Fishers’s post 
hoc tests revealed that the significant differences in the trial-types lay between: I 
AGREE/Positive and I AGREE/Negative (p = .002); I AGREE/Positive and I 
DISAGREE/Negative (p < .001); I AGREE/Negative and I DISAGREE/Positive (p = 
.005); and I DISAGREE/Positive and I DISAGREE/Negative (p < .001).  
Four one sample t-tests were conducted on the D-IRAP trial-type scores in order 
to determine whether each differed significantly from zero. Only I AGREE/Positive 
and I DISAGREE/Positive were significant (both p’s < .001), the remaining two trial-
types were not (both p’s > .339).  
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Explicit-Implicit Correlations 
Responding on the RSES ranged from 19-26 (M: 21.95, SD: 1.82), indicating 
as expected that all participants presented with explicit high self-esteem. A Fishers r 
to z correlation was calculated to determine if the RSES scores correlated with the 
overall D-IRAP score. Although the correlation was positive, it was not significant [r 
=.148; n = 23; p = .504].  
 
DISCUSSION 
The primary aim of Experiment 7 was to assess the utility of the IRAP as an 
implicit measure of self-esteem and to assess potential correlations between explicit 
and implicit measures of the same. The research was also the first attempt to modify 
the IRAP by presenting target stimuli that were whole statements, rather than words 
or pictures. In order to facilitate greater concordance between the IRAP as an implicit 
measure of self-esteem and the RSES as an explicit measure, the IRAP presented 
statements as target stimuli that had been taken directly from the RSES. The findings 
indicated that the IRAP did appear to tap into self-esteem when responding on two of 
the target trial-types was in the predicted direction. That is, participants significantly 
confirmed that they agreed with the positive (high self-esteem) statements and 
significantly disconfirmed that they disagreed with them. They had no strong reaction 
to whether they disagreed with the negative statements. Although these findings were 
largely as expected from participants who all scored as high in self-esteem on the 
explicit RSES, there were no significant correlations between the two measures. 
 In Experiment 8, we continued with our investigations of using the IRAP to 
explore clinical phenomena and extending the target stimuli to full statements. In line 
with the previous study, we once again attempted to enhance the potential the overlap 
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between the explicit and implicit measures by taking whole statements from the 
former and presenting them in the latter. In Experiment 8, we examined implicit 
attitudes to acceptance and avoidance in a sample of participants who presented with 
a high orientation towards acceptance on an explicit measure. 
 
EXPERIMENT 8 
     
There is a general consensus among psychologists that clinically relevant 
phenomena are influenced by individual beliefs and that many forms of 
psychopathology result from dysfunctional beliefs or misinterpretations of events, 
emotions, etc. (e.g. Beck, 1976). This general perspective is consistent with RFT, 
which would argue that the bi-directionality of stimulus relations ensures that there is 
almost no type of action that does not participate in relational frames with other 
actions, memories, thoughts, emotions, sensations, etc. Indeed, according to 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; a program of clinical treatment that is 
functionally related to RFT), attempts to avoid these relations likely serve only to 
increase, rather than decrease, the hold our internal content has over our external 
actions (Wilson, Hayes, Gregg, & Zettle, 2001). Of course, many studies of emotional 
and cognitive suppression support this view (Wegner, 1994) and suggest, in line with 
ACT, that the most effective strategy for dealing with problematic internal cognitions 
is to accept, rather than avoid, them and move on with valued living. That way, the 
problematic content may not go away, but one has the opportunity to achieve values 
even if it doesn’t (Hayes, & Strosahl, 2004).  
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The Current Research 
In Experiment 8, we used the IRAP to explore implicit attitudes towards 
acceptance and avoidance. For this purpose, we selected undergraduate students who 
showed an explicit propensity towards high acceptance/low avoidance on the 
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ-2). In order to enhance the potential 
overlap between the two types of measure, as we had done in Experiment 7, we took 
opposing statements directly from the AAQ and inserted them into the IRAP as target 
stimuli. 
 
Participants 
A sample of thirty-four participants was recruited for Experiment 8. All were 
undergraduate students at NUIM and were aged between 18 and 58 years old (M: 24 
years and 9 months). All participants were recruited through class announcements and 
notice boards in the Psychology Department. Participants had no experience of the 
IRAP and received no remuneration for their involvement. All were required to have 
high fluency in English, as well as normal or corrected to normal vision. Participants 
received no remuneration for their involvement. In the current study, ten participants 
were excluded from the analyses because they had failed to reach criterion during the 
practice blocks. This left a sample of twenty-four participants. 
 
Setting 
The setting employed here was identical to Experiment 7. 
 
Apparatus and Materials 
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Experiment 8 involved two basic sets of materials. The explicit measure 
comprised of the AAQ-2 and the implicit measure comprised of the IRAP.  
The AAQ-2 is a written self-report measure of emotional avoidance and 
acceptance (Hayes, Bissett, Roget, Padilla, Kohlenburg et al., 2004). It comprises of a 
10-item list of statements that assess avoidance (e.g. ‘Emotions cause problems in my 
life’) or acceptance (e.g. ‘It’s okay if I remember something unpleasant’). Participants 
indicate the truth of each statement using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1/Never 
True to 7/Always True. A copy of the AAQ-2 can be found in Appendix J. A high 
score (maximum 70) indicates high acceptance/low avoidance, whereas a low score 
(minimum 7) indicates high avoidance/low acceptance. The mean scores for a sample 
of university students is 50.72 (SD = 9.19). The alpha value of the AAQ-II is strong at 
.83, while the scales also possess good test-retest reliability: .80 (at 3 months) and .78 
(at 12 months -- Bond, Hates, Baer, Carpenter, Orcutt, Waltz, et al., manuscript under 
submission). The overall AAQ score can also be sub-scored into two sub-scores, one 
for acceptance (maximum=21) and one for avoidance (maximum=49), by collating 
the scores for each type of statement. 
The IRAP employed here was identical in format to Experiment 7, with the 
exception of the new stimuli. The sample stimuli comprised the phrases I AGREE and 
I DISAGREE. The target stimuli comprised of six AAQ statements, three categorised 
as high acceptance/low avoidance (e.g. IT IS OK IF I REMEMBER SOMETHING 
UNPLEASANT) and three categorised as low acceptance/high avoidance (e.g. 
WORRIES GET IN THE WAY OF MY SUCCESS). The response options comprised 
of the words TRUE and FALSE (see Table 18). The screen shots previously 
employed as visual aids were adapted for current purposes. The six exposures to each 
trial-type comprised of two exposures to each of the three target statements.  
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Table 18 
The Stimulus Arrangements Employed in Experiment 8 
 
Sample 1 
I AGREE 
Sample 2 
I DISAGREE 
Response Option 1 
True 
Response Option 2 
False 
Target words consistent with I Agree Target words consistent with I Disagree 
It’s ok if I remember something unpleasant I’m afraid of my feelings 
My thoughts and feelings do not get in the way of how I 
want to live my life 
Emotions cause problems in my life 
I am in control of my life Worries get in the way of my success 
It’s ok if I remember something unpleasant I’m afraid of my feelings 
My thoughts and feelings do not get in the way of how I 
want to live my life 
Emotions cause problems in my life 
I am in control of my life Worries get in the way of my success 
 
 
Procedure 
 All participants completed the study in a single experimental session that 
lasted between 30 and 40mins. in total. Although made available to them, none opted 
for short breaks at any point. All participants were presented with the same 
experimental sequence that involved exposure to the AAQ-2 followed after a short 
break by the IRAP. 
All procedural aspects of the IRAP were identical to the previous studies, with 
the exception of the new stimuli. In this case, the four basic trial-types were referred 
to as: I AGREE/Acceptance (top left of Figure 15); I AGREE/Avoidance (top right); I 
DISAGREE/Acceptance (bottom left); and I DISAGREE/Avoidance (bottom right). 
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Figure 15. A schematic representation of the four basic trial-types in Experiment 8. 
 
Correct responses on consistent trials involved indicating agreement with 
acceptance-based statements (i.e. high acceptance/low avoidance) and disagreement 
with avoidance statements (i.e. low acceptance/high avoidance). That is, participants 
were required to respond as follows, for example: I AGREE/I AM IN CONTROL OF 
MY LIFE/TRUE; I AGREE/I’M AFRAID OF MY FEELINGS/FALSE; I 
DISAGREE/I AM IN CONTROL OF MY LIFE/FALSE; and I DISAGREE/I’M 
AFRAID OF MY FEELINGS/TRUE. In contrast, correct responses on inconsistent 
trials involved indicating agreement with avoidance statements and disagreement with 
I am in control of my life 
Consistent Inconsistent 
Select ‘d’ key Select ‘k’ key 
I AGREE 
True False 
I’m afraid of my feelings 
Consistent Inconsistent 
Select ‘d’ key Select ‘k’ key 
True False 
I Agree 
I AGREE/Acceptance I AGREE/Avoidance 
I am in control of my life 
Consistent Inconsistent 
Select ‘d’ key Select ‘k’ key 
I Disagree 
False True 
I’m afraid of my feelings 
Consistent Inconsistent 
Select ‘d’ key Select ‘k’ key 
False True 
I Disagree 
I DISAGREE/Acceptance I DISAGREE/Avoidance 
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acceptance statements. That is, participants were required to respond as follows, for 
example: I AGREE/I AM IN CONTROL OF MY LIFE/FALSE; I AGREE/I’M 
AFRAID OF MY FEELINGS/TRUE; I DISAGREE/I AM IN CONTROL OF MY 
LIFE/TRUE; and I DISAGREE/I’M AFRAID OF MY FEELINGS/FALSE. 
  
RESULTS 
 The mean D-IRAP trial-type scores obtained across participants are presented in 
Figure 16. Again, responding consistent with predictions (that was, responding I agree 
with acceptance statements, and the reverse, I disagree with avoidance statements) 
was indicated in Figure 16 by bars above zero (positive D-IRAP scores) and  
responding inconsistent with predictions (responding that I agree avoidance 
statements, and the reverse, I disagree with acceptance statements) was indicated by 
bars below zero (negative D-IRAP scores). The largest D-IRAP score was recorded for I 
AGREE/Acceptance, with a smaller D score recorded on I DISAGREE/Acceptance, 
but both were in the predicted direction. Hence, participants confirmed that they 
agreed with the acceptance statements and disconfirmed that they disagreed with 
them. Similarly small D scores were recorded for I AGREE/Avoidance and I 
DISAGREE/Avoidance, but again both of these effects were in the predicted 
direction. That is, participants disconfirmed that they agreed with the avoidance 
statements and confirmed that they disagreed with them.   
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Figure 15. Mean D-IRAP trial-type scores recorded in Experiment 8. * Indicates that 
the trial-type was significant relative to zero. Arrow indicates trial-types 
that were significantly different from each other. 
 
 
 The mean D-IRAP trial-type scores were subjected to a 2x3x4 mixed repeated 
measures ANOVA. Trial-type was significant [F(3,66)=4.254; p = .008;  ηp2 =.162], 
test order, sequence and the interaction effects were not (all p’s > .398) were not. 
Fisher’s post-hoc tests indicated the significant trial-type differences lay between I 
AGREE/Acceptance and I DISAGREE/Acceptance (p = .025), and I 
AGREE/Acceptance vs. I DISAGREE/Avoidance approached significance (p = .056) 
all other p’s > .10. 
Four one-sample t-tests were used to determine if any of the D-IRAP trial-type 
scores differed significantly from zero. Only I AGREE/Acceptance was significant 
[t(23)=5.236, p < .001], all other p’s > .34. 
 
Explicit-Implicit Correlations 
Participants’ AAQ scores ranged from 28-70 (M: 49.29, SD: 10.76), 
indicating as expected a propensity towards high acceptance/low avoidance. The sub-
scores were as follows: acceptance: M: 14.39, SD: 3.27 and avoidance: M: 35.22, SD: 
8.9. A series of Fishers r to z correlations was conducted to determine if the AAQ 
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data correlated with D-IRAP trial-type scores. The correlation overall proved to be 
negative and non-significant [r=-.117, p = .589].  
 
DISCUSSION 
 The primary aim of Experiment 8 was to assess the utility of the IRAP as a 
measure of implicit attitudes to acceptance and avoidance and to determine the 
potential correlation between this and the AAQ as an explicit measure of the same. In 
order to facilitate the overlap between the two types of measure, high vs. low 
acceptance statements were taken directly from the AAQ and presented as target 
stimuli within the IRAP. The IRAP outcomes indicated that participants significantly 
confirmed that they agreed with the acceptance statements and disconfirmed that they 
disagreed with them (although the latter was not significant). They also disconfirmed 
that they agreed with the avoidance statements and confirmed that they disagreed with 
them (but again neither of these was significant). This implicit propensity towards 
acceptance and away from avoidance was not surprising with this sample of 
participants who all scored as high acceptance/low avoidance on the explicit AAQ. In 
spite of this apparent overlap, however, the statistical correlation between the two 
measures proved non-significant.   
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
General Discussion  
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Chapter 5 
General Discussion  
 
The aim of the current chapter is to provide a summary of the empirical work 
presented in Chapters 2 to 4, as well as articulating the main theoretical issues arising 
from each. A generic issue that spans all aspects of the research programme will then 
be discussed. 
 
Chapter 2: Summary of Findings from Experiment 1 
The first experimental aim of the current research programme was 
methodological and attempted to determine the stimulus presentation that would 
produce the strongest IRAP effect. Practically all available IRAP studies to date have 
employed a presentation format in which both the sample stimuli and response 
options randomly switch positions across trials within each block. However, there is 
no empirical evidence to suggest the superiority of this format over any others (e.g. 
keeping either of these features static).   
Experiment 1 of the current research set out to address this simple 
experimental question. Its main aim was to systematically manipulate the presentation 
of stimuli on-screen to determine what influence this might have on implicit 
responding. Naturally, a simple IRAP, rather than one on race for example, was 
chosen for this purpose. Experiment 1 comprised of four conditions: Moving-Moving 
(where sample stimuli and response options were both randomised); Moving-Static 
(where the sample stimuli were randomised, but response options remained in fixed 
locations); Static-Moving (sample stimuli were fixed and response options were 
randomised); and Static-Static (sample stimuli and response options were both fixed).  
 117 
The results of the study were consistent with previous IRAP evidence, with 
strong and predicted IRAP effects. More importantly, the comparisons across the four 
conditions indicated that the randomisation of the sample stimuli combined with 
fixing the response options (Moving-Static) generated the strongest D-IRAP score. 
However, randomising the samples appeared to be the more critical variable because 
the D-IRAP score recorded for randomising both samples and response options 
(Moving-Moving) was only marginally smaller and was also significant. Fixing the 
samples and randomising the response options (Static-Moving) also yielded a 
significant effect, although it was smaller than the two previous effects (but not 
significantly). In contrast, fixing both samples and response options (Static-Static) 
generated a much smaller IRAP effect that was not significant. 
 These outcomes suggested that the consistent use of the Moving-Moving format 
in IRAP research to date had been wise and had at least to some extent facilitated the 
strong IRAP effects commonly reported. In line with these findings and the existing 
literature’s use of this format, all subsequent studies in the current thesis thereafter 
employed the Moving-Moving presentation. 
 
Theoretical Issue Arising From Chapter 2 
 Stimulus presentation plays an important role in any experimental methodology, 
but may be particularly important to implicit procedures. This sensitivity results, at 
least in part, from the delicate balance between the need to make the task challenging 
(rather than turning it into an explicit measure because the time constraint is loose), 
while ensuring that the task is do-able. Indeed, several studies have indicated that 
disruptions in the sequence of implicit learning can arise from alterations in the 
locations of the target stimuli (Schmidtke, & Heuer, 1997; Stadler, 1995; Tavassoli, & 
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Lee, 2004). In Experiment 1 we manipulated the screen presentation of sample stimuli 
and response options, and in doing this manipulated task difficulty. Since the 
completion of this thesis 
new research has emerged that manipulates the maximum response latency allowed in 
the IRAP, another means of manipulating task difficulty. Barnes-Holmes, Murphy, 
Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart (in press) have presented evidence that suggests that 
reducing the maximum response latency allowed on each trial to 2000ms rather than 
3000ms may be better at targeting implicit responding. Barnes-Holmes et al 
conducted an identical experiment to Experiment 3 of the current work under two 
conditions, one when the maximum response latency was 3000ms and one when the 
maximum response latency was 2000ms. The results showed that in the 3000ms 
context that participants were responding that they were pro-White and also pro- 
Black, in the 2000ms condition significantly greater pro- White and anti- Black 
stereotyping was revealed. In Experiment 3 of this thesis we found a pro- White, a 
pro-Black and also an anti- Black bias. While these results show a more mixed 
attitude toward Black persons at 3000ms than was found by Barnes-Holmes et al, we 
may also have found a stronger anti-Black bias predicted if we had used 2000ms as a 
maximum response latency. This research by Barnes-Holmes et al (in press) 
highlights the necessity to continue experimenting with the experimental features of 
the IRAP. 
  The findings from Experiment 1 were perhaps more positive than anticipated in 
suggesting that only one method of organising the sample stimuli and response 
options (i.e. Static-Static) failed to generate a significant IRAP effect, although even 
this was in the predicted direction. These outcomes were perhaps more important for 
the IRAP than for the IAT, for example, because the screen presentations in the 
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former are simple and do not change across trial blocks, as is the case for the IAT. 
Hence, although the data here did not suggest that great disruption of effects would 
arise from the use of any of the four presentation formats, it did suggest that 
significant effects are facilitated more by some formats than others.  
 The fixed or random nature of the stimuli presented in the IRAP also raises the 
related issue about the degree of flexibility that participants need to have, particularly in 
switching across blocks between consistent and inconsistent responding. The data here 
suggest that the greater the randomisation (e.g. Moving-Moving), the better the IRAP 
effect and the less the randomisation, the weaker the effect (Static-Static). Hence, one 
might assume that greater flexibility within the screen presentations across trials permits 
greater flexibility in responding across blocks, hence improved accuracy and/or speed. 
There is recent empirical evidence that supports the importance of flexibility in this 
regard. O’Toole and Barnes-Holmes (in press) used the IRAP to target similar/different 
and before/after relations in conjunction with the explicit Kaufman Brief Intelligence 
Test. Consistent with their predictions, participants who produced higher scores on the 
intelligence test responded more quickly on the IRAP. Specifically, the inconsistent IRAP 
trials produced a larger number of significant correlations with the explicit measure than 
consistent trials. In other words, participants who performed better on the intelligence test 
were not only faster at IRAP responding, but also demonstrated a greater degree of 
relational flexibility. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that this flexibility across 
blocks may be facilitated by requiring considerable flexibility in responding to rapidly 
changing features of screen presentations across trials. The current findings support this 
view. 
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Chapter 3: Summary of Findings from Experiments 2-6 
The second aim of the current thesis was to determine the utility of the IRAP 
as a measure of implicit attitudes to race and this was the core focus of Experiments 2 
to 6 reported in Chapter 3. In the IRAP in Experiment 2, participants were simply 
required to relate the phrases WHITE PERSON and BLACK PERSON to a range of 
positive and negative terms that could be readily categorised as safe and dangerous. In 
this study, we predicted that Irish participants would readily relate White with safe 
and Black with dangerous, hence showing a pro-White and anti-Black bias.  
The data indicated that responding on the White trial-types showed the 
expected pro-White bias where White was safe and not dangerous, although the latter 
effect was not significant. Unexpectedly, responding on the two Black trial-types was 
contrary to predictions and failed to show an anti-Black bias. Specifically, participants 
significantly confirmed (rather than denied) that Black was safe and had mixed views 
about Black as dangerous. Evidence from explicit measures was consistent with this 
lack of anti-Black bias. But in spite of this apparent overlap, the overall D-IRAP score 
failed to correlate with many of the explicit measures, although the latter correlated 
with each other.  
Several IAT studies of race have reported stronger pro-White and anti-Black 
bias with the presentation of pictures, rather than words. Hence, Experiment 3 
presented a picture-based race IRAP to determine if this would result in any 
improvement on the IRAP outcomes, particularly with regard to an anti-Black bias. 
However, in order to assess the possible role of attentional weapon bias that had also 
been observed in IAT evidence on race, and to create the possibility that this might 
also facilitate anti-Black bias, both the Black and White men in the pictures were 
holding guns. Nonetheless, the experimental contingencies remained as before, with 
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correct responding based entirely on race, rather than on the guns (in any case, all 
pictures contained guns). We simply wanted to determine whether pictures of Black 
and White men with guns would enhance the weak IRAP effects recorded with words.  
The results indicated significant D-IRAP scores for responding on SAFE/White 
and SAFE/Black trial-types, but the former and not the latter was in the predicted 
direction. That is, participants confirmed that both White and Black men with guns 
were safe, showing a pro-White and pro-Black bias even when they held guns. 
However, participants’ implicit views diverged to some extent on whether the Black 
and White men holding guns were dangerous. Specifically, participants had mixed 
views on whether White men with guns were dangerous, but they significantly 
confirmed that Black men with guns were dangerous. The effect for danger, therefore, 
showed an anti-Black bias. In short, the anti-Black bias recorded here (but not in 
Experiment 2) suggested that the presence of the guns had, to some extent, negatively 
influenced participants’ implicit attitudes to the Black men in the pictures. Again, 
however, the majority of explicit measures reflected the absence of explicit racial bias 
and in spite of a number of significant correlations among explicit measures, none 
correlated with the IRAP.  
In order to confirm that the anti-Black effect in Experiment 3 had resulted 
from the guns in the pictures, Experiment 4 presented pictures of the same Black and 
White men holding mundane objects. If the guns had not enhanced the anti-Black 
bias, then we predicted that the outcomes here would be consistent with those from 
Experiment 2. Again, correct responding was always based on race, not on the items 
held.  
The results indicated that participants significantly confirmed that both the 
White and Black men holding mundane objects in the pictures were safe. Similarly, 
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they did not differentiate between the two races in terms of dangerousness. That is on 
both the DANGEROUS/White and Dangerous/Black trial-types they denied that the 
White and Black men were dangerous. In short, the anti-Black bias from Experiment 
3 was lost. This outcome did suggest that the guns presented in the previous study had 
negatively biased participants against the Black men in the pictures as dangerous. 
Again, on the majority of explicit measures, participants indicated the absence of 
racial bias and although the explicit measures did correlate with each other, none 
correlated with the IRAP.  
In order to further examine the potential effect of the guns on anti-Black bias 
and in line with previous IAT studies of race, Experiment 5 presented pictures of 
Black and White men holding guns and mundane objects. However, it is important to 
remember that correct responding was again based on race, not on the items held in 
the pictures. We wanted to determine whether the guns and mundane objects would 
differentially influence discriminations of race and to what extent to combination of 
the two types of items would yield effects that overlapped with those recorded in the 
previous experiments (in which only one type of item was held). In order to examine 
the relative impact of each type of held item, the IRAP analyses were further sub-
divided into eight (rather than four) trial-types.  
The majority of effects were weak. Specifically, only responding on 
SAFE/White/Mundane was significant and indicated that participants confirmed that 
White men with mundane objects were safe. Interestingly, however, they had mixed 
views on whether Black men with mundane objects were safe, thus showing some 
evidence of a pro-White and anti-Black bias in this regard. Unexpectedly however, 
when asked about White and Black men with mundane objects as dangerous, 
participants had mixed views about White as dangerous, but denied that Black was 
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dangerous. Similarly, when asked about Black and White men holding guns as safe, 
participants unexpectedly confirmed that White was not safe, but Black was safe. 
Finally, when asked about White and Black men holding guns as dangerous, 
participants confirmed that both White and Black were dangerous. Hence, although 
the majority of effects were non-significant, there was greater than expected evidence 
of pro-Black bias, irrespective of whether the items held were guns or mundane 
objects.  
In Experiment 6, participants were presented with the same IRAP as the 
previous study, but they were now required to discriminate the objects in the pictures 
as the basis for correct responding and ignore race. That is, on consistent trials guns 
were always dangerous and mundane objects were always safe and correct responding 
on inconsistent trials was reverse (guns always safe and mundane objects always 
dangerous). Our aim here was to determine whether this would yield a different 
outcome from the previously weak but pro-Black effects. Again, the majority of 
effects overall were weak. The only significant effects were recorded on 
SAFE/Black/Gun and DANGEROUS/White/Gun. Hence, participants significantly 
denied that the Black men with guns were safe (but had mixed views on White with 
guns as safe) and significantly confirmed that White men with guns were dangerous 
(but had mixed views on Black with guns was dangerous). In addition, they confirmed 
that White and Black men with mundane objects were safe. They also unexpectedly 
confirmed that White and Black men with mundane objects were dangerous. This 
weak array of effects was consistent with Experiment 5, but showed no obvious bias 
in either direction. 
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Theoretical Issues Arising from Chapter 3 
In general the IRAP race outcomes here were not entirely consistent with IAT 
evidence, particularly with regard to anti-Black bias. On several occasions, we found 
sound evidence of pro-White bias, but struggled to record anti-Black bias, with the 
only exception for the latter being the presentation of guns only in Experiment 3. One 
possible reason for the discordance of evidence may concern the fact that the majority 
of IAT studies are conducted with American participants, whereas participants here 
were all Caucasian Irish. Indeed, the US is a historically multi-cultural society, but 
has an equally long history of Black slavery and Black discrimination. As a result, 
perhaps this climate has served to strengthen anti-Black bias and pro-White bias 
simultaneously (see Dovidio, Kawakami, & Beach, 2001). Indeed, Dovidio and 
Gaertner (2003) argued that social categorisation by race is automatic for US citizens. 
By contrast, Ireland is historically a more homogeneous culture that only very 
recently was subject to considerable inward migration, particularly from persons 
native to the African continent. Hence, we have as yet not experienced levels of 
migration of Black persons or related variables that contribute to the types of anti-
Black bias demonstrated by American participants of IAT studies. Interestingly, anti-
Black only emerged in our research in the context of threat and even Irish participants 
have considerable exposure to American television where crime is almost 
synonymous with Black, but not White, persons. As a result, a visual context 
involving weapons would perhaps be adequate to capturing anti-Black bias in Irish 
participants, but a less threatening context would not. Indeed, the weak and mixed 
effects on the remaining four IRAP experiments here support this view. 
It might be argued that the anti-Black effect recorded only with the 
presentation of guns in Experiment 3 is evidence of attentional bias that enhanced 
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anti-Black effects. This would be consistent with evidence reported by Duncan (1976) 
who demonstrated that even mildly aggressive behaviour was perceived as more 
threatening when performed by a Black person than by a White person (see also 
Sagar, & Schofield, 1980). Attentional weapon bias is a particularly well-established 
effect in the context of eye-witness testimony and several implicit studies have 
demonstrated that the presence of weapons serves to enhance anti-Black bias (Payne, 
Lambert, & Jacoby, 2001). The IRAP data from Experiment 3 indicate a similar effect 
and suggests that the weapons influenced the discriminations of race, even though 
they were actually irrelevant to correct responding.  
One of the key contrasts between Experiments 2 and 3 attempted to determine 
which would generate better IRAP effects for racial prejudice. Although the data 
favoured the latter in this regard, it was difficult to determine whether this resulted 
from the use of pictures per se, or the presentation of weapons. To some extent, the 
data from Experiment 4 in particular resolved this issue and indicated that racial 
pictures per se do not necessarily generate strong IRAP effects.  
However, several IAT studies have indicated that stronger race effects are 
generally observed with pictures, rather than words. For example, Dasgupta et al. 
(2000) reported that faces of Black vs. White persons produced stronger racial bias on 
the IAT compared to Black vs. White names. According to Greenwald (1999), IAT 
effects are not as strong for words as pictures because pictures are aided by visual 
discriminations, while words are not. The current research was the first IRAP work to 
present picture stimuli, rather than words, so more research will be needed to 
determine which generates the better effects. To some extent, however, this will also 
likely depend on the types of implicit attitudes that are targeted. 
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The use of pictures, however, creates the added possibility that the outcomes 
do not reflect genuine racial preferences, but simply participants’ greater familiarity 
with White faces over Black. This suggestion is supported by findings in which 
frequent exposure to previously neutral stimuli enhances self-reported preference for 
those stimuli (Zajonc, 1968). However, several studies suggest that this possibility 
may not explain IAT effects for race. First, Ottaway, Hayden and Oakes (2001) 
controlled for familiarity while assessing attitudes to Black, White and Hispanic 
names and found that White participants still expressed automatic preferences for 
White names over the others. Second, American participants have been found to 
exhibit greater automatic preferences for unfamiliar American faces than familiar 
Russian faces (Rudman, Greenwald, Mellott, & Schwartz, 1999). Third, White 
Americans who have had extensive exposure to Black and other racial groups, still 
show significantly racist IAT effects. Taken together, these facts suggest that obvious 
familiarity with the in-group cannot discount in-group vs. out-group preferences. 
Another issues relating to the to use of picture stimuli when investigating race 
is highlighted by Eberherdt et al. This study shows that participants show more 
prejudice to Black persons with very black skin compared to Black persons of 
relatively pale skin. In Experiments 3 to 6 the picture stimuli we employed depicted 
Black men with relatively pale sink. Given the research by Eberherdt et al it is likely 
that we would have found a stronger anti-Black effect if we had employed picture 
stimuli depicting very Black men. 
 Perhaps a better question for the IRAP research program here concerns the 
impact of the safe/dangerous dimension we chose to target in all five studies of race. 
Indeed, we selected this over, for example, the more basic good vs. bad distinction, 
because we thought that the more extreme dimension would generate stronger implicit 
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outcomes. Our data suggest that this was not necessarily the case, although it is 
difficult to tell what role the dimension played here, because we did not 
systematically compare White and Black on any other dimension. However, perhaps 
our selection was counter-productive in that the specificity of safe vs. dangerous 
requires more experience of different racial groups in order to create a strong IRAP 
effect, but more simplistic categorisations such as White-good/Black-bad may create 
these effects more readily. This view would lend support to our previous argument 
that our race IRAP did not show as strong anti-Black effects as the IAT because we 
involved Irish rather than American participants. Again, more IRAP research will be 
needed to separate out the different magnitude of effects that may be obtained when 
racial groups are compared along different dimensions and with different participant 
groups. 
 Although the weak IRAP effects in Experiments 5 and 6 are perhaps most 
readily accounted for in terms of unacceptably small cell sizes, the sub-division of the 
more common four trial-types into eight was a useful addition to these studies 
involving complex visual arrays. Without analysis at this level, it would have been 
very difficult to tease apart the potential influence of the two types of items held by 
the men in the pictures. Indeed, analysis at this level would have been basically 
impossible without using the D-IRAP algorithm, which appears to offer a significant 
analytic advance over previous analyses of the response latency data.   
 Another issue for discussion that arose in Chapter 3 was the question of 
explicit measures. Five explicit measures were employed in Chapter 3 (the Modified 
Modern Racism Scale (MMRS), the Discrimination and Diversity Scale (DDS), the 
Racial Experience Questionnaire (REQ), the Feeling Thermometer and a series of 
Likert scales). We considered it necessary to use all of these measures as each 
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measure gave us a different perspective of participant’s attitudes to race. The Modern 
Racism Scale (MRS) and the Discrimination and Diversity Scale (DDS) are two of 
the explicit measures of racial attitudes that have been most commonly used in 
conjunction with implicit measures of race and therefore allow us to compare our 
research(e.g., Dasgupta et al., 2000; Greenwald et al., 1998; Wittenbrink et al., 1997). 
In Chapter 2, we employed a modified version of the MRS, which is shorter than the 
original version and is more relevant to an Irish population. We also employed the 
DDS, a measure of discrimination on the basis of race and also openness to embracing 
cultural diversity in our country. By using these measures we had the benefit of being 
consistent with established research.  
 The feeling thermometer and Likert measures give a reflection of participant’s 
global or general attitudes. These measures were included as there is evidence to 
suggest that implicit measures correlated more frequently with explicit measures of 
global attitudes such as semantic differential ratings or feeling thermometers than to 
more complex policy related measures, like the MRS (Dovidio, Kawakami, & Beach 
2003). This is illustrated by Dasgupta, McGee, Greenwald, & Banaji (2000) who 
found that two IAT measures of racial prejudice correlated more strongly with 
semantic differential (rs = .24 and .38) and feeling thermometer (rs = .23 and .21) 
measures than with the MRS (rs = -.13 and .02) and a diversity scale (rs = -.02 
and.14). This effect has also been found by Greenwald and Farnham (2000), who 
found a significant correlation between implicit self-esteem and feeling thermometers 
(r = .06) but no significant correlations with any other explicit measure (average r = 
.17). Likewise, in IRAP research Vahey, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart 
(in press) showed a correlation between implicit self-esteem and feeling 
thermometers.  
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 The REQ was a closed questionnaire was designed specifically for our 
experimental purposes. The purpose of this measure was to explore the relationship 
between racial bias and actual exposure contact with members of another race. Each 
of these explicit measures was important in its own way, although in some respects it 
could be argued that the DDS was one of the most important measures to use in the 
current research. The DDS is the only measure used in this research that is identical to 
that used in other implicit studies, as we used a modified version of the MRS and the 
Likert measures, feeling thermometers and REQ were specific to this research. 
 
Chapter 4: Summary of Findings from Experiments 7 and 8 
The third aim of the current thesis was to examine the utility of the IRAP as a 
measure of clinically relevant implicit cognitions. In Experiment 7, participants were 
required to indicate their agreement or disagreement with a range of statements that 
reflected high self-esteem (i.e. were positive about the self) or reflected low self-
esteem (i.e. were negative about the self). Because the study was also concerned with 
whether or not the IRAP would correlate with an explicit measure of self, the positive 
and negative statements presented in the IRAP were taken directly from the 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES) and participants also completed this as an 
explicit measure.  
The findings indicated that participants significantly confirmed that they 
agreed with the positive (high self-esteem) statements and significantly disconfirmed 
that they disagreed with them. They also disconfirmed that they agreed with the 
negative statements, although this effect was non-significant. They had no strong 
reaction to whether they disagreed with the negative statements. Although these 
findings were largely as expected from participants who all scored as high in self-
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esteem on the explicit RSES, there were no significant correlations between the two 
measures. 
In Experiment 8, we used the IRAP to explore implicit attitudes towards 
acceptance and avoidance. For this purpose, we selected undergraduate students who 
showed an explicit propensity towards high acceptance/low avoidance on the 
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ-2). In order to enhance the potential 
overlap between the two types of measure, as we had done in Experiment 7, we took 
opposing statements directly from the AAQ and inserted them into the IRAP as target 
stimuli. The results indicated that participants significantly confirmed that they agreed 
with the acceptance statements, but all other effects were non-significant. Closer 
inspection of the trial-type data, however, were as expected and showed that 
participants disconfirmed that they agreed with the avoidance statements and 
confirmed that they disagreed with them. In spite of this overlap of implicit evidence 
with the outcomes on the AAQ, there was no significance correlation between the two 
measures.  
 
Theoretical Issue Arising From Chapter 4 
Participants in Experiments 7 and 8 appeared to find it more difficult to 
respond to negative statements than positive and this finding is consistent with the 
literature on reasoning and problem-solving, which provides evidence for a “top-
down” cognitive processing bias toward confirming rather than disconfirming a 
postulate (see Eysenck & Keane, 2000, for a review). Hence, increased cognitive load 
on these trials may have reduced automaticity, thus weakening IRAP effects.  
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Theoretical Issue Arising from the Thesis 
 One of the secondary aims of the current research program was to examine the 
relationship between implicit and explicit measures. This is a common aim in all 
published and unpublished IRAP studies and practically all published IAT studies.  
There is considerable debate within the field of implicit cognition concerning 
whether or not researchers ‘should’ expect to find explicit-implicit correlations in a 
given context and in simple terms the general trend is that sometimes there are 
correlations and sometimes there are not. Indeed, there is not even clear evidence of a 
pattern one way or the other in the measurement of specific attitudes. According to 
Greenwald et al. (2003), the greater the concordance between explicit and implicit 
measures, the greater the validity of what is being measured. Alternatively, Dovidio 
and Fazio (1992) have argued that the magnitude of the correlation depends upon 
participants’ motivation and opportunity to deliberate, such that high motivation and 
opportunity produce low explicit-implicit correlations. This latter view has 
considerable support from the facts that some of the weakest correlations in the area 
are reported in the measurement of the most socially-sensitive attitudes and it is well-
established that participants have a strong desire to try to control self-perceived 
prejudices (Ziegert & Hanges, 2005). Hence, it is not surprising that discrepancies 
between explicit and implicit measures are observed in the context of studying race, 
as was the case here for the majority of the data. 
Discordance between explicit and implicit measures has led to further 
questions about what is actually being targeted across the different methodologies 
(Cameron, Alvarez, & Bargh, 2000). Some researchers, for example, have argued that 
the different measures simply target different evaluations of the same attitude and 
Fazio and Olson (2003) suggested that this difference results from the fact that 
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implicit attitudes are probably not available to conscious processing or introspection.  
Indeed, Greenwald et al. (1998) thus described the two types of evaluations as 
‘dissociated’, while Wilson (2000) referred to them as ‘independent’. Blaire (2001) 
has even gone so far as to suggest that implicit and explicit attitudes are independent 
cognitive representations that result from different psychological processes. There is 
considerable support for the idea that implicit and explicit cognitions operate like a 
dual processing system. Advocates of this argument include Devine (1989), Haeffel, 
Abramson, Brazy, Shah, Teachman and Nosek, (2007) and Neely (1977).   
Structural similarity has also been shown to be a variable that effects 
correlations between measures. For example, Ajzen and Fishbein (1977) reported that 
structural similarity increased correlations between different explicit measures. 
However, the findings from the last two experiments here suggest that perhaps this 
relationship does not hold across explicit and implicit measures, when the two failed 
to correlate even though the statements from the explicit measure comprised the target 
stimuli in the implicit measure. 
A behaviour analytic and RFT account of the relationship between implicit 
and explicit attitudes is referred to as the Relational Elaboration and Coherence 
(REC) Model. The REC model assumes that an instance of implicit responding, such 
as an IRAP effect, when produced under appropriate time-pressure, is driven largely 
by immediate and relatively brief relational responses, whereas explicit measures 
reflect extended and coherent relational networks. 
  
Concluding Comments 
 The current thesis was ambitious in its aim to conduct three different types of 
IRAP research. The data from Experiment 1 were as expected and showed strong 
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IRAP effects for all conditions, as well as offering insight into the screen presentation 
format that facilitates significant effects. The data from the more ambitious later sets 
of experiments were not as straightforward. That is, while we often recorded effects 
that we had predicted, we equally often failed to record effects that we expected and 
on some occasions we even recorded effects that we had not expected. This variability 
was particularly apparent in the race studies. On balance, however, this was a 
complex array of studies that presented complex visual arrays on screen. Our findings 
on the clinical phenomena were more positive and generally more in line with 
predictions. Taken together, therefore, the IRAP did appear to meet a range of 
challenges as a measure of implicit attitudes to race, self-esteem and acceptance and 
demonstrated that the future for the methodology as a tool for measuring implicit 
attitudes is promising. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
References 
 135 
References 
Ahern, A.L., & Hetherington, M.M., (2006). The thin ideal and body image: An 
experimental study of Implicit Attitudes. Psychology of Addictive Behaviors, 20, 
338–342. 
Ajzen, I., & Fishbein, M. (1977). Attitude–behavior relations: A theoretical analysis and 
review of empirical research. Psychological Bulletin, 84, 888–918.  
Amodio, D.M., & Devine, P.G. (2006). Stereotyping and evaluation in implicit race bias: 
Evidence for independent constructs and unique effects on behavior. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 91, 652-661. 
Barnes, D. (1994). Stimulus equivalence and relational frame theory. The Psychological 
Record, 44, 91-124. 
Barnes, D. (1996). Naming as a technical term: Sacrificing behavior analysis at the altar 
of popularity. Invited commentary for the Journal of the Experimental Analysis of 
Behavior, 65, 264-267. 
Barnes, D., Browne, M., Smeets, P.M., & Roche, B. (1995). A transfer of functions and a 
conditional transfer of functions through equivalence relations in three to six year 
old children. The Psychological Record, 45, 405-430. 
Barnes, D., & Holmes, Y. (1991). Radical behaviorism, stimulus equivalence, and human 
cognition. The Psychological Record, 41, 19-31. 
Barnes, D., & Keenan, M. (1993). Concurrent activities and instructed human fixed-
interval performance. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 59, 501-
520. 
 136 
Barnes, D., & Roche, B. (1996). Relational frame theory and stimulus equivalence are 
fundamentally different: A reply to Saunders' commentary. The Psychological 
Record, 46, 489-507. 
Barnes-Holmes, Y., Barnes-Holmes, D., Smeets, P.M., Strand, P., & Friman, P. (2004). 
Testing and training relational responding in accordance with the relational frame 
of opposite in young children. International Journal of Psychology and 
Psychological Therapy, 4, 531-558. 
Barnes-Holmes, D., Barnes-Holmes, Y., Power, P., Hayden, E., Milne, R., & Stewart, I. 
(2006). Do you really know what you believe? Developing the Implicit Relational 
Assessment Procedure (IRAP) as a direct measure of implicit beliefs. The Irish 
Psychologist, 32, 169-177. 
Barnes-Holmes, D., Cochrane, A., Barnes-Holmes, Y., & Stewart, I. (2004). “Offer it up” 
and psychological acceptance: Empirical evidence for your grandmother's wisdom. 
The Irish Psychologist, 31, 72-78. 
Barnes-Holmes, D., Dymond, S., Roche, B., & Grey, I. (1999). Language and cognition. 
The Psychologist, 12, 500-504. 
Barnes-Holmes, D., Murtagh, L., Barnes-Holmes, Y., & Stewart, I. (in press). Using the 
Implicit Association Test and the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure 
toMeasure Attitudes Towards Meat and Vegetables in Vegetarians and Meat-
Eaters. Psychological Record. 
Beck, A.T. (1976). Cognitive therapy and emotional disorders. New York: International 
University Press. 
Baron, A.S., & Banaji, M.R. (2006). The development of implicit attitudes: Evidence of 
race evaluations from ages 6 to 10 and adulthood. Psychological Science, 17, 53-58 
 137 
Bernard, L.C., Hutchison, S., Lavin, A., & Pennington, P. (1996). Ego-strength, 
hardiness, self-esteem, self-efficacy, optimism, and maladjustment: Health-related 
personality constructs and the "Big Five" model of personality. Assessment, 3, 115-
131. 
Blascovich, J., & Tomaka, J. (1991). Measures of self-esteem. In J. P. Robinson, P. R. 
Shaver, and L. S. Wrightsman, (Eds.) Measures of personality and social 
psychological attitudes, (Volume I, pp. 115-160). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.  
Bond, F.W., Hayes, S.C., Baer, R.A., Carpenter, K.M., Orcutt, H.K., Waltz, T., et al. 
(2008). Preliminary psychometric properties of the Acceptance and Action 
Questionnaire-II: A revised measure of psychological flexibility and acceptance. 
Manuscript submitted for publication.  
Correll, J., Park, B., Judd, C.M., & Wittenbrink, B. (2002). The police officer’s dilemma: 
Using ethnicity to disambiguate potentially threatening individuals. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 1314-1329. 
Cullen, C., & Barnes-Holmes, D. (in press). Implicit pride and prejudice: A heterosexual 
phenomenon? In T.G. Morrison, and M.A. Morrison (Eds.), Modern Prejudice. 
New York: Nova Science. 
Cullinan, V., Barnes-Holmes, D., & Smeets, P.M. (2000). A precursor to the relational 
evaluation procedure: Analyzing stimulus equivalence II. The Psychological 
Record, 50, 467-492. 
Cullinan, V., Barnes-Holmes, D., & Smeets, P.M. (2001). A precursor to the relational 
evaluation procedure: The search for the contextual cues that control equivalence 
responding. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 76, 339-349. 
 138 
D’Amato, M.R., & Colombo, M. (1985). Auditory matching-to-sample in monkeys 
(Cebus apella). Animal Learning and Behavior, 13, 375–382. 
D’Amato, M.R., & Worsham, R.W. (1974). Retrieval cues and short term memory in 
Capuchin monkeys. Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 86, 
274-282. 
Dasgupta, N., McGhee, D.E., Greenwald, A.G., & Banaji, M.R. (2000). Automatic 
preference for White Americans: Eliminating the familiarity explanation. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 36, 316-328. 
Dawson, D.L., Barnes-Holmes, D., Gresswell, D.M., Hart, A.J.P., & Gore, N.J. (in press). 
Assessing the implicit beliefs of sexual offenders using the Implicit Relational 
Assessment Procedure: A first study. Sexual Abuse: A Journal of Research and 
Treatment. 
de Houwer, J. (2002). The Implicit Association Test as a tool for studying dysfunctional 
associations in psychopathology: Strengths and limitations. Journal of Behaviour 
Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 33, 115-133. 
de Houwer, J. (2003). The extrinsic affective Simon task. Experimental Psychology, 50, 
77-85.  
de Jong, P.J. (2002). Implicit self-esteem and social anxiety: Differential self-positivity 
effects in high and low anxious individuals. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 40, 
501-508. 
de Jong, P.J., Pasman, W., Kindt, M., & van den Hout, M.A. (2001). A reaction time 
paradigm to assess complaint-specific (implicit) dysfunctional beliefs. Behaviour 
Research and Therapy, 39, 101–113. 
 139 
de Jong, P.J., van den Hout, M., Rietbroek, H., & Huijdig, J. (2003). Dissociations 
between implicit and explicit attitudes toward phobic stimuli. Cognition and 
Emotion, 17, 521-545. 
Devine, P.G. (1989). Stereotypes and prejudice: Their automatic and controlled 
components. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56, 5-18.  
Donahoe, J.W., & Palmer, D.C. (1994). Learning and complex behaviour. Needham 
Heights, M.A.: Allyn and Bacon. 
Duncan, B.L. (1976). Differiental social perception and attribution of intergroup 
violence: Testing the lower limits of stereotyping of blacks. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 34, 590-598. 
Dunham, Y., Baron, A.S., & Banaji, M.R. (2006). From American city to Japanese 
village: A cross-cultural investigation of implicit race attitudes. Child Development, 
77, 1268-1281. 
Dymond, S., & Barnes, D. (1994). A transfer of self-discrimination response functions 
through equivalence relations. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 
62, 251-267. 
Dymond, S., & Barnes, D. (1995). A transformation of self-discrimination response 
functions in accordance with the arbitrarily applicable relations of sameness, more-
than, and less-than. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 64, 163-184. 
Dymond, S., & Barnes, D. (1996). A transformation of self-discrimination response 
functions in accordance with the arbitrarily applicable relations of sameness and 
opposition. The Psychological Record, 46, 271-300. 
 140 
Dymond, S., & Barnes, D. (1998). The effects of prior equivalence testing and detailed 
verbal instructions on derived self-discrimination transfer: A follow-up study.  The 
Psychological Record, 48, 147-170. 
Eberhardt, J.L., Goff, P.A., Purdie, V.J., & Davies, P.G. (2004). Seeing black: Race, 
crime and visual processing.  Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87, 
876-893. 
Edwards, C.A., Jagielo, J.A., Zentall, T.R., & Hogan, D.E. (1982). Acquired equivalence 
and distinctiveness in matching to sample by pigeons: Mediation by reinforcer-
specific expectancies. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior 
Processes, 8, 244-259. 
Egloff, B., & Schmukle, S.C. (2002). Predictive validity on an Implicit Association Test 
for measuring anxiety. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83,1141-
1455. 
Eysenck, M.W., & Keane, M.T. (2000). Cognitive psychology: A student’s handbook  
 (4th ed). East Sussex, UK: Psychology Press Ltd. 
Farnham, S.D., Greenwald, A.G., & Banaji, M.R. (1999). Implicit self-esteem. In D. 
Abrams, and M.A. Hogg (Eds.), Social identity and social cognition (pp. 230-248). 
Oxford, U.K.: Blackwell Publishers. 
Gilbert., D.T., & Hixon. J.T. (1991). The trouble with thinking: activation and application 
of stereotypic beliefs. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60, 509–17. 
Gray, N.S., Brown, A.S., MacCulloch, M.J., & Smith, J. (2005). An implicit test of the 
associations between children and sex in pedophiles. Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology, 114, 304-308. 
 141 
Greenwald, A.G. (1990). What cognitive representations underlie social attitudes? 
Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 28, 254-260. 
Greenwald, A.G., & Banaji, M.R. (1995). Implicit social cognition: Attitudes, self-
esteem, and stereotypes. Psychological Review, 102, 4-27. 
Greenwald, A.G., Banaji, M.R., Rudman, L. A., Farnham, S.D., Nosek, B.A., & Mellott, 
D.S. (2002). A unified theory of implicit attitudes, stereotypes, self-esteem, and 
self-concept. Psychological Review, 109, 3-25. 
Greenwald, A.G., & Breckler, S. J. (1985). To whom is the self presented? In B.R. 
Schlenker (Ed.), The self and social life (pp. 126-145). New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Greenwald, A.G., & Farnham, S.D. (2000). Using the Implicit Association Test to 
measure self-esteem and self-concept. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 79, 1022-1038. 
Greenwald, A.G., McGhee, D.E., & Schwarz, J.L.K. (1998). Measuring individual 
differences in implicit cognition: The Implicit Association Test. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 1464-1480. 
Greenwald, A.G., Nosek, B.A., Banaji, M.R., & Klauer, K.C. (2005). Validity of the 
salience asymmetry interpretation of the IAT: Comment on Rothermund and 
Wentura (2004). Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 134, 420-425. 
Greenwald, A.G., Nosek, B.A., & Banaji, M.R. (2003). Understanding and using the 
Implicit Association Test: I. An improved scoring algorithm. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 85, 197-216. 
 142 
Greenwald, A.G., Oakes, M.A., & Hoffman, H.G. (2003). Targets of discrimination: 
Effects of race on responses to weapons holders. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 39, 399-405. 
Grover, V.P., Keel, P.K., & Mitchell, J.P. (2003). Gender differences in implicit weight 
identity. International Journal of Eating Disorders, 34, 125-135. 
Hastings, R.P. (1997). Measuring staff perceptions of challenging behaviour: The 
Challenging Behaviour Attributions Scale (CHABA). Journal of Intellectual 
Disabilities Research, 41, 495–501. 
Haeffel, G.J., Abramson, L.Y., Brazy, P.C., Shah, J.Y., Teachman, B.A., & Noesk, B.A. 
(2007). Explicit and implicit cognition: A preliminary test of a dual-process theory 
of cognitive vulnerability to depression. Behavior Research and Therapy, 45, 1155-
1167. 
Hayes, S.C., & Barnes, D. (1997). Analysing derived stimulus relations requires more 
than the concept of stimulus class. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of 
Behavior, 68, 235-270. 
Hayes, S.C., Barnes-Holmes, D., & Roche, B. (2001). Relational frame theory: A post-
Skinnerian account of human language and cognition. New York: Plenum. 
Hayes, S.C., Bissett, R., Roget, N., Padilla, M., Kohlenburg, B.S., Fischer, G., Masuda, 
A., Pistorello, J., Rye, A.K., Berry, K., & Nicols, R., (2004). The impact of 
acceptance and commitment training and multi-cultural training on the stigmatising 
attitudes and professional burnout of substance abuse counsellors. Behaviour 
Therapy, 35, 821-835. 
 143 
Hayes, S.C., Bissett, R.T., Strosahl, K.D., Wilson, K.D., Pistorello, J., Dykstra, T. A., et 
al. (2000). Psychometric properties of the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire 
(AAQ). Non-published manuscript. (Obtained by request from first author). 
Hayes, S.C., & Hayes, L.J. (1989). The verbal action of the listener as a basis for rule-
governance. In S.C. Hayes (Ed.) Rule-governance behavior: Cognition, 
contingencies, and instructional control. New York: Plenum Press.  
Hayes, S.C., Strosahl, K.D., & Wilson, K.D. (1999). Acceptance and Commitment 
Therapy. An experimental approach to behavior change. New York: Guildford. 
Hayes, S.C., Strosahl, K.D.(Eds.) (2004). A practical guide to Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy. New York: Springer-Verlag. 
Hayes, S.C., Wilson, K.G., Gifford, E.V., Follete, V.M., & Strosahl, K.D. (1996). 
Experiential avoidance and behavioral disorders: A functional dimensional 
approach to diagnosis and treatment. Journal of Consulting and Clinical 
Psychology, 64, 1152-1168. 
James, W. (1890). Principles of psychology (Vol. 1). New York: Henry Hold. 
Karpinski, A. (2004). Measuring self-esteem using the Implicit Association Test: The 
role of the other. Society for Personality and Social Psychology, 30, 22-34.  
Kernis, M.H., Weisenhunt, C.R., Waschull, S.B., Greenier, K.D., Berry, A.J., Herlocker, 
C.E., & Anderson, C.A. (1998). Multiple facets of self-esteem and their relations to 
depressive symptoms. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 24, 657-688. 
Koole, S.L. Dijksterhuis, A., & van Knippenberg, A. (2001). What’s in a name: implicit 
self-esteem and the automatic self. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
80, 669-85. 
 144 
Lang, P.J., Bradley, M.M., & Cuthbert, B.N. (1999). International Affective Picture 
System (IAPS): Instruction manual and affective ratings. Technical report A-4. 
Florida: University of Florida, The Center for Research in Psychophysiology. 
Leader, G., Barnes-Holmes, D., & Smeets, P.M. (2000). Establishing equivalence 
relations using a respondent-type procedure III. The Psychological Record, 50, 63-
78. 
Leader, G., & Barnes-Holmes, D. (2001). Establishing fraction-decimal equivalence 
using a respondent-type training procedure. The Psychological Record, 51, 151-
166. 
Lindeman, M., & Verkasalo, M. (1995). Personality, situation, and positive-negative 
asymmetry in socially desirable responding. European Journal of Personality, 9, 
125-34. 
Marial, J.B. (2004). Spanish adaptation of the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire 
(AAQ). International Journal of Psychology and Psychological Therapy, 4, 505-
515. 
McConahay, J.B. (1983). Modern racism and modern discrimination: The effects of race, 
racial attitudes, and context on simulated hiring decisions. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 9, 551-558. 
McConaghy, J.B. (1986). Modern racism, ambivalence, and the Modern Racism Scale. In 
J.F. Dovido, and S.L. Gaertner (Eds.), Prejudice, discrimination and racism (pp. 
91-125). Orlando, FL: Academic Press.  
 145 
McHugh, L., Barnes-Holmes, Y., O'Hora, D., & Barnes-Holmes, D. (2004). Perspective-
taking: A relational frame analysis. The Experimental Analysis of Human Behavior 
Bulletin, 22, 4-10. 
Neely, J.H. (1977). Semantic priming and retrieval from lexical memory: Roles of 
inhibitionless spreading activation and limited-capacity attention. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 106, 226-254. 
Nosek, B.A., & Banaji, M.R. (2001). The Go/no-go Association Task. Social Cognition, 
19, 625-666.  
Nunes, K.L., Firestone, P., & Baldwin, M.W. (2007). Indirect assessment of cognitions of 
child sexual abusers with the Implicit Association Test. Criminal Justice and 
Behavior, 34, 454-475. 
Nuttin, J.M. (1985). Narcissism beyond Gestalt and awareness: The name letter effect. 
European Journal of Social Psychology, 15, 353-61. 
Ottaway, S.A., Hayden, D.C., & Oakes, M.A. (2001). Implicit attitudes and racism. 
Effect of word familiarity and frequency on the Implicit Association Test. Social 
Cognition, 19, 97-144. 
Payne, B.K. (2001). Prejudice and perception: The role of automatic and controlled 
processes in misperceiving a weapon. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 81, 181-192. 
Payne, B.K. (2006). Weapon bias: Split second decisions and unintended stereotyping. 
Current Directions in Psychological Science, 15, 287-291. 
 146 
Payne, B.K., Burkley, M.A., & Stokes, M.B. (2008). Why do implicit and explicit 
attitudes test diverge? The role of structural fit. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 94, 16-31. 
Payne, B.K., Lambert, A.J., & Jacoby, L.L. (2002). Best laid plans: Effects of goals on 
accessibility bias and cognitive control in race-based misperceptions of weapons. 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 38, 384-396. 
Pelham, B.W., & Swann, W. B. (1989). From self-conceptions to self-worth: On           
          sources and structure of global self-esteem. Journal of Personality and Social                         
     Psychology, 57, 672-680. 
Pine, D.S., Mogg, K., Bradley, B.P., Monegomery, L., Monk, C.S., McClure, E., Guyer, 
A.E., Ernst, M., Charney, D.S., &  Kaufman, J. (2005). Attention bias to threat in 
maltreated children: Implications for vulnerability to stress-related 
psychopathology. American Journal of Psychiatry, 162, 291-296. 
Plant, E.A., & Devine, P.G. (1998). Internal and external motivation to respond without 
prejudice. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75, 811-832. 
Puliafico, A., & Kendall, P. (2006). Threat-related attentional bias in anxious youth: A 
review. Clinical Child and Family Review, 3-4, 162-180. 
Reese, H.W. (1968). The perception of stimulus relations: Discrimination learning and 
transposition. New York: Academic Press. 
Richeson, J.A., & Trawalter, S. (2008). The threat of appearing prejudiced and race-based 
attentional biases. Association for Psychological Science, 19, 98-102. 
Rippere, V. (1977). “What’s the thing to do when you’re feeling depressed?” – a pilot 
study. Behavior Research and Therapy, 15, 185-191. 
 147 
Roefs, A., & Jansen, A., (2002). Implicit and explicit attitudes toward high-fat foods in 
obesity. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 111, 517-521. 
Rosenberg, M. (1965). Society and the adolescent self-image. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
Rudman, L.A., & Ashmore, R.D. (2007). Discrimination and the Implicit Association 
Test. Group Processes and Intergrroup Relations, 10, 359-372. 
Sagar, H.A., & Schofield, J.W. (1980). Racial and behavioral cues in black and white 
children's perceptions of ambiguously aggressive acts. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 19, 590-598. 
Scanlon, G. (2008). The utility of the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP): 
Measuring self-esteem profiles of Children with Special Educational Needs and 
Assessing the Attitudes of Teachers to Children with Emotional Behavioural 
Difficulties in Mainstream Education. Unpublished doctoral thesis. 
Schlenker, B.R., & Britt, T.W. (1999). Beneficial impression management: Strategically 
controlling information to help friends. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 76, 559-573. 
Schlenker, B.R., & Britt, T.W. (2001). Strategically controlling information to help 
friends: Effects of empathy and friendship strength on beneficial impression 
management. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 37, 357-372. 
Sackeim, H.A., & Gur, R.C. (1978). Self-deception, self-confrontation, and 
consciousness. In G.E. Schwartz, and D. Shapiro (Eds.), Consciousness and self-
regulation: Advances in Research (Vol. 2, pp. 139-197). New York: Plenum. 
 
 148 
Schmidtke, V., & Heuer, H. (1997). Task integration as a factor in secondary-task effects 
on sequence learning. Psychological Research, 60, 53-71. 
Schuman, H., Steeth, C., & & Bobo, L. (1997). Racial attitudes in America: Trends and 
interpretations. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Sidman, M. (1971). Reading audio-visual equivalences. Journal of Speech and Hearing 
Research, 14, 5-13. 
Simon. J.R. (1990). The effects of an irrelevant directional cure on human information 
processing. In R.W. Proctor, and T.G. Reeve (Eds), Stimulus-response 
compatibility: An integrated perspective (pp. 31-86). New York: North Holland. 
Smeets, P.M., Leader, G., & Barnes, D. (1997). Establishing stimulus classes with adults 
and children using a respondent training procedure: A follow-up study. The 
Psychological Record, 47, 285-308. 
Smith-McAllen, A., Johnson, B.T., Dovidio, J.F., & Pearson, A.R. (2006). Black and 
white: The role of colour bias in implicit race bias. Social Cognition, 24, 46-73. 
Spalding, L.R., & Hardin, C.D. (1999). Unconscious unease and self-handicapping: 
Behavioral consequences of individual differences in implicit and explicit self-
esteem. Psychological Science, 10, 535–539.  
Stacy, A.W., Newcomb, M.D., & Ames, S.L. (2000). Implicit cognition and HIV risk 
behavior. Journal of Behavioural Medicine, 23, 475-499. 
Stadler, M.A. (1995). Role of attention in implicit serial learning. Journal of 
Experimental. Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 21, 674-685. 
 149 
Steele, D.L., & Hayes, S.C. (1991). Stimulus equivalence and arbitrary applicable 
relational responding. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 56, 555-
561.  
Stewart, I., Barnes-Holmes, D., Roche, B., & Smeets, P.M. (2001). Generating derived 
relational networks via the abstraction of common physical properties: A possible 
model of analogical reasoning. The Psychological Record, 51, 381-408. 
Teachman, B.A., Gregg, A., & Woody, S.R. (2001). Implicit processing of fear-relevant 
stimuli among individuals with snake and spider fears. Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology, 110, 226-235. 
Teachman, B.A., & Woody, S.R. (2003). Automatic processing in spider phobia: Implicit 
fear associations over the course of treatment. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 112, 
100-109. 
Tavassoli, N.T., & Yih, H.L. (2004). The effect of attribute order on judgment in Chinese 
and English. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 10, 258-266. 
Tulving, E., Schacter, D., & Stark, H.A. (1982). Priming events in word fragment 
completion are independent on recognition memory. Learning Memory and 
Cognition, 8, 336-341. 
Varitanian, L.R., Herman, C.P., & Polivy, J. (2004). Accuracy in the estimation of body 
weight: An alternate test of the motivated-distortion hypothesis. The International 
Journal of Eating Disorders, 36, 69-75. 
Vitale, A., Barnes-Holmes, Y., Barnes-Holmes, D., & Campbell, C. (2008). Facilitating 
responding in accordance with the relational frame of comparison: Systematic 
empirical analyses. The Psychological Record, 58, 365-390. 
 150 
Warrington, E.K., & Weinskrantz. L. (1968). New method of testing long-term retention 
with special inference to amnesic patients. Nature, 217, 972-974. 
Wegner, D.M. (1994).White bears and other unwanted thoughts. New York: Guilford. 
Wenzlaff, R.M., Wengar, D.M., & Klein, S.B. (1991). The role of thought suppression in 
the bonding of thought and mood. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
60, 500-508. 
Wiers, R.W., de Jong, P.J., Haverman, R., & Jelicic, M. (2004). How to change implicit 
drug use-related cognitions in prevention: A transdisciplinary integration of 
findings from experimental psychopathology, social cognition, memory, and 
experimental learning psychology. Substance Use and Misuse, 39, 1625-1684  
Wiers, R., van Woerden, N., & Smulders, F. (2002). Implicit and explicit alcohol-related 
cognitions in heavy and light drinkers. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 111, 648-
658. 
Wilson, K.G., Hayes, S.C., Gregg, J., & Zettle, R.D. (2001). Psychopathology and 
psychotherapy. In S.C. Hayes, D. Barnes-Holmes, and B. Roche. (Eds). Relational 
frame theory: A post-Skinnerian account of human language and cognition. New 
York: Plenum. 
Wittenbrink, B., Judd, C.M., & Park, B. (1997). Evidence for racial prejudice at the 
implicit level and its relationship with questionnaire measures. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 72, 262-274. 
Wulfert, E., & Hayes, S.C. (1988). The transfer of conditional sequencing through 
conditional equivalence classes. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 
50, 125-144. 
 151 
Yamaguchi, S., Greenwald, A.G., Banaji, M.R., Murakami, F., Chen, D., Shiomura, K., 
Kobayashi, C., Cai, H., & Krendl, A. (2007). Apparent universality of positive 
implicit self-esteem. Psychological Science, 18, 498-500. 
Yarmey, A.D., & Jones, H.T.P. (1983). Is eyewitness identification a matter of common 
sense? In S. Lloyd-Bostock, and B.R. Clifford (Eds), Evaluating witness research: 
Recent psychological research and new perspectives, (pp.13-40). New York: 
Wiley. 
 
  
  
 
  
 
Table of Appendices  
Appendix A   Examples of the Likert scales representing stimuli employed in Experiment 1  
Appendix B   The Modified Modern Racism Scale  
Appendix C  The Discrimination and Diversity Scale (DDS)  
Appendix D  The Racial Experience Questionnaire (REQ)  
Appendix E  The Feeling Thermometers employed in Experiments 2‐6  
Appendix F  Examples of the Likert scales representing stimuli employed in Experiment 2  
Appendix G  An example of Likert scales representing stimuli employed in Experiments 2‐6  
Appendix H  The Rosenberg Self‐Esteem Scale (RSES)  
Appendix I  The Acceptance and Avoidance Questionnaire (AAQ‐2)    
Appendix 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Examples of the Likert scales representing the stimuli employed in 
Experiment 1 
Caress 
           Please indicate the extent to which you would rate the word above as pleasant or unpleasant by circling the appropriate number. 
 
  
  
 
Freedom 
           Please indicate the extent to which you would rate the word above as pleasant or unpleasant by circling the appropriate number. 
 
 
Abuse 
           Please indicate the extent to which you would rate the word above as pleasant or unpleasant by circling the appropriate number. 
Extremely Unpleasant                                                            Extremely Pleasant            ‐6      ‐5      ‐4      ‐3      ‐2       ‐1       0        1       2        3        4       5       6   
Extremely Unpleasant                                                            Extremely Pleasant            ‐6      ‐5      ‐4      ‐3      ‐2       ‐1       0        1       2        3        4       5       6   
Extremely Unpleasant                                                            Extremely Pleasant            ‐6      ‐5      ‐4      ‐3      ‐2       ‐1       0        1       2        3        4       5       6   
Appendix B 
The Modified Modern Racism Scale (MMRS) 
Please  indicate  the  extent  to  which  you  agree  or  disagree  with  each  of  these 
statements by circling a number on each scale, where ­2 indicates that you strongly 
disagree,  ­1  indicates  that  you  slightly  disagree,  0  that  you  neither  disagree  nor 
agree, 1 indicates that you slightly agree and  2 indicates that  you strongly agree. 
  It is easy to understand the anger of Black people  Strongly Disagree     ‐2         ‐1         0         1         2     Strongly Agree ____________________________________________________  Blacks are getting too demanding in their push for equal rights  Strongly Disagree     ‐2         ‐1         0         1         2     Strongly Agree ___________________________________________________  Over the past few years Blacks have gotten more economically than they deserve  Strongly Disagree     ‐2        ‐1         0          1         2     Strongly Agree ____________________________________________________    
Appendix C 
The Discrimination and Diversity Scale (DDS) 
Discrimination Scale Using the scale below as a guide please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each statement.  Members of ethnic minorities have a tendency to blame Whites too much for problems that are of their own doing 1‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐2‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐3‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐4‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐5 Strongly Disagree          Neutral          Strongly Agree    ___________________________________________  Members of ethnic minorities often exaggerate the extent to which they suffer from racial inequality 1‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐2‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐3‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐4‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐5 Strongly Disagree          Neutral          Strongly Agree _____________________________________________ 
 Black people often blame the system instead of looking at how they could improve their situation themselves 
 1‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐2‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐3‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐4‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐5 Strongly Disagree          Neutral          Strongly Agree _____________________________________________ 
Appendix C continued  
The Discrimination and Diversity Scale (DDS) 
Diversity Scale 
 Using the scale below as a guide please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each statement.  There is a real danger that too much emphasis on cultural diversity will tear Ireland apart 1‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐2‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐3‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐4‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐5 Strongly Disagree          Neutral          Strongly Agree    ___________________________________________   The desire of many ethnic minorities to maintain their cultural traditions impedes the achievement of racial equality 1‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐2‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐3‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐4‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐5 Strongly Disagree          Neutral          Strongly Agree _____________________________________________ 
 Whites need to learn about Black culture if positive inter‐ethnic relations are to be achieved 1‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐2‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐3‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐4‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐5 Strongly Disagree          Neutral          Strongly Agree _____________________________________________ 
Appendix D 
The Racial Experience Questionnaire 
 Subject No:_____________ Subject Age:____________ Male [  ]    Female [   ]   1. Do you know any Black people in Ireland? None [  ]  A handful  [   ]   Many  [   ] 2. Do you have any friends who are Black? None [  ]  A handful  [   ]   Many  [   ] 3. Do you work with any Black people? None [  ]  A handful  [   ]   Many  [   ] 4. Would you say that you have had one or more close friendships with a Black person? Yes  [  ]  No [   ]  5. Do many Black people live in your neighbourhood? None [  ]  A handful  [   ]   Many  [   ] 6. Would you  say that your experiences of meeting Black people have been positive or negative overall? Very Negative [  ] Negative [   ]     Equally Negative and Positive  [   ] Positive [  ] Very Positive [   ] 
Appendix E 
The Feeling Thermometers employed in Experiment 2­6   
           
Appendix F 
Examples of the Likert scales representing stimuli employed in 
Experiment 2 
 Please use the scale below to indicate which word in each pair is the most appropriate description of a Black person 
 
­3indicates that the word on the left is the most appropriate 
description of a Black person, 3 indicates that the word on the right is 
the most appropriate description of a Black person and 0 indicates that 
neither word is appropriate 
  SAFE                                                                                                 DANGERSOUS 1‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐2‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐3‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐4‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐5‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐6‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐7 Strongly Disagree          Neutral          Strongly Agree   Please indicate the extent to which you would rate the word above as pleasant or unpleasant by circling the appropriate number.  _________________________________________________________   FRIENDLY                                                                                              HOSTILE 1‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐2‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐3‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐4‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐5‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐6‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐7 Strongly Disagree          Neutral          Strongly Agree   Please indicate the extent to which you would rate the word above as pleasant or unpleasant by circling the appropriate number.  _________________________________________________________         
 
Appendix G 
An example of a Likert scale representing stimuli employed in       
Experiments  2­6   1) For each picture you are shown, please state what object the person is holding  2) Also please indicate the extent to which you would rate the person in the picture as safe or dangerous by circling a number on the scale below.  
Picture 1       The  object is a :____________________________________________     I would rate the person in Picture 1 as:         Please indicate the extent to which you would rate the person in each picture as safe or dangerous by circling the appropriate number.    
Extremely Safe                                                            Extremely Dangerous    ‐6      ‐5      ‐4      ‐3      ‐2       ‐1       0        1       2        3        4       5       6   
Appendix H 
The Rosenberg Self­Esteem Scale (RSES) 
Instructions: Below is a list of statements dealing with your general feelings about 
yourself. If you strongly agree, circle SA. If you agree with the statement, circle A.  If 
you disagree, circle D.  If you strongly disagree, circle SD.  
  
  
 
1 On the whole, I am satisfied with 
myself. 
 
SA A D SD 
2* At times, I think I am no good at 
all. 
SA A D SD 
3 I feel that I have a number of good 
qualities. 
SA A D SD 
4 I am able to do things as well as 
most other people. 
SA A D SD 
5* I feel I do not have much to be 
proud of. 
SA A D SD 
6* I certainly feel useless at times 
 
 
SA A D SD 
7 I feel that I’m a person of worth, at 
least on an equal plane with  
others. 
SA A D SD 
8* I wish I could have more respect 
for myself. 
 
SA A D SD 
9* All in all, I am inclined to feel that 
I am a failure 
SA A D SD 
10 I take a positive attitude toward 
myself. 
SA A D SD 
 *Indicates that item is negatively worded    
Appendix I 
The Acceptance and Avoidance Questionnaire­II (AAQ­II)   
Below you will find a list of statements. Please rate how true each statement is for you by 
circling a number next to it. Use the scale below to make your choice.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
never 
 true 
very seldom 
true 
seldom  
true 
sometimes  
true 
frequently  
true 
almost always 
true 
always  
true 
       
1. Its OK if I remember something unpleasant. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. My painful experiences and memories make it difficult for me to live a life that I 
would value. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. I’m afraid of my feelings. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. I worry about not being able to control my worries and feelings. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. My painful memories prevent me from having a fulfilling life. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. I am in control of my life. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. Emotions cause problems in my life. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. It seems like most people are handling their lives better than I am. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. Worries get in the way of my success. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. My thoughts and feelings do not get in the way of how I want to live my life. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
  
